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CHAPTER 1 
DOING AND ORGANIZING EUROPEAN POLICY WORK:  
A CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICES  
 
 
1.1 Background and aims of this study 
 
‘Europeanization’ is definitely one of the contemporary buzzwords in the world of 
government and public policy makers throughout Europe, just like ‘globalization’ is 
to economists. It is more than just a buzzword, however. Although agreement among 
experts about the precise figures turns out to be surprisingly difficult to obtain, there 
is little question that in recent decades a significant portion of hitherto national 
regulation and policy development is now being produced in European arenas. These 
Europeanized policymaking processes involve an intricate and often complex 
interplay between actors at the (sub)national and EU level. Europeanized policy 
arenas have developed distinctive rules, norms and practices that govern this 
interplay. Knowing how to leverage these distinct features is a crucial condition for 
any actor – be it a national ministry, a trans-national pressure group or a multinational 
firm – seeking to wield influence over European policymaking processes.  
 A sophisticated policy management capacity at the European stage is 
something that all Member States seek to achieve. They know that in order to 
safeguard their national interests, they need their representatives to understand and 
manipulate the peculiar agenda-setting mechanisms, institutional rhythms, 
opportunity structures and veto points of European policy making. It is what ministers 
whose portfolios are in highly Europeanized policy domains expect their civil 
servants to deliver. These expectations are not always met: numerous studies in 
different countries show that knowledge, institutional capacity and effective 
coordination at the national level are often lacking.  
Despite its long experience as founding member of the EU, the Netherlands is 
often depicted as a country that has not been particularly successful in gearing its 
national machinery of government for effective performance in European arenas. The 
Dutch attitude towards the European integration process has long been characterized 
by a fundamental optimism, both regarding its general thrust as well as about its 
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government’s own capacity as founding member to help steer European institutional 
development in desirable directions. With ‘Europe’ regarded as fundamentally 
unproblematic, the management of European affairs was largely left to pockets of 
specialized expertise – at the Foreign Office, at the Dutch Permanent Representation 
in Brussels, at the international affairs units in certain ministries, among the regular 
participants in the relevant interdepartmental coordination committees, or simply the 
discretion of individual officials whose highly specialized portfolios required 
participation in European working groups and committees. Outside this relatively 
small world of ‘repeat players’ European affairs engendered little interest among 
politicians and civil servants. Going to work in or on ‘Europe’ was hardly a route to 
career advancement – more likely the opposite. 
This attitude has changed markedly in recent years. In 1995, the secretaries-
general of the Dutch ministries published a report in which they called attention to the 
relative neglect of developments at the European level in the Netherlands, and argued 
that these were nevertheless quickly becoming one of the key forces shaping the 
future of the Dutch civil service. This report was followed by a series of high-level 
reports and academic studies concerning the Dutch place in Europe. The progressive 
widening and deepening of the European integration process that took place 
throughout the nineties sent a clear message to all the Member States, the Dutch 
included: ceteris paribus, getting things done at the European level was becoming 
much more difficult. Whilst the scope of European involvement in public 
policymaking was expanding markedly, the rules of the European policymaking game 
were changing fast. States that could not or would not adapt and raise their game 
would find themselves outmanoeuvred by others and/or by the European institutions. 
In this study, we examine if and how this message has sunk in. It differs from most 
other studies on Dutch EU policymaking undertaken so far in that it does not focus on 
the preparation of the Dutch position in European arenas. The key formal EU 
coordination mechanisms in Dutch central government have been scrutinized 
repeatedly, and their strengths and weaknesses have been clearly articulated 
(Soetendorp and Hanf, 1998; Andeweg and Soetendorp, 2001; Raad voor het 
Openbaar Bestuur, 2004; De Zwaan, 2005; cf. Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000; 
Kassim, Menon, Peters and Wright, 2001). In this study, we regard Europeanization 
of national policymaking not just as an intra- and interdepartmental coordination 
challenge but as an emergent, differentiated set of political and professional practices, 
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which participants in European policy processes need to be aware of and master in 
order to be effective at the European level (Heritier et al, 2001; cf. Becking and 
Hopman, 2005). This has been much less researched in the Netherlands (but see 
Schout, 1998; Sie Dhian Ho and Van Keulen, 2004) than in some other countries (see 
for example Smith, 2000, 2001; Jacobson, Laegreid and Pedersen, 2004; Baetens and 
Bursens 2004a and 2004b). 
Specifically our chief research aim is twofold. We want to find out: a) how 
individual Dutch civil servants who operate in Europeanized/Europeanizing 
environments experience their craft as participants in multilevel policy processes: how 
they think it works, what sort of expertise and experience it requires, how much time 
they devote to it, how they seek to achieve successes and avoid failures at the 
European stage; b) but how these national ‘Eurocrats’ are facilitated and constrained 
in doing their jobs by the organizational contexts in which they work, i.e. the degree 
to which their home departments or ministries are ‘Europeanized’ in their routines and 
practices.  
This is clearly not just a matter of academic interest. The findings of this study 
bear directly upon policies for recruitment, training, career development, knowledge 
management and organizational (re)design in the Dutch civil service. Our insights and 
recommendations regarding these will be formulated in the final chapter of this report. 
In the remainder of this first chapter we describe the design of this study and 
foreshadow the contents of the report. 
 
 
1.2 Research questions and study design 
 
Looking more closely at the research aim stated above, one may observe that it 
harbours four distinct, but related puzzles: which civil servants in the Netherlands are 
involved in European policy processes, how do they approach their European tasks, 
what do they actually do, and how are their beliefs and practices shaped by the 
organizations in which they work?  Producing credible answers to this four-fold 
question is not an easy task. The Dutch central government is vast and heterogenous 
by itself. More importantly, the European policymaking processes that national 
officials are involved in are numerous, varied and often complex, mobilizing different 
clusters of officials in different arenas and often spanning long periods of time. 
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Finally, access to some of these actors and arenas is not always easy to gain: key 
people are busy, certain issues can be sensitive, and some arenas can be closed off to 
outsiders.  
Coming to terms with such an ambitious research aim is a challenge that 
researchers can best meet by cutting it up in manageable pieces. These can then be 
studied by the use of multiple, complementary methods of data gathering and 
analysis. We have done likewise. After exploratory research provided indications of 
what was possible and feasible, two main research questions were elaborated: 
 
1. How do individual Dutch civil servants experience and practise the craft of 
policymaking for and in European arenas? 
2. To what extent and how are these civil servants facilitated and constrained by 
existing ways of organizing European affairs in their respective organizations?  
 
The first question regards the individual dimension of the European civil service craft. 
This question pertains to the implications of working in multi-level/European settings 
for the identity and performance of national officials, a subject that has generated 
much research in the last decade (see the overview in chapter 2). We have 
operationalized it in the following key issues:  
  
- role orientations: what do national civil servants see as their chief tasks and 
aims when participating in European policy processes?  
- activity and contact patterns: how big a part of their daily work is taken up by 
European matters, and how do they spend that time? 
- arenas and channels: where does ‘European’ policymaking ‘happen’ for these 
civil servants? 
- formal and informal ‘rules of the game’: how does policymaking unfold in 
these arenas? 
- measures of quality and effectiveness: what do Dutch civil servants consider to 
be ‘a proper job’ in operating at the European stage? 
- knowledge and expertise: what in their experience are crucial competencies for 
national civil servants operating on the European stage?  
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The second question pertains to the organizational dimension. This question fits into 
the ongoing interest in the effects of European integration on the structure and modus 
operandi of national administrative systems in European states (see chapter 2 for an 
overview of existing research findings). Again, we have identified a number of key 
issues associated with this dimension: 
 
- job structure: do civil servants feel they have sufficient time and opportunity 
to devote themselves to the European dimension of their portfolio? 
- education and training: what facilities and incentives exist within the civil 
servants’ organizations for acquiring the skills necessary to be an effective 
player in European policy arenas? 
- career development: to what extent are placements in Europe and posts that 
have a strong European component considered to be ‘good career moves’ in 
the civil servants’ organizations?  
- instruction and guidance: how are policy priorities to be achieved at the 
European level developed and communicated to the civil servants who operate 
in European arenas? What degree of discretion are they given? 
- feedback and accountability: how do civil servants who operate in European 
arenas report about their activities to their ‘back offices’, and how is their 
performance ascertained and evaluated there? 
- top management commitment: to what extent do the top echelons of the 
organization accord proper priority to European issues, and to what extent do 
they get personally involved in European arenas if and when needed? 
- resources: do civil servants involved in European policy work find there is 
enough funding and staff support from their organizations for them to be able 
to operate effectively? 
 
We have examined these issues using four different, complementary methods of data 
collection: 
 
1. We have studied the relevant reports, documents and academic literature on 
the subject. The academic literature in particular has not just been scanned for 
contributions pertaining to the Dutch situation, but for relevant research 
findings in other countries as well. 
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2. We have incorporated several questions into a large survey on job 
characteristics, satisfaction and public sector motivation administered by the 
Dutch Ministry of the Interior (the co-called POMO survey). The survey was 
conducted in the first months of 2006 and was completed by 4502 civil 
servants working in central government organizations (a response rate of 
45%). Through this survey, we have been able to obtain a unique, quantitative 
assessment of the number and type of civil servants involved in EU decision-
making, as well as their judgment of the organizational aspects of their tasks 
(for the questions on Europeanization included in the survey, see Appendix I). 
3. We have conducted structured, thematic interviews with over 46 middle-
ranking and top officials covering two policy sectors (see below for 
explication) coming from four different ministries, their associated executive 
agencies and the Dutch Permanent Representation in Brussels. We asked them 
about their experiences in ‘doing’ European policymaking (and, to a lesser 
extent, policy implementation) in The Hague, in Brussels, and anywhere else 
that their jobs took them. The interviews were recorded on tape and later 
transcribed. All interviewees agreed to be cited by name, but we have 
generally refrained from doing so unless the quotes were clearly recognisable 
as coming from a particular person (for the list of interviews, see Appendix 
II). 
4. We have engaged in non-participant observation of the Europe-related work 
routines of officials in different parts of the Dutch police, the ministry of the 
Interior, the ministry of Justice, and the Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority.  
5. After completing all this, and having drawn preliminary conclusions on the 
basis of the survey and the two case studies, we conducted five expert 
meetings with middle-ranking and top-level officials from throughout the 
Dutch government, in order to check on the broader salience of these initial 
findings, and further deepen our insights on what it means to be, and organize, 
national ‘Eurocrats.’ A total of twenty seven officials participated in these 
sessions, which lasted 2.5 hours each. They were taped and transcribed.   
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For step 3 and 4, we adopted a comparative case research strategy. This strategy 
entailed comparing civil service practices in two policy domains that met two 
conditions:  
 
a. Both should involved more than one Dutch ministry’s responsibilities, so 
as to enable comparison of two different Dutch civil service organizations 
operating within one and the same European domain; 
b. The two domains should differ in terms of the timing and degree of 
Europeanization of regulatory and policy activity. This enabled us to 
examine if Europeanized civil service practices differ across the various 
governance regimes (‘pillars’) that the EU harbours, as well as if Dutch 
public organizations that have been dealing in Europe for decades show 
more effectiveness and maturity in doing so than those whose involvement 
is much more recent.  
 
These considerations led us to select two policy domains for further study: veterinary 
policy (ministries of Agriculture and Health; old, first pillar, high degree of 
Europeanization) and European police cooperation (ministries of Interior and Justice; 
new, third pillar, low degree of Europeanization). It should be stressed here that the 
comparative strategy chosen here implies that this part of our analysis is only valid for 
the organizations examined. Its findings were used as a starting point for further 
exploration in the expert meetings covering officials working in a large number of 
other domains, but the case findings as such do not apply to these other domains.  
Although these limitations of our research design are not to be overlooked, to 
our knowledge it is by far the methodologically most ambitious effort to penetrate the 
craft of ‘doing business in Europe’ as a national official/organization (see further 
chapter 2). 
 
 
1.3 Overview 
 
In chapter 2 we first report the results of our academic groundwork: the literature 
review. Readers not interested in the academic state of the art with respect to the 
nexus between Europeanization, national administrative organizations and individual 
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civil servants can read this diagonally. Those that don’t, will find an overview of 
current insights concerning the activities, role perceptions and organizational contexts 
of national civil servants and experts who operate in EU arenas.  
The main findings of our own field research are reported in chapters 3-5. 
Chapter 3 presents the findings of the survey study, mapping the phenomenon of 
‘Europeanization’ in the Dutch central government machinery by identifying the 
distribution of people and organizations doing (degrees of) European policy work. It 
also explores the correlates of Dutch civil servants’ EU activities. Whereas the survey 
study thus aims to capture the ‘ballpark’ of Europeanization in the Dutch civil service, 
it cannot tell us much about what people actually do and how they experience their 
involvement in EU policy processes. This requires a more close up view. Such views 
are offered in chapters 4 and 5, which describe the findings of the qualitative study – 
the interviews and observations. Chapter 4 focuses on the veterinary policy arena, and 
looks at the practices of Dutch ‘Eurocrats’ in it through the lens of strategic 
behaviour. It identifies and discusses three basic strategies employed by Dutch 
veterinary Eurocrats in seeking to influence the chief arena in the policy process in the 
First Pillar of the EU: signalling, front-loading and coalition formation. Chapter 5 
turns to the domain of European police cooperation and looks more closely at the day-
to-day work practices of Dutch Eurocrats in this field. It identifies and discusses two 
markedly different styles of doing business in Europe: the bureaucratic-diplomatic 
and the street-level entrepreneurial style.  
In the final chapter, we summarize and compare the findings of the study and 
place them in a broader context with the aid of the findings obtained from the expert 
meeting discussions. We return to the two main questions and the related clusters of 
issues stated earlier in the current chapter to interpret these findings, and draw general 
conclusions.  
Above all, this study emphasizes the multi-faceted and differentiated nature of 
‘Eurocratic’ work, both domestically and in European arenas. European policymaking 
simply cannot be captured in a single institutional formula (‘expertocracy’, 
‘transnational bargaining’). It takes place in different clusters of networks with 
different characteristics and ‘rules of the game’ that national civil servants need to 
know how to play by in order to be effective in their jobs. And depending on their 
specific positions in the wider fabric of the policymaking process, different types of 
national Eurocrats face different types of opportunities and constraints shaping Dutch 
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positions and European policies. The final chapter ends with a set of policy 
recommendations for improving Dutch civil service performance in Europe that 
acknowledge this essential variety.   
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CHAPTER 2 
STREET-LEVEL DIPLOMATS AND THE MAKING OF EU 
POLICY: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS 
 
 
2.1 Street-level diplomats in the European Union 
 
In this study we examine how national civil servants operate in EU policy arenas and 
how their work is embedded within their home organizations. Perhaps surprisingly, 
these are quite novel questions in the fields of EU research and international 
diplomacy. At the same time, these fields do contain useful insights which form a 
useful starting point for further analysis. Below we review several strands of 
literature: on diplomacy and diplomatic history, on international ‘government 
networks’, on policymaking in the EU, and on the impact of the EU on domestic 
administrations. We focus on insights about what we will call ‘street-level diplomats’: 
individual civil servants from specialized policy departments who represent their 
government in international arenas. 
The concept ‘street-level diplomat’ borrows from Lipsky’s (1980) famous 
study of street-level bureaucrats: civil servants who deliver government services in 
direct contact with clients, such as social workers and policemen. Using the metaphor 
of ‘street-level diplomats’ for the kind of civil servants we are interested in highlights 
a number of issues and questions that are important to our study. First, it turns the 
focus towards the work practices of individual civil servants, and the way these 
practices are shaped by and embedded in their organizational context. Second, it turns 
our attention to certain tensions and dilemmas that are inherent in the work of street-
level diplomats. These tensions and dilemmas stem from the position of street-level 
workers in the ‘front line’ of service delivery (in Lipsky’s study) and in direct contact 
with representatives from other governments (in our study), respectively. 
We proceed as follows. The rise of ‘street-level diplomats’ is closely related to 
changes in countries’ international representation over the years. In section 2, we will 
outline these changes by presenting two contrasting models of diplomatic 
representation. Section 3 will take a closer look at the analogy between street-level 
bureaucrats and street-level diplomats in order to spell out its implications for our 
thinking on street-level diplomats. Section 4 then looks at the empirical evidence 
regarding the importance of street-level diplomats and the types of networks within 
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which they operate. Section 5 discusses the work practices of individual street-level 
diplomats and the way governments try to co-ordinate their activities. Finally, section 
6 draws a number of conclusions and identifies the implications for our study. 
 
 
2.2 Two models of diplomatic representation 
 
The organization of a government’s international representation arguably oscillates 
between two extremes or ‘models’ of international representation. The first model, 
which conforms to the traditional image of ‘foreign policy’, sees international 
representation as distinct from other areas of government policy. It is conducted by 
professional diplomats, who claim to have the specific expertise needed to deal with 
the diplomats of other states. In this model, the external relations of states are dealt 
with exclusively by civil servants who have specialized in relations with foreign 
counterparts. Other civil servants only deal with domestic affairs. Insofar as 
‘domestic’ policies have an external dimension, this external dimension is the 
responsibility of diplomats. For example, in this model environmental specialists 
develop domestic environmental policies, but diplomats carry out negotiations on 
international environmental agreements. Moreover, the diplomatic service is highly 
formalized and hierarchical, with clear channels of command and accountability. This 
allows governments to exert a high degree of control over their external relations and 
to maintain a ‘single voice’ toward other governments. We will call this model the 
‘diplomatic model’ of international representation. 
 The other model sees international relations as carried out by a multitude of 
civil servants, each of them dealing with their own area of expertise. Not only do 
environmental civil servants develop domestic policies but they also conduct 
international talks and negotiations on these topics. Taken to its extreme, this implies 
the absence of a single chain of hierarchy in the international field. There may be 
hierarchical relations within a policy area, but there is not one overarching formal 
structure of hierarchical accountability and control in international affairs. In this 
model, therefore, governments ‘dissolve’ in their constituent components and 
maintain a multitude of (independent) ties with their counterparts in other 
governments. We will call this the ‘functional model’ of international representation. 
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The ‘diplomatic model’ of international representation evolved from the 17th 
century onwards and had three defining characteristics (cf. Coolsaet 1998: 3; see also 
Melissen, 2006). First, diplomacy was considered to be a specific profession, apart 
from policy-specific or ‘technical’ expertise. This premise was derived from ‘the 
notion that all the most important foreign policy decisions were essentially political, 
and that the skills required to handle them were derived from intuition and 
experience’ (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 218). In terms of organizing a country’s 
diplomatic service, this implied that diplomacy was meant to be a lifetime career, and 
that each diplomat had to enter the service at the lowest level (Kennan 1997: 200). 
Second, diplomats operated within a centralized organization led by a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. This system allowed information from different sources to be 
processed in one place and to ensure a consistent voice in the state’s external 
relations. Third, the diplomatic model took bilateral relations between states as its 
foundation. 
 The diplomatic model was built on a conception of the state as a single unit. A 
diplomat was supposed to be ‘speaking for the supreme source of power in his own 
country’ (Kennan 1997: 204). Moreover, foreign policy and domestic policy were 
supposed to be completely separate. Foreign policy focused on ‘the double agenda of 
diplomacy for centuries: commercial issues and security’ (Coolsaet 1998: 4). Insofar 
as international commitments impinged on domestic policies, it was assumed that 
‘some single coherent and responsible center of power [the supreme power in the 
quote above] (…) was in a position to compel the country’s other authorities to play 
their part in meeting any commitments made through the diplomatic process’ (Kennan 
1997: 204). 
 The diplomatic model in its pure form has always been subject to challenges 
(Craig, George and Lauren, 2006). In the literature these challenges have been 
explained with reference to two developments: the growing scope and complexity of 
the international policy agenda and the rise of multilateralism. The growing 
international policy agenda has led to a tension between the conception of diplomacy 
as a distinct, ‘non-technical’ profession and the need for specialized policy-specific 
knowledge to deal with issues of a highly technical nature. This tension has run 
parallel with the blurring between foreign policy and domestic policy. In the years 
between and directly after the two world wars, the main challenge to traditional 
diplomacy came from economists, which were placed in embassies to deal with the 
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growing importance of international economic policy co-ordination (Hamilton and 
Langhorne 1995: 169-170 and 203-204). Since then, the international agenda has 
come to encompass a wide range of issues that in earlier times were thought to be 
domestic in scope, such as environmental policy, social policy, or health. This has 
undermined one of the basic assumptions underlying the diplomatic model, that is, the 
separation between foreign and domestic policy. Furthermore, it has led to a 
proliferation of direct contacts between policy-specific departments in different 
countries, which Berridge (2002: 15) has described as ‘direct-dial diplomacy’. 
 Other authors (e.g. Coolsaet 1998) identify the rise of multilateralism as the 
driving force behind the rise of a new type of diplomat. Since multilateral forums 
typically deal with specific issues, countries tend to staff them with specialists in 
those areas who, moreover, often report directly to a policy-specific department rather 
than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kennan 1997: 207). Nowhere is this trend 
clearer than in the European Union (EU), which has established a plethora of specific 
forums to deal with almost any conceivable policy area. 
 This way of organizing a country’s international representation can be seen as 
a shift toward the ‘functional model’ of international representation. In its purest 
form, this model has quite a different set of characteristics than the diplomatic model. 
To begin with, international representation is seen as an integral part of a policy area, 
and the main claim to professional knowledge is related to substantive technical 
expertise rather than diplomatic expertise. As a result, a country is represented by 
environmental civil servants in talks and negotiations on international environmental 
policies or by criminal justice experts in international crime policies. Second, the 
government’s external representation is not organized in a single hierarchical system. 
There is not one ‘foreign office’ that co-ordinates all external relations. Rather, 
governmental representatives report directly to their ‘own’ department and have little 
to do with representatives from other departments. Insofar as co-ordination among 
them is to take place, this can only occur through the mechanisms that are available 
for domestic policy co-ordination, not through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As 
Coolsaet (1998: 21) notes, this development ‘gives the current diplomatic structure 
and organization a cobweb-character, without main threads as it seems’. And finally, 
then, the functional model is not primarily built on bilateral diplomatic relations but 
on a combination of bilateral and multilateral relations, in which the emphasis often 
lays with the latter. 
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 In terms of underlying assumptions, the functional model also stands 
diametrically opposed to the diplomatic model. The state is not seen as a single unit, 
embodied by a ‘supreme power’ but as a collection of government agencies. In 
Slaughter’s words, the state has become a ‘disaggregated state’: ‘it is disaggregating 
into its component institutions’, which maintain a multitude of ties with their 
counterparts in other countries (Slaughter 2000: 178; 2004: 12-15). As a corollary, as 
was already explained above, the functional model in its pure form does not assume a 
distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy, but treats these as two 
components of a given policy area. 
 
 Diplomatic model Functional model 
Characteristics:  
Role of diplomatic 
professionalism 
Diplomacy as a distinct 
profession 
Diplomacy as aspect of 
policy-specific 
professionalism 
Organization of diplomatic 
service 
Hierarchical in a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Non-hierarchical, reporting to 
specialized departments 
Main type of diplomatic 
relations 
Bilateral Bilateral and multilateral 
Assumptions:  
Nature of the state Single unit with sovereign 
power 
Multitude of government 
agencies with functional 
specializations 
Distinction between foreign 
policy and domestic policy 
Clear separation between 
foreign and domestic policy 
No separation between 
foreign and domestic policy 
Table 1. Two models of diplomatic representation 
 
An overview of the characteristics of and assumptions underlying the two models of 
diplomatic representation is presented in table 1. These two models are extremes, 
‘ideal types’, which in their pure form have never existed in reality. Still, in recent 
decades the ‘functional model’ seems to have gained in importance relative to the 
‘diplomatic model’, because of the widening scope of issues that are discussed at the 
international level, and the increase in the level of specialized knowledge required to 
deal with these issues in international (often multilateral) forums. 
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Nevertheless, elements of both models can be identified in the international 
representation of most states. The functional model presents itself most clearly in 
terms of the multitude of specialized civil servants participating in working groups, 
expert groups and other types of committees in the EU and other international 
organizations. In addition, government agencies have established direct links with 
their counterparts in other countries, more often than not bypassing their Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 The diplomatic model is present in the attempts at co-ordinating the national 
input in international forums. This is exemplified by the central co-ordinating role that 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs formally play in their states’ international policies 
(Hocking and Spence, 2002). At embassies, the officials from specialized departments 
operate under the aegis of an ambassador who has normally made his or her career in 
diplomatic service. These elements of formalization and hierarchy based on the 
‘diplomatic model’ serve to guarantee at least some unity of voice in international 
arenas, predicated on the idea that there is an overarching ‘national interest’, which 
supersedes the specific interests that may exist in the various policy areas. 
 This duality in international representation creates a tension. Looked at from 
the ‘diplomatic model’, parallel and non-hierarchical representation may easily lead to 
lack of accountability, unwanted and unforeseen commitments, and contradictory 
inputs that may weaken the overall effectiveness of a country in the international 
arena. Looked at from the ‘functional model’, formalization and hierarchy will lead to 
inflexibility and a loss of expertise that, in turn, will undermine the effectiveness of 
the government’s activities in international affairs. 
This tension becomes most visible at the level of the individuals representing a 
government in an international forum or vis-à-vis their counterparts in another 
country. In the end, it is at the individual level that choices are made and 
organizational arrangements are put in practice. A central claim of our study is 
therefore that a focus on individuals will help us to learn more about the way 
governments’ diplomatic representation operates nowadays. Moreover, we claim that 
the rise of the ‘functional model’ has given rise to a specific kind of diplomat:  the 
‘street-level diplomat.’ Before proceeding to analyse the work conditions and work 
practices of street-level diplomats, we will therefore first show why and how we have 
borrowed this concept for the purposes of our analysis. 
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2.3 Street-level bureaucrats and street-level diplomats 
 
Lipsky’s classic study of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ analysed work practices of lower-
level workers in service delivery organizations (such as policemen, teachers, and 
welfare workers). These workers operate in an environment that is characterized by 
five conditions (Lipsky 1980: 27-28): 
• Inadequate resources; 
• Increasing demand for services; 
• Ambiguous, vague or conflicting agency goals; 
• Goal achievements that are difficult to measure; 
• Nonvoluntary clients. 
As a result, street-level bureaucrats operate under high levels of discretion and 
autonomy. At the same time they experience strong tensions between ideal and reality 
in their work. Lipsky analyses the patterns of practice in their dealings with clients 
that street-level bureaucrats develop in response to these tensions. 
 At first sight, the analogy between ‘street-level bureaucrats’ and ‘street-level 
diplomats’ may seem somewhat far-fetched. There are two reasons, however, why the 
‘street-level’ concept captures many important aspects of the work of individual 
diplomats in what we have called the ‘functional model’ of diplomacy. The first 
reason is that many characteristics of both types of street-level officials stem from the 
great autonomy they enjoy in their work. The second reason is that the position of the 
two types of street-level officials (between superiors and clients or between superiors 
and colleagues, respectively) leads to a number of tensions in their day-to-day work 
that deserve further analysis. By focusing on street-level workers, Lipsky invites us to 
look at the beliefs and work practices of individual civil servants. Such a focus also 
has great relevance for the study of street-level diplomats.  
 To start with, the work of street-level diplomats is also characterized by a 
great deal of discretion and autonomy. Street-level diplomats typically operate in the 
international arena with relatively little direct control from hierarchical superiors (cf. 
Coolsaet 1998: 20). There are three reasons for this. First, the work of street-level 
diplomats often requires specific expertise, which makes it difficult for others than the 
street-level diplomat properly to assess the processes and outcomes that take place in 
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the international arena. Second, hierarchical superiors often concentrate their scarce 
time and resources on a limited number of salient issues. Since expertise-driven, 
international policy issues are normally not high on the domestic administrative and 
political agenda, hierarchical superiors may take a ‘fire alarm’ approach to the work 
of street-level diplomats, only interfering when clear problems arise (cf. McCubbins 
and Schwartz 1984). Third, in their interaction with colleagues from other states, 
street-level diplomats may form networks that they can use to strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis their hierarchical superiors. In domestic settings, they may represent 
an ‘international consensus’ which they can use to reinforce claims ‘at home’ (cf. 
Haas’ analysis of ‘epistemic communities’; Haas 1989; 1990). Moreover, since 
decisions are taken in international networks, the work of street-level diplomats 
suffers from what scholars of public accountability have called ‘the problem of the 
many hands’: when many people contribute to a single outcome and individual 
contributions are difficult to distinguish, it is almost impossible to keep a single 
person responsible for the outcome (cf. Bovens 1998: 45-52). 
 As to the second point, street-level diplomats are similar to street-level 
bureaucrats in the sense that both types of officials have to deal with a range of 
tensions arising from their position as an intermediary – be it between bureaucracy 
and client or between domestic bureaucracy and international counterparts. This 
intermediary position tends to expose the street-level official to opposite claims from 
the ‘two sides’ as well as to tensions between personal autonomy and (attempts at) 
organizational control. A crucial element of our analysis of street-level diplomats 
therefore is how they deal with these tensions, given the characteristics of their 
working environment. 
 At the same time, we should also note the limits to the comparison between 
the two types of street-level workers. These limits stem from the fact that many of the 
characteristics of street-level bureaucrats derive from the fact that they are engaged in 
service delivery to clients. The five specific characteristics of street-level bureaucrats 
outlined above reflect this service delivery character. Street-level diplomats, by 
contrast, don’t act on the `streets’ of society but on those of international policy 
arenas. These have little in common, except one crucial point: both are far removed – 
physically as well as psychologically – from the world of politics and bureaucracy as 
usual. Hence in terms of work conditions there is a crucial commonality between the 
two, which we shall explore further below.  
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2.4. Managing external relations in the disaggregated state 
 
2.4.1 The shift toward functional diplomacy 
The two models of diplomatic representation are ideal-typical in the sense that neither 
exists in reality in its purest form. In practice, we may observe elements of both in the 
way governments conduct their policies with other governments. However, these 
models bring out well the different logics underlying modes of international 
representation and allow us to analyse the consequences of shifts from one model to 
the other. 
 These shifts have been widely documented in the literature on diplomacy and 
international relations. For instance, Berridge (2002: 14) notes that ‘it is rare for [a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs] now to have the same authority in the conduct of foreign 
relations relative to other ministries that it once had’ and ‘in all states the “line 
ministries” – trade, finance, defence, transport, environment and so on (…) – now 
engage in direct communication not only with their foreign counterparts but also with 
quite different agencies abroad’. On a similar note, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 
217) claim that ‘diplomatic inflation has tended (…) to modify the role of the 
professional generalist. The pace of technological change, the speed of modern 
communications, and a heightened awareness of regional and global interdependence, 
have meant increased involvement in external affairs by domestic ministries’. For 
Coolsaet (1998: 18), ‘the declining role of the ministry of Foreign Affairs as the 
central channel for diplomatic relations with other states’ is ‘a central characteristic’ 
of the way states have adapted to the rise of multilateral forums. 
 It is more difficult to pinpoint the shift between the two models in quantitative 
terms, but some figures exist. In 1997, George Kennan (1997: 206) estimated that 
around 70 per cent of all personnel in U.S. diplomatic missions came from other 
departments and agencies than the U.S. Department of State. The relative importance 
of these departments and agencies also varies over time. For instance, between 1986 
and 1996, the number of employees from the U.S. Departments of Health, Justice and 
Transportation in foreign U.S. missions increased strongly, while the number of 
employees from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of 
Agriculture and the U.S. Information Agency declined (Talbott 1997). 
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 The most fertile ground for functional diplomacy is the European Union – 
both because its remit extends to a wide range of policy issues and because it is the 
world’s strongest supranational organization. Under the aegis of the EU, thousands of 
national civil servants meet regularly in a wide range of committees and working 
groups to discuss and decide on European policies and regulatory standards. The 
exact number of Commission expert groups, ‘comitology’ committees and Council 
working parties is difficult to assess, since some groups may be dormant while others 
do not appear in official overviews. Wessels and Rometsch (1996: 331) estimate that 
around 25,000 national officials were involved in Council and Commission working 
groups in 1994. Drawing on a Commission overview from 2004, Brandsma (2006) 
counts some 1090 expert groups, excluding sub-groups and working groups of these 
expert groups. In addition, the number of Council working parties is estimated at 
around 160, while the number of ‘comitology’ committees, in which member state 
representatives monitor the implementation of EU law by the European Commission, 
stands at around 320. Most of these groups are typically attended by lower-ranking 
civil servants who are specialists in their policy field or even on a specific policy 
issue. In addition to departmental civil servants, these groups may also include 
representatives from independent agencies in the member states. 
 The most systematic data on participation in EU policymaking by domestic 
civil servants can be found in surveys conducted in Nordic countries. In a survey 
among officials from ministries and directorates in Norway, not even an EU member 
state, around 45% of respondents (both in ministries and in directorates) indicated that 
they were affected ‘to some extent or more’ by the EU and/or the EEA Agreement (to 
which Norway is a party). In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this was even 61% 
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999: 135). Although impact does not imply that an official is 
active within the EU, the figure does attest to the importance of the EU for domestic 
civil servants. 
In a survey among governmental units in Norway, Iceland, Sweden and 
Finland (two EU members and two non-members), Lægreid et al. (2004) report 
figures about the perceived impact of the EU, as well as about contacts with the EU 
institutions and participation in EU committees. The number of respondents who 
perceive ‘the overall consequences of EU/EEA policies and regulations on their 
department’ to be ‘fairly large/very large’ ranges between 31% (for Norway) and 64% 
(for Iceland), with 57% for both Sweden and Finland. In terms of actual contacts, 
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their results show that most contacts are with the Commission (up to 43% of 
respondents in Sweden), while participation in EU committees ranges between 7% 
(for comitology committees among Finnish respondents) and 26% (for Commission 
expert committees, again among Finnish respondents). These figures are likely to 
overestimate the level of contacts since the survey was conducted among the ‘EU 
specialists’ of each governmental unit. Still, they indicate the wide range of officials 
within those countries’ governments who are active in EU policymaking. 
 
2.4.2 Forms of functional diplomacy 
In her study of government networks, Slaughter (2004) identifies several types of 
government networks. She defines a network as ‘a pattern of regular and purposive 
relations among like government units working across borders that divide countries 
from one another and that demarcate the “domestic” from the “international” sphere’ 
(Slaughter 2004: 14). These networks come into existence because ‘businesses that 
cross borders must be regulated across borders. The increasing transnational nature of 
services and the recognition of the extraterritorial dimension of domestic regulation 
mean that regulators often simply cannot do their job without cooperating with one 
another’(39). These networks are populated by top officials or career civil servants 
who possess a specific expertise on a particular subject. Slaughter thinks that the most 
concentrated site for these kinds of networks is the European Union. She cites 
Dehousse to describe ‘the basic paradox of EU governance: “increased uniformity is 
certainly needed: [but] greater centralization is politically inconceivable, and probably 
undesirable.” The response is regulation by networks – networks of national officials’ 
(50). 
The first distinction Slaughter makes among different types of government 
networks is between horizontal and vertical networks. In horizontal networks links are 
made between counterpart national officials across borders. Vertical networks are 
formed between national government officials and their supranational counterparts. In 
vertical networks state delegate their sovereignty to an institution above them. 
Horizontal networks are easy to detect. Vertical government networks are less 
frequent, but potentially very important, according to Slaughter.  
Apart from this distinction between horizontal and vertical networks, 
Slaughter also identifies types of networks with different tasks. There are information 
networks, enforcement networks and harmonization networks. These may be 
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horizontal or vertical. They may have overlapping functions: harmonization and 
enforcement networks also exchange information and offer assistance (52). 
Information networks bring together civil servants to exchange ideas, 
techniques and experiences and to collect best practices. As a by-product, officials in 
these networks then also start to exchange ideas and experiences concerning 
professional competences, quality, and integrity. Influence in these networks is 
exercised through knowledge and persuasion. 
In enforcement networks ‘talks lead to action – direct aid in enforcing specific 
regulations against specific subjects’(51). Enforcement networks are mostly found 
among those government officials whose job is actually law enforcement: police 
officers, customs officials, drug agents. An example of a criminal enforcement 
network within the EU was created as far back as 1976: Trevi. An example Slaughter 
gives of a vertical enforcement network are the relations between national courts and 
the European Court of Justice, which consist of close ties between supranational 
officials and their domestic counterparts.  
Harmonization networks bring regulators together to ensure that the rules in a 
particular substantive area conform to a common regulatory standard. Harmonization 
networks are always authorized by a treaty or executive agreement. They do not arise 
spontaneously or bottom up. Harmonization is often politically controversial because 
harmonizing distinctive national regulations may have significant policy implications. 
The European Union has developed a system of regulation by networks in order to 
respond to the challenges of trying to harmonize or at least reconcile the regulations 
of its diverse and growing membership. This is located in the EU Council of Ministers 
and closely connected to the process of ‘comitology’ that surrounds council decision-
making (43). 
According to Slaughter civil servants working in these types of networks 
inside and outside of the EU ‘genuinely are the new diplomats’ (63). 
 
 
2.5 Work practices in street-level diplomacy 
 
2.5.1 Beliefs and role conceptions of street-level diplomats 
Studies on beliefs and role conceptions of what we have called ‘street-level 
diplomats’ have mainly been conducted in the context of the EU. These studies focus 
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on the question whether national representatives in European venues adopt an 
‘intergovernmental’ or a ‘supranational’ role conception (Beyers 2002; Beyers and 
Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2002; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). An 
intergovernmental role perception means that officials feel the greatest loyalty toward 
their national government. During meetings in Brussels, officials then feel that they 
are primarily there to represent their member state. A supranational role perception 
means that officials feel the greatest loyalty toward the EU. They then feel that they 
are there to help move the EU forward and solve EU problems (cf Thedvall, 2006). 
These studies are based on surveys among participants from national 
governments in either Commission expert groups or Council working parties. The N 
in these studies is typically of an intermediate size: 26, 46 and 95 for Norwegian, 
Swedish and Belgian officials, respectively, in Beyers and Trondal (2004), 28 and 70 
for Norway and Sweden in Trondal and Veggeland (2003), a total of 160 Danish, 
Norwegian and Swedish officials in Trondal (2002), 95 Belgian and 106 non-Belgian 
officials in Beyers (2002), and 47 in Egeberg’s (1999) study of five smaller member 
states. 
 These studies present two interesting conclusions. First, they point out that 
besides intergovernmental and supranational role perceptions, officials may also hold 
‘functional expert’ role perceptions. In that case, officials feel the greatest loyalty 
toward their policy area or area of expertise. This role perception is, in principle, 
neutral as to the level of decision-making. In that sense, it ‘transcends’ the national-
supranational divide (Egeberg 1999; see also Thedvall, 2006, who reports an 
intensive, observation-based case study rather than survey data). 
 Second, they show that the role perception depends on the context in which an 
official operates. Thus, an official may adopt an intergovernmental role perception in 
some situations, and a supranational role perception in another. Officials therefore 
have ‘ambiguous’ role perceptions that are (at least partly) determined by contextual 
factors. Most studies look at institutional factors to explain variations in the 
prevalence of role perceptions. 
 In his analysis of ‘government representative’ (= ‘intergovernmental’) versus 
‘functional expert’ roles, Egeberg (1999) distinguishes between different institutional 
contexts at both the domestic and the EU level. At the domestic level, he argues, 
officials from cabinet-level departments are more likely to adopt an intergovernmental 
role perception than officials from agencies that are separated from the cabinet level. 
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At the EU-level, officials are more likely to adopt an intergovernmental role 
perception in Council Working Parties, in which the national backgrounds of officials 
are emphasized in several ways, than in Commission Expert Committees, in which 
national backgrounds are de-emphasized. ‘Comitology’ committees are in between 
these two. 
 Empirically, Egeberg only analyses differences between Council Working 
Parties and Commission Expert Committees, and finds that officials indeed show 
greater allegiance to their own government in Council Working Parties than in 
Commission Expert Committees. In another study, Trondal and Veggeland (2003) 
find strong evidence for differences in role perceptions between officials from 
cabinet-level departments and officials from independent agencies in Sweden. At the 
same time, all studies show that the member state remains the main point of reference 
for all national officials, and supranational loyalties are only secondary (Beyers and 
Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). 
 In addition to this broad difference among institutional context, several studies 
have also looked at more specific variables that may affect officials’ role perceptions. 
According to Egeberg (1999), greater participation on an EU-level committee leads to 
greater loyalty towards that committee (but not to the EU as such) (see also Trondal 
2002). Beyers (2002), by contrast, finds no such relationship between prolonged 
participation and role perception among Belgian officials. His analysis points to the 
greater importance of domestic characteristics and domestic socialization in 
explaining role conceptions. 
In a comparison of Swedish and Belgian officials, Beyers and Trondal (2004) 
review eight hypotheses on the impact of domestic institutional contingencies. They 
argue, for instance, that specialized officials and officials from sectoral departments 
are more likely to adopt supranational roles than non-specialized officials and 
officials from the Foreign Office. Also, officials are more likely to adopt 
supranational roles if the number of veto players among principals at the domestic 
level is greater and the relations between these veto players is more competitive. Their 
empirical results suggest support for these hypotheses, but their analysis is weakened 
by the fact that they only look at institutional differences at the aggregate country-
level and not at the individual level. Interestingly, Trondal (2002) finds little support 
for the effect of national co-ordination mechanisms on the role perceptions of national 
officials. In the (Scandinavian) countries he has studied, stronger co-ordination 
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mechanisms do not lead (automatically) to stronger identification with national 
interests. Again, Beyers’ (2002) study of Belgian officials shows a different outcome: 
his results indicate a correlation between ‘low organizational self-esteem’ (including 
weak national co-ordination) and supranational role conceptions. 
 
2.5.2 Co-ordinating and organizing street-level diplomacy 
Even though street-level diplomats enjoy considerable autonomy in their work, they 
are embedded within an organizational framework that affects what they do and how 
they do it. Within the literature, this has mainly been dealt with in the context of the 
co-ordination of a state’s diplomatic representation. With the erosion of their 
dominant role in international representation, this type of co-ordination has become 
the main activity for many Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Coolsaet 1998: 19). 
 Berridge (2002: 15-16) identifies seven strategies by which Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs have aspired to exercise a co-ordinating role in the state’s 
international representation: 
• By channelling reports from officials from other departments through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
• By placing officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in special 
committees that deal with foreign affairs; 
• By retaining the authority to check and, possibly, veto any international 
agreement concluded by another department; 
• By requiring officials from other departments to give notice of trips abroad; 
• By creating and chairing interdepartmental committees to deal with certain 
foreign policy issues; 
• By stimulating exchange of personnel with other departments; 
• By merging the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with other departments that have 
important foreign policy functions. 
Not all of these strategies are used in any single country, but each has been used at 
least in some countries. The co-ordination of international policies has been studied 
most extensively in the EU. This literature builds mainly on comparisons of single 
studies of national co-ordination systems (see Kassim et al. 2000, a key text in the 
field, for a good example of this approach). Studies that systematically compare co-
ordination systems of several member states, using the same methods and approaches, 
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are rare (for a comparative case study of France and the Netherlands, see Harmsen 
1999). 
 This literature has highlighted a number of differences between co-ordination 
structures. The main difference lies in the degree of centralization of co-ordination, 
whereby the UK and France are presented as examples of relatively centralized 
systems while, for instance, the Netherlands is presented as a system that relies more 
on horizontal co-ordination between departments. A recent comparative study of 
delegation practices between Swedish and French central administrations and their 
Permanent Representations documents in great detail that the French system operates 
in a more centralized and more formalized fashion than the Swedish one – and that it 
is far more efficient for that reason (Larue, 2006). It argues that although the French 
system is generally more efficient, it too cannot escape the problems that beset 
principals in delegation relations vis à vis their agents: not knowing in detail what 
agents do, and not being able to control their behaviour. These findings highlight our 
assertion that national Eurocrats – in this case those who operate the permanent 
representations to the EU - are, indeed comparable to street-level bureaucrats in their 
elusiveness to hierarchical control and accountability mechanisms. 
One should not overstate the differences between centralized and fragmented 
national coordination structures. As Peters and Wright (2000: 165) note, these 
differences may be more real on paper than in practice: co-ordination may be more 
fragmented in the UK and France than their formal structures suggest, while the 
relatively fragmented Dutch system in practice shows a significant degree of informal 
co-ordination. In both systems, centralized co-ordination is complemented by direct 
links between departments and EU institutions (mainly the Commission). The extent 
of these direct links is arguably determined by the nature of the issue: politically 
salient issues will be dealt with at higher levels in the domestic administration, while 
more technical issues are usually left to specialized departments (cf. Peters and 
Wright 2000: 166). This conforms to differences in decision-making processes at the 
EU-level, in which politically salient issues are dealt with in the higher-level 
institutions (European Council and Council of Ministers), while the less salient issues 
are dealt with in the multitude of working groups and expert groups that are attached 
to the Commission and the Council. According to this argument, then, the role of 
street-level diplomats and their room for manoeuvre will be greatest in issues that are 
technical and politically not so salient. 
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Of course, this argument begs the question why certain issues are more 
‘political’ than others. For some issues this is quite obvious: treaty negotiations will 
normally involve higher political levels than talks on technical standards for 
machinery. Still, in between these extremes, member states may attach different 
political priorities to different issues. The room that organizations allow to street-level 
diplomats is therefore also the result of political and organizational choices within 
domestic departments: a weak interest from higher echelons will increase this role, 
while a greater interest will weaken it. 
In terms of effectiveness, greater co-ordination is often assumed to be more 
effective (Larue, 2006). This may not be the case, however, since centralized co-
ordination may reduce the flexibility of representatives in Brussels, which may 
impede their effectiveness. In addition, the effectiveness of co-ordination is also 
affected by the resources and expertise of the co-ordinators (Peters and Wright 2000: 
170). 
A weakness of the existing literature is that it focuses on comparisons of 
national systems as a whole. As a result, it tends to look exclusively at co-ordination 
mechanisms at the national level and it tends to juxtapose two models: co-ordination 
that is centralized at one point nationally and co-ordination that is dispersed among 
many horizontal units. This focus obscures the fact that co-ordination can take place 
at several levels within government and that, in principle, the same types of issues and 
tensions arise at each of these levels. 
The analysis can be extended by looking both at the degree of centralization 
and the organizational level at which centralization takes place, as is done in Table 2 
below. 
 
Degree of co-ordination  
Strong Intermediate Weak 
Government 
National 
centralization 
  
Department 
 
 
  
Level of 
government 
Unit   
Individual 
autonomy 
Table 2. Levels and degrees of co-ordination 
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The rows indicate the organizational level at which co-ordination takes place. This 
can be at the level of the government as a whole, at the level of departments or at the 
level of individual units. The columns indicate whether the degree of co-ordination is 
strong or weak. The two extremes are formed by the left upper-hand cell, which 
signifies strong co-ordination at the level of the government as a whole, and the right 
lower-hand cell, which signifies weak co-ordination at unit level (and thus, by 
implication, a high degree of autonomy for individuals in that unit). 
 At each of these levels, there is tension between the benefits of 
centralization/co-ordination versus decentralization/autonomy. An interesting 
question is why some organizations choose for a more centralized approach to 
conducting their international business – and to examine what consequences this has 
for their effectiveness in the EU arena and for other values such as accountability and 
organizational continuity. 
 
2.5.3 The impact of the EU on domestic administrations 
The co-ordination of street-level diplomats within national administrations is only one 
of the ways in which the EU may have affected domestic administrations. Another, 
potentially more far-reaching question concerns the extent to which the EU has 
affected the overall organization of national executive systems. Have there been 
changes to internal structures and functioning of ministerial departments? Or have the 
co-ordination structures that have been set up created parallel structures while leaving 
the existing national administrative structures intact? These questions have been 
studied as part of a broader research agenda on ‘Europeanization’: the impact of the 
EU on domestic policies, politics, and institutions. A lot of work has been done under 
this rubric in and beyond the Netherlands (cf. Van Keulen, 2006), targeting different 
levels and objects of analysis.  
At a macro-level of analysis, one group of scholars has examined the extent to 
which Europeanization has caused a convergence of national administrative systems. 
Despite decades of EC/EU evolution and despite the pouring out of European 
legislative output after the Single European Act and Treaties of Amsterdam and 
Maastricht, divergence, not convergence of the different member states’ national 
administrations turned out to be the dominant pattern. Organizational adaptation to the 
EU has been incremental at best, and changes that have occurred all fitted well within 
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the cores of the national administrative styles and practices (Harmsen 1999; Rometsch 
and Wessel 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Bulmer and Burch 1998; Olsen 2003). 
On top of this, empirical studies old and new show that national administrations treat 
European policies as ‘national business as usual’ (Yesilkagit and Blom-Hansen 
forthcoming), making no distinction between domestic and European policies 
(Siedentopf and Ziller 1988; Metcalfe 1994; cf. Van Keulen, 2006). This has led 
Harmsen to posit that the diverse trajectories of national administrative adaptation to 
the process of European integration must ‘be understood in terms of national political-
administrative models. States will both seek to export aspects of those models to the 
European level and be faced with more or less severe problems of institutional 
adaptation when the choices made at the European level depart from those models’ 
(Harmsen 2000: 71).  
 At a meso-level of analysis, where the configuration of the executive and the 
organization of ministerial departments are examined, scholars have found that the 
EU has had effects on the national administrations (Kassim et al. 2000; Hanf and 
Soetendorp 1998). All studies found some variations in terms of the extent of change, 
and reflect the observations on the co-ordination of EU-related work made above. The 
most important findings are that (1) heads of government have gained prominent co-
ordinating capacities in EU affairs; (2) foreign affairs ministries have undergone an 
erosion of their positions as they were overshadowed by their prime ministers; and (3) 
interministerial structures have been set up to co-ordinate and manage European 
policies. 
An important finding concerning ministerial departments is that they have 
adapted themselves through the establishment of EU units, personnel policies to 
prepare their civil servants for ‘Brussels’ and other quite functional adaptations. More 
than adaptation, however, ‘ministerial administrations … are directly involved in the 
preparation, the making and the implementation of EC decisions … The national 
administration, together with the administration on the European level, with the help 
of its expertise and qualified staff, has become one of the key actors in the European 
integration process’ (Rometsch and Wessels 1996: 360). But changes have not been 
spectacular. Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) concluded that no radical shift or change has 
taken place in the way that things were done in national administration after as 
compared to before EU membership. Adjustments were generally made in an 
 34
incremental way, administrative traditions and arrangements that were already in 
place were used as the foundations for the new structures.  
 An important contribution to the study of the effect of Europeanization on 
national ministries is produced by a number of Scandinavian surveys and case studies. 
By using surveys, these studies attempt to estimate the degree in which specific parts 
of the central governments were touched by European policies. Egeberg (2005: 10), 
for example, found that ‘parts of the national administrations on certain occasions 
function as part of a Community administration, while on other occasions fulfill their 
traditional obligations as servants of national political authorities’. Larsson and 
Trondal (2005) show that the EU institutions have a differentiated impact on national 
administrative systems. Whereas the Commission’s procedures weaken domestic 
politico-administrative leadership, i.e., prime minister and foreign offices, the Council 
procedures work to strengthen these. Laegreid et al (2004) and Jacobsson et al (2001), 
finally, find that the number of EU co-ordinators has overall increased within 
individual ministries and the set-up of collegial interdepartmental bodies has risen at 
different levels for the co-ordination of EU policies. They conclude that 
Europeanization has led both member and non-member Scandinavian national 
administrations to adapt in a significant but non-radical way to the requirements of the 
EU policy making system. More pervasive and centralized, but still quite 
‘improvised’ coordination does take place in the run-up to special events, for example 
prior and during a term as EU President (Elgström, 2003; Ekengren, 2004; Van 
Keulen, 2004) – but it tends not too last: with the pressure of the Presidency project 
behind them, national systems tend to veer back to more decentralized arrangements. 
 Finally, at a micro-level of analysis, Smith’s (2001) case study of the 
Europeanization of the Scottish Office confirms the findings above, observing that: ‘ 
‘“Europeanization” did not involve a homogenizing journey towards a common 
“European” administrative style and infrastructure. Instead, accretive and incremental 
modifications took place within the context of national and departmental 
conventions.’ These conclusions were echoed in Sundelius and Ekengren’s (2004) 
survey of trends in the Europeanization of national foreign policies (and departments). 
A few scholars have focused on the impact of Europeanization on the culture of 
ministerial departments. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the cultural impact of 
Europeanization has allegedly been much deeper. As Jordan (2003) concludes: ‘[T]he 
EU has helped to make the DoE [‘Department of the Environment’] a more 
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environmental department than it would otherwise have been. In a sense, the EU 
helped the DoE to find a culture.’ (Jordan 2003: 280). This was effected in particular 
by the recurring ‘misfits’ between European environmental policies and the British 
practice: ‘as the number of “errors” began to stack up, the DoE found itself in the 
awkward (and eventually untenable) position of having to implement selectively or 
very slowly directives it had sanctioned’ (Jordan 2003: 280). 
 All in all, then, the literature on Europeanization confirms that domestic civil 
servants have become linked to European networks. At the same time, these 
developments have generally not affected the ‘core’ of administrative organization in 
the member states. Rather, insofar as changes to the organization have been made, 
they have been largely functional and non-radical, adapting specific parts of the 
organization to the new requirements posed by EU-related activities. However, as 
Jordan’s study of the DoE shows, the EU may have had a more profound impact 
within specific pockets of national administrations, in particular where it has affected 
elements of the organization’s understanding of its own role within the overall 
administration. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions: dilemmas and tensions in street-level diplomacy 
 
This chapter has made a number of related claims. First, building on long standing 
observations in the literature on diplomacy, we have argued that the international 
representation of states oscillates between two models of diplomatic representation: a 
‘diplomatic model’, in which diplomatic representation is the province of a 
specialized, hierarchically organized diplomatic service, and a ‘functional model’, in 
which the state is represented by a variety of (technical) experts who deal with 
specific international policy issues and who operate with great autonomy and report 
directly to their (policy) department or agency. This functional model has led to the 
rise of what we have called ‘street-level diplomats’, policy specialists who deal 
directly with their counterparts in other countries, often working with great autonomy. 
 These two models are ideal-types and the organization of governments’ 
international representation shows characteristics of both. On the one hand, the 
number and autonomy of policy experts in diplomatic representation is undeniable. 
On the other hand, however, governments (and more in particular Ministries of 
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Foreign Affairs) still strive to co-ordinate their international presence. There are good 
reasons for this duality in the diplomatic representation of states. The rise of new 
issues that require greater technical expertise has undermined the traditional claim to 
distinctive skills and knowledge on the part of professional diplomats. At the same 
time, the various issues that are dealt with by technical experts are related and overlap 
in a number of ways. At the higher, ‘political’ levels of diplomacy, in particular, 
governments still trade off one issue for another and have to ensure a degree of 
consistency in the claims they make in various international forums. 
 The current literature shows two main gaps or weaknesses that we will address 
in our empirical study. First, there is little systematic knowledge of the (quantitative) 
scale of street-level diplomacy. How many civil servants are involved in these kinds 
of activities and how important are these activities relative to ‘traditional’ diplomacy? 
What we know either rests on educated guesses based on numbers of forums or on the 
presence on foreign missions of officials from departments other than the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. We will seek to fill this gap through the survey that is reported on in 
chapter 3. 
 Second, we have little insight into daily work practices of street-level 
diplomats. What do these officials do when they interact with colleagues from other 
countries? How do they deal with the tensions inherent in their position as 
interlocutors between their own department and their foreign peers? Some of the 
answers to these questions can be derived from the valuable survey work that has 
been done by a small group of scholars in the EU. In addition, however, we need to 
study more closely the work of street-level diplomats in their ‘natural habitats’, for 
instance by engaging in observation. This may also yield more insight into the way 
these officials are embedded in their organizations. Most studies of the co-ordination 
of international policies tend to analyse systems of co-ordination from a top-down 
perspective, focusing on organizational structures and channels of control. The effect 
that these structures have on the ‘street-level’ of diplomacy is much less understood, 
however, while there are ample indications that co-ordination practices may diverge 
substantially from co-ordination structures. In our study, we will address these issues 
in the interviews and by observing civil servants ‘at work’ when in Brussels. The 
results from these research activities are reported in chapters 4 and 5 of this report. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARD A EUROPEANIZED CIVIL SERVICE?  
A SURVEY STUDY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Who are the Dutch civil servants involved in EU-related work? How many of them 
are there? Do they differ from the ‘average’ civil servants and, if so, how? And how is 
their work embedded in and facilitated by their organizations? These are the questions 
that we addressed in a large-scale survey held among Dutch civil servants in 2006. 
This survey offers a unique opportunity to obtain an insight into the quantitative 
dimensions of a ‘Europeanized civil service craft’. 
 In this chapter, we will report on the results of this survey. In doing so, we will 
follow the distinction among two main questions that was made in chapter 1. We will 
first discuss the activities and characteristics of individual civil servants. Based on the 
survey data, we will show how many civil servants are involved in EU-related 
activities and how much time they spend on these activities. Furthermore, using 
various background characteristics, we will develop a profile of Europeanized civil 
servants and try to assess whether this profile differs from that of civil servants who 
are not involved in EU-related activities. Finally, we will analyse whether different 
types of EU-related activities tend to be carried out by different civil servants or 
whether they tend to be combined within one job. 
 After discussing individual civil servants, we will turn to the way in which 
individual activities are organizationally embedded and facilitated. We will assess the 
organizational embeddedness by looking at the degree of isolation of EU-related 
work. Is EU-related work embedded broadly within government departments or is it 
carried out by pockets of EU specialists? Subsequently, we will analyse the degree of 
organizational support for EU-related work that is offered by governmental 
organizations, and the differences in organizational support among different (types of) 
organizations. 
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The questions that will be answered in this chapter are summed up in the text 
box below. Before presenting the empirical findings, however, we discuss how the 
survey was designed and carried out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Survey design 
 
3.2.1 Survey design 
For our study, we had the opportunity to connect to the Personnel Survey (‘POMO 
Survey’) carried out by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior (‘BZK’). This is a large-
scale survey that aims at investigating the satisfaction, motivation, and mobility of 
civil servants, so as to assess and improve the attractiveness of the civil service as an 
employer. The survey is held biannually; for the present research we have used the 
2006 edition.  
In the 2006 edition, we included a number of questions pertaining to the EU’s 
impact on civil servants’ work. These questions have not been asked to the entire 
sample. The Dutch civil service is a very heterogeneous group, which does not only 
comprise national, regional, and local levels of government, but also various public 
sectors like academic hospitals, universities, and the police. As we are primarily 
interested in Europeanization of central government, we have targeted our questions 
at this subset of the population. 
The sample of respondents working in central government consisted of 10,000 
civil servants working within central government for at least a year. Each of these 
Overview of research questions in this chapter 
1. Individual EU-related activities 
o What percentage of Dutch civil servants carry out EU-related activities? 
o How much time do Dutch civil servants spend on EU-related activities? 
o What is the relative importance of different types of EU-related activities? 
o Do civil servants involved in EU-related work differ from the ‘average’ civil 
servant? 
o To what extent do individual civil servants engage in different (types of) EU-
related activities? 
2. Organizational embeddedness and support 
a. To what degree are EU-related activities broadly embedded or, rather, 
isolated within the organisation? 
b. How well are EU-related activities supported organizationally? 
c. To what extent does organizational support differ between different types of 
organizations? 
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respondents received the same questionnaire including the EU-related questions. They 
could fill out the questionnaire on paper or on the Internet. In the end, 4502 
respondents completed the questionnaire, a response rate of 45%. 
 
3.2.2 Measuring EU-related activities by individual civil servants 
In order to assess the extent to which individual civil servants deal with the EU in 
their work, we included three questions into the survey. The precise wording of each 
question can be found in Appendix I. Starting with EU-related activities by individual 
civil servants, we included the question whether or not a respondent deals with the EU 
in his or her work, so as to assess civil servants’ EU involvement (question 1 in 
Appendix I). Moreover, we asked respondents to provide an estimate of the time spent 
per week on EU-related affairs (question 3). As to the types of EU-related activities 
carried out, we distinguished between several activities in the stages of EU policy-
making and consecutive policy implementation. Concerning policy-making we 
distinguished between preparation of the Dutch input into EU-level meetings, 
participation in Council working groups, participation in European Commission 
meetings, bilateral consultations, and involving local government in EU-level policy-
making. Related to the policy-implementation stage, we discerned three items: 
transposition, practical application/enforcement of EU policies, and taking into 
account EU policies during national policy-making. These activities are reflected by 
the eight items under question 2. We asked the respondents to indicate the importance 
of these activities in their work, on a 5-point Likert scale. 
 
3.2.3 Measuring organizational embeddedness and support 
Concerning the organizational dimension of EU-related work, we were interested in 
two variables: organizational embeddedness and organizational support. In order to 
assess organizational embeddedness, we have constructed a ‘dispersion index’ on the 
basis of the questions on EU-involvement and time spent. The dispersion index shows 
the extent to which EU-related activities are spread among civil servants within an 
organization. The construction of this index will be explained as part of the empirical 
analysis. As to the organizational support for EU-related activities, we incorporated 
six statements into the questionnaire relating to the way in which employers facilitate 
EU-related activities. For each statement, respondents could indicate whether they 
agreed/did not agree on a five-point scale (question 4 in Appendix I). The assumption 
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is that the more important employers deem the EU, the better they will facilitate EU-
related activities. 
We distinguish between two types of organizational support, relating to 
personnel management and policy management. To begin with, personnel 
management is an important aspect of organizational support because for a long time 
most Dutch departments had a somewhat dual career system for Europeanized and 
‘national’ civil servants. We assume that, when the EU has indeed become more 
important for the Dutch civil service, these paths will become mixed, and EU 
experience will become a general asset for career development. To gauge the 
importance of the EU in personnel management, we asked to what extent a 
respondent’s employer offers sufficient EU-related training opportunities, uses EU 
experience as a personnel selection criterion, and treats EU experience positively with 
an eye on career development.  
In addition, we conceptualized organizational support in terms of policy 
management, i.e. the way the policy process is designed and controlled. When top 
bureaucrats and politicians deem EU affairs unimportant or even peripheral to their 
policy field, it can be expected that there is no systematic attention for EU-related 
activities. In this respect, there has been much discussion in the Netherlands about the 
failure of the coordination system for EU negotiations. It is often said that the 
mandates given for negotiations are unclear, due to a low political priority. The same 
is said about EU-related activities more generally; these are thought to receive less 
political support than ‘national’ activities. A final alleged problem pertains to the 
existence of ‘Chinese walls’, or limited coordination between those civil servants who 
negotiate about EU policies, and those who carry them out subsequently. Statements 
relating to each of these issues were included in the questionnaire. 
 
3.2.4 Explaining activity patterns: Background variables 
The questions on EU-related work were part of a larger questionnaire that included a 
range of background variables on each respondent. This allows us to analyse the way 
in which these background variables affect EU-related activities. The choice of these 
variables to be included in the analysis was somewhat arbitrary insofar as little 
systematic research has so far been done on the characteristics of individual civil 
servants. As a result, we could not rely on an existing body of tested hypotheses. In 
order to avoid simply lumping a whole range of ‘usual suspects’ into the analysis, we 
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therefore relied on a combination of (informed) common sense and the preliminary 
findings from the qualitative study reported in chapters 4 and 5.  
In constructing a profile of Europeanized civil servants, we believe that three 
categories of variables are potentially important. First, we expect individual 
characteristics of civil servants to play a role. The types of activities that civil 
servants undertake are shaped by their past experiences and the position they occupy 
within an organization. Hence, we included four variables in our analysis that capture 
most of this individual background: age, seniority, education and rank. Age may play 
a role in EU-related activities insofar as younger civil servants may have grown up in 
a more self-evidently international or Europeanized environment than older civil 
servants. If this is true, we would expect younger civil servants to be involved 
relatively more often in EU-related activities than older civil servants. The 
respondent’s age was calculated on the basis of the survey question on the year in 
which the respondent was born. 
Second, seniority may have an impact in the sense that EU-related activities 
may be entrusted to more or, by contrast, less experienced civil servants. We did not 
expect any specific direction beforehand. Seniority was calculated on the basis of a 
survey question that asked since when the respondent has held his or her current job. 
Furthermore, we expect EU-involvement to increase with higher levels of 
education since EU-related work involves skills, such as a command of foreign 
languages and an understanding of the legal and institutional build-up of the EU, that 
require a high-level training. In the questionnaire, the level of education was 
measured by a question that asks respondents to indicate the highest level of 
completed education from among nine levels, ranging from low (primary education) 
to high (PhD).  
Finally, we include rank. It had been pointed out to us in interviews that the 
upper echelons in the Dutch civil service tend to be less involved in EU-related work 
than the levels lower down. Prior studies (Noordegraaf, 2000; ‘t Hart et al, 2002) 
suggest that top-ranking civil servants operate very closely to the Dutch political 
arena and are therefore allocate more attention to national than to European issues 
(which have long tended to be relatively unimportant in Dutch politics). In order to 
explore this contention, we include a measure of rank in our analysis. Since rank 
cannot be derived directly from the questionnaire (and is difficult to compare across 
different organizations within central government), we included gross monthly 
 42
income as a proxy. This variable was divided into nine categories from less than € 
1500 to more than € 5000. 
The second category of background variables that we included pertains to a 
respondent’s job type. The group of civil servants working in central government is 
highly heterogeneous, ranging from managers via policy officials to those working in 
support functions, such as secretaries. The questionnaire included a question in which 
respondents were asked to characterize their job in one of eight categories: policy 
preparation, oversight, management, research, policy implementation, secretariat, 
support, and other. This question is used to assess the variation in EU-related work 
across job types. In doing so, we expect secretarial and support staff to be least 
involved since most EU-related activities by member state civil servants relate to 
substantive policy-making and implementation. 
As a third category, we expect differences in EU-involvement between the 
several organizations within central government. After all, some policy areas are 
more heavily Europeanized than others and it may therefore be expected that civil 
servants working in those fields are involved in EU-related work more often. In 
addition, we may expect there to be a difference between policy departments, which 
formulate policies, and executive agencies, which carry them out. Since the EU is 
primarily a policy-making institution, we could expect civil servants in policy 
departments to be involved in EU-related work more often than civil servants in 
executive agencies. On the other hand, in a survey among Norwegian civil servants, 
Egeberg and Trondal (1999) did not find any significant difference between 
Norwegian ministries and agencies. For analysing differences between organizations, 
we used a survey question that required respondents to indicate for which 
organization within Dutch central government they worked. Respondents had a choice 
among eighteen organizations, including all ministries (with the exception of the 
Ministry of Defense). This variable was later used to construct a dichotomous variable 
that distinguished between policy departments and executive agencies. 
 In analysing the organizational dimension of EU-related work, we also seek to 
explain differences in organizational support for this type of work in the various 
organizations involved. In doing so, we rely on three background variables that were 
also used for analysing individual involvement. First, we look at the respondent’s job 
type, using the same categories that were outlined above. This allows us to see if civil 
servants in different types of jobs experience different levels of organizational 
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support. Second, we look at the difference between policy departments and executive 
agencies. Third and finally, we analyse organizational support as a function of the 
overall degree of Europeanization of the organization a respondent works for. 
 
 
3.3 Finding ‘Eurocrats’ in the Dutch civil service 
 
Let us now present the findings of the survey. We start with the first main issue: how 
big does EU-related work loom in the daily existence of Dutch central government 
bureaucrats. How many of them can be called national ‘Eurocrats’ – people for whom 
dealing with EU matters is part of their professional core business – and for how 
many is the EU merely something they hear about as citizens? 
 
3.3.1 EU involvement and time spent on the EU 
In the survey, we first asked respondents whether they dealt with the EU in their 
work. As is shown in table 1, around 30% of respondents answered ‘yes’ to this 
question. To distinguish these respondents from those who reported no involvement 
with the EU, we will refer to them as ‘Europeanized civil servants’. 
 
  
EU involvement Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
No 
 
3066 68,1 69,8 
Yes 
 
1329 29,5 30,2 
Valid total 
 
4395 97,6 100,0 
Missing 
 
107 2,4  
Total 4502 100,0   
Table 1. EU involvement among civil servants (N=4502) 
 
Within the group of Europeanized civil servants, the vast majority spends relatively 
little time on EU-related activities. This is indicated in figure 1, which shows the 
average number of hours a week spent on EU-related activities by Europeanized civil 
servants. As Figure 1 shows, a bit more than half of all Europeanized civil servants 
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spend 2 hours or less a week on EU-related activities, and almost 75% spend less than 
10 hours. On the other side of the spectrum, there are peaks at 30 hours, 36 hours and 
40 hours. The latter two answers presumably reflect a full working week for those 
respondents, making them the real ‘Eurocrats.’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can also look at the time spent on EU-related work by dividing the reported 
number of hours by the contractual working week of each respondent. We then obtain 
8245 43 40 38 36 34 33 32313028272524222018161512109876 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Figure 1: Time spent per week on EU-related activities 
among Europeanized civil servants (N=1244)  
25,0% 
20,0% 
15,0% 
10,0% 
5,0% 
0,0% 
A note on means and medians 
The mean (average) time spent on EU-related activities among Europeanized civil 
servants is 7.81 hours a week. This number is biased, however, by the relatively small 
group of respondents who report a high number of hours. As a result, some 69% of all 
respondents spend less than the mean 7.81 hours a week on EU-related activities. An 
alternative way of summarizing the data is therefore to look at the median time spent. The 
median is obtained by ordering all respondents starting with the ones who reported 0 
hours and ending with those who reported the highest number of hours, and then taking 
the respondent who lies precisely in the middle. For the group of Europeanized civil 
servants (the 30% of respondents who indicated they dealt with the EU), the median 
number of hours spent on the EU is 2, which reflects the fact that an overwhelming 
number of these respondents spend relatively few hours on EU-related activities. 
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the time spent on EU-related activities relative to the total working week. Table 2 
shows the time shares of EU-related activities divided among four classes, ranging 
from less than 25% to more than 75%. 
 
 
Share of contract 
time spent on EU Frequency 
Percentage of 
all 
respondents 
Percentage of 
Europeanized 
civil servants 
Cumulative Percentage 
of Europeanized civil 
servants 
Less than 25% 
 
918 20,4 73,9 73,9 
25-50% 
 
113 2,5 9,1 83,0 
50-75% 
 
76 1,7 6,1 89,1 
More than 75%1 
 
135 3,0 10,9 100,0 
Total 1242 27,62 100,0   
Table 2. Time share of EU-related work among all respondents and Europeanized civil servants 
(N=4502) 
 
The majority of Europeanized civil servants (73.9%) spend less than 25% of their 
contract time on the EU, while 10.9% spend more than 75% of their working week on 
EU-related activities. The categories between 25% and 75% combined account for the 
remaining 15.2%. These findings indicate that EU-related activities are dispersed 
among a wide range of Europeanized civil servants, but that a small group spends 
relatively much time on the EU. 
 
3.3.2 Understanding patterns of EU involvement 
What determines whether a civil servant will be involved in EU-related activities? 
And do the characteristics of Europeanized civil servants differ from those of non-
Europeanized civil servant? Above, we outlined three sets of variables on which 
Europeanized and non-Europeanized civil servants may differ: individual 
                                                 
1 For a small number of respondents, the EU-related time share exceeds 100 %. This may be due to the 
fact that they regularly make overtime, or that they hold more than one job (since the contractual 
working time is calculated on the basis of the respondent’s main job). 
2 The total percentage is less than the 30% of respondents who reported that they were involved in EU-
related work (see table 1). The reason for this is that some of those respondents failed to answer either 
the question on the number of hours spent on the EU or the question on the number of contract hours, 
leading to missing values for the time share of EU-related activities. 
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characteristics of civil servants, job type, and the type of organization in which civil 
servants work. We will first explore the relationship between these sets of variables 
and EU involvement by looking at the relevant cross tables. These cross tables will 
give an indication of how EU-related work is distributed among different types of 
civil servants. Subsequently, we will look at all potential explanatory variables 
together in a logistic regression analysis. 
To explore the relationship between age and EU involvement, Table 3 shows 
the numbers of Europeanized respondents in eight age classes. The table shows both 
the percentage of respondents in each category that indicated they were involved in 
EU-related activities and the median time spent on those activities among 
Europeanized civil servants. Respondents between the ages of 35 and 45 report most 
often that they are involved in EU-related work, but the differences between the age 
classes are fairly small and not significant.3 The median number of hours spent on 
EU-related activities by Europeanized civil servants is also fairly similar, with higher 
age categories reporting slightly higher numbers of hours (3 versus 2 hours). The 
youngest age category reports a much higher median time spent. This outcome should 
be treated with caution, however, because the number of respondents in this category 
who report being involved in EU-related activities is rather small (only 12). 
 
 Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Frequency Hours Frequency 
25 years and younger 21% 12 5.0 56 
26 – 30 years 30% 69 2.0 231 
31 – 35 years 28% 134 2.0 484 
36 – 40 years 33% 196 2.0 602 
41 – 45 years 33% 251 2.0 763 
46 – 50 years 31% 259 2.0 829 
51 – 55 years 31% 253 3.0 830 
56 years and older 26% 153 3.0 586 
Total 30% 1327 2.0 4381 
Table 3. EU involvement by age class (N=4381) 
 
The pattern for seniority also shows little systematic variation, as is shown in Table 4. 
Seniority is measured in terms of the number of years a respondent has worked in his 
                                                 
3 Cramer’s V=.054 (not significant). 
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or her current job. We have grouped the responses together in eight classes. There 
seems to be a slight decrease in EU-involvement as people occupy a position for more 
than 20 years, but differences are small.4 Moreover, people who have been in their 
current job for more than 30 years report a higher median time spent (although, again, 
this outcome may be biased by the relatively small number of respondents in those 
categories). 
 
 Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Hours Hours Frequency 
Less than 5 years 32% 614 2.0 1895 
5 – 9 years 29% 368 2.0 1259 
10 – 14 years 29% 119 2.0 408 
15 – 19 years 31% 86 3.0 278 
20 – 24 years 25% 48 2.0 192 
25 – 29 years 26% 44 1.0 167 
30 – 34 years 25% 25 9.0 101 
35 years and more 25% 15 5.0 59 
Total 30% 1319 2.0 4359 
Table 4. EU involvement by seniority (number of years in current job) (N=4359) 
 
Clearer differences are found when we look at the level of education enjoyed by 
respondents. Table 5 shows EU involvement across nine levels of education (plus a 
category ‘other’). The levels are indicated with their Dutch abbreviations and roughly 
ordered from lower to higher levels of education. The table shows clear increases in 
EU involvement as respondents have completed higher levels of education.5 The only 
exception is the ‘Havo/VWO’ category, which scores higher than ‘MBO’ and ‘HBO’. 
It is questionable, however, whether ‘MBO’ should be regarded as a ‘higher’ level of 
education than ‘Havo/VWO’. In addition to the numbers of civil servants involved in 
EU-related work, the median time spent also shows a gradual rise as the level of 
education increases.6 Hence, the two measures of EU-involvement reinforce each 
other. 
                                                 
4 As is also borne out by the (statistically not significant) Cramer’s V of .050. 
5 Cramer’s V for this table is .219 and highly significant at p<.001. 
6 The median time spent shows a peak at ‘WO Bachelor’. As in the tables above, this peak may be a 
result of the relatively small number of respondents in that category, so one should not impute too 
much substantive meaning to this outcome. 
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 Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Frequency Hours Frequency 
Primary education 22% 8 1.0 36 
LBO 18% 36 0.0 201 
Mavo 21% 149 2.0 721 
Havo, VWO 30% 148 2.0 489 
MBO 23% 190 2.0 835 
HBO 29% 283 2.0 978 
WO Bachelor/Kandidaats 43% 19 5.0 44 
University (Doctoraal) 46% 440 3.0 968 
PhD (gepromoveerd) 59% 47 3.5 80 
Other 25% 9 1.5 36 
Total 30% 1329 2.0 4388 
Table 5. EU involvement by educational level (N=4388) 
 
An association with EU involvement can also be seen for income, which can be 
treated as a proxy for the rank a respondent occupies within the civil service. Table 6 
shows the levels of EU involvement across nine categories of gross monthly income.7 
The level of EU-involvement consistently increases as income rises, from less than 
20% for incomes below € 2000 to a bit more than 50% for incomes of more than € 
5000.8 Contrary to expectations, higher ranks therefore seem to be associated with 
higher levels of EU-involvement. The median number of hours reported by 
Europeanized civil servants shows a somewhat erratic picture, although generally 
respondents in higher income classes tend also to report somewhat higher numbers of 
hours spent on EU-related activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In the survey, there were separate classes for less than € 1250, € 1251-1500, € 1501-1750 and € 1751-
2000. In order to obtain fixed intervals, these four classes were combined into two classes of less than € 
1500 and € 1501-2000, respectively. 
8 As a result, Cramer’s V is .230 and significant at p<.001. 
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 Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Frequency Hours Frequency 
Less than € 1500 15% 42 2.0 290 
€ 1501 – 2000 20% 99 2.0 505 
€ 2001 – 2500 22% 190 1.0 883 
€ 2501 – 3000 29% 161 2.0 552 
€ 3001 – 3500 33% 194 4.0 588 
€ 3501 – 4000 35% 129 2.0 372 
€ 4001 – 4500 38% 143 4.0 376 
€ 4501 – 5000 49% 94 2.0 192 
More than € 5000 51% 195 4.0 385 
Total 30% 1247 2.0 4143 
Table 6. EU involvement by gross monthly income (N=4143) 
 
In addition to these individual characteristics, we can also look at the type of work a 
civil servant does, as we may expect different types of civil servants to be 
differentially involved in EU-related activities. As is shown in table 7, this is indeed 
the case. Almost half of the officials working on policy preparation deal with the EU 
in one way or another. Interestingly, this is less so the case for officials working on 
policy implementation; in this group, only one third indicates his or her work has a 
European dimension to it. A large percentage of managers also indicate their work has 
been Europeanized. Not surprisingly, those holding support and secretarial functions 
deal with EU affairs least often. These differences also hold when we look at the 
median time spent on EU-related activities by those civil servants who indicated they 
are involved in EU-related work. Median civil servants involved in policy preparation 
and oversight spend most time on EU-related activities while Europeanized civil 
servants involved in secretarial or support work score well below the overall median. 
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 Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Frequency Hours Frequency 
Policy preparation 47% 270 4.0 581 
Oversight 43% 282 4.0 660 
Management 37% 186 2.0 498 
Research 35% 71 2.0 201 
Policy implementation 30% 224 2.0 749 
Secretariat 18% 49 0.0 275 
Support 17% 144 1.0 829 
Other 17% 92 2.0 558 
Total 30% 1318 2.0 4351 
Table 7. EU involvement by work type (N=4351) 
 
We can do the same for the different organizations within the Dutch central 
government that are covered in the survey. In addition to all ministries (except the 
Ministry of Defense), the survey includes some of the larger executive agencies (the 
tax service (‘Belastingdienst’), the immigration service (IND), the prison service 
(DJI) and ‘Rijkswaterstaat’), as well as the ‘Hoge Colleges van Staat’. The 
organizations are shown in Table 8, starting with the organization that has the highest 
percentage of Europeanized civil servants and so on. Dutch abbreviations and names 
are used to identify each organization (they will explained in the text below). 
 
Organization Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Frequency Hours Frequency 
LNV 61% 169 8.0 276 
BZ 56% 63 4.0 113 
V&W 52% 58 3.0 111 
EZ 52% 60 4.0 115 
SZW 38% 43 1.5 114 
VROM 37% 62 2.0 167 
Financiën (not including 
Belastingdienst) 
37% 37 4.0 100 
IND 34% 34 2.0 101 
VWS 33% 46 2.0 141 
Belastingdienst 31% 386 4.0 1237 
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Rijkswaterstaat 31% 105 2.0 340 
BZK 30% 26 2.0 86 
Hoog College van Staat 25% 13 1.0 52 
OCW 18% 21 2.0 116 
Justitie (not including 
DJI and IND) 
17% 117 1.0 687 
AZ 17% 2 1.0 12 
DJI 11% 58 0.0 554 
Other 39% 26 2.0 66 
Total 30% 1326 2.0 4388 
Table 8. EU involvement by government organization (N=4388) 
 
From Table 8 we can derive a  ‘league table’ of the ÉU-ness’ of Dutch public 
organizations. Three clusters can be distinguished: 
• Eurocratic bulwarks. Four organizations have more than 50% Europeanized 
civil servants: the Ministries of Agriculture (LNV), Foreign Affairs (BZ), 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W), and Economic 
Affairs (EZ). The median time spent on EU-related work reported by 
respondents from these organizations is also above the ‘overall’ median of 2.0 
hours (up to 8.0 hours in the Ministry of Agriculture). From these four 
organizations, LNV, BZ and EZ are among the departments that have 
traditionally been identified as strongly involved in EU policymaking. The 
high number of Europeanized civil servants in the Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management is perhaps a bit more surprising. On the 
other hand, in their survey among Norwegian civil servants, Egeberg and 
Trondal (1999) also found that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Transport, 
and Industry & Energy were most affected by the EU, so the high score for 
V&W may reflect a wider pattern. 
• Eurocratic runners-up. A second group is formed by a number of 
organizations that have between 30 and 40% Europeanized civil servants. Of 
these organizations, the Ministries of Social Affairs (SZW), Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment (VROM) and Finance (Financiën) score close 
to 40%, while the Immigration Service (IND), the tax service 
(Belastingdienst), the Water Management Service (Rijkswaterstaat), as well as 
the Ministries of Health (VWS) and the Interior (BZK) are closer to 30%. The 
differences within this group are relatively small, however. The same is true of 
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the median time spent on EU-related activities, which is 2.0 hours for most 
organizations (but lower for SZW at 1.5 hours and higher for the Ministry of 
Finance and the tax service at 4.0). 
• National champions. The third group, finally, is formed by a number of 
organizations that score well below 30% Europeanized civil servants. Apart 
from the ‘Hoge Colleges van Staat’ (which include, among others, Parliament 
and the Accounting Office), this group includes the Ministries of Education 
and Culture (OCW) and Justice (Justitie), the Prime Minister’s Office (AZ), 
and the Prison Service (DJI). The median time spent on EU-related activities 
also tends to be lower than the overall median with the exception of OCW, 
which scores exactly on the overall median of 2.0 hours. What is most 
surprising about this group is the Justice Department, as justice has been one 
of the key areas in EU policymaking over the past few years.9 
In contrast to the high-scoring organizations, our survey differs from 
the results of Egeberg and Trondal (1999) when it comes to organizations that 
are least affected by the EU. The lowest-scoring organizations in the 
Norwegian survey were the Ministries of Children & Family Affairs and 
Health & Social Affairs. There is no equivalent in Dutch central government 
for the former ministry, but both the Ministries of Social Affairs and Health 
score relatively higher in the Dutch survey. It is not clear why.  
We can break down the results on organizations in a different way, focusing on the 
common distinction between executive agencies (Belastingdienst, Rijkswaterstaat, 
IND and DJI) and policy departments (all government ministries plus the Hoge 
Colleges van Staat).10 Table 9 shows the number of Europeanized civil servants in 
each category. 
 
 
                                                 
9 A partial explanation for this is that the category ‘Justitie’ also includes support staff in the judiciary, 
which is less likely to be involved in EU-related activities.Based on the survey data, we cannot directly 
differentiate within the Justitie category. However, we can look at the work location of each 
respondent. Taking ‘working in The Hague’ as a proxy for ‘working at the policy department of 
Justice’, we indeed find that respondents working in The Hague are more often involved in EU-related 
work than those working outside of The Hage (26% as compared to 15%). This, however, is a crude 
measure, as the number of respondents working in The Hague is lower than what could be expected on 
the basis of the total number of employees in the Department of Justice. Moreover, even if we take this 
as a valid proxy, the Ministry of Justice scores lower than other ministries. 
10 The ‘other’ category is left out of this distinction. 
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 Involved in 
EU-related work 
Median time spent 
(among Europeanized 
civil servants only) 
Total number of 
respondents 
 Percent Frequency Hours Frequency 
Executive agency 26.1% 583 2.0 2232 
Policy department 34.3% 717 2.0 2090 
Total 30% 1300 2.0 4322 
Table 9. EU involvement by executive agency vs. policy department (N=4322) 
N.B. Cramer’s V=.089 (p<.001) 
 
This shows that policy departments count a somewhat higher number of Europeanized 
civil servants than executive agencies (34.4% vs. 26.1%), while the median number of 
hours spent on EU-related activities is the same in both types of organization. This 
difference is statistically significant, but not overwhelmingly large (as indicated by 
Cramer’s V of .089). These findings are in line with the Norwegian surveys, in which 
civil servants in ministries indicated a slightly higher impact of the EU on their work 
than civil servants in agencies. A caveat in interpreting these results is that we have 
only been able to look at some executive agencies, because independent ‘quango-
type’ executive agencies (‘ZBO’s’ in the Dutch administrative system) were not 
included in the survey. 
 
3.3.3 Profiling Dutch Eurocrats: an integrated apporach 
Useful as these tables may be for exploring the differences in EU involvement among 
different types of civil servants and organizations, they do not allow for a more 
integrated assessment of differences in EU involvement. To that end, we need to look 
at the impact of several potential explanations simultaneously. We have done this 
through a logistic regression. This is used to find out which factors explain whether a 
respondent falls in one of two categories (such as answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the 
question on EU involvement). 
 For explaining this outcome, we included three blocks of variables: 
• The four variables that indicate individual characteristics: age11, income12, 
seniority13 and educational level (which was recoded into a dichotomous 
variable with values ‘high’ and ‘low’14). 
                                                 
11 In the logistic regression, we did not use the categories of Table 3, but the age in years. 
12 We used the categories of Table 6, which can be treated as an interval-level variable. 
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• The type of work a civil servant does (see Table 7). Because this variable has 
eight categories, it was split up into dummies that indicated ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for 
each of the types of work. These dummies were subsequently included in the 
logistic regression analysis. Because we expect support staff to be least 
involved in EU-related work (an assumption that is also borne out by Table 7), 
the category ‘support staff’ was taken as the baseline category, against which 
all other categories are compared. 
• The organization a civil servant works for (see Table 8). Here, too, we had to 
split the variable into dummies for each organization.15 In the analysis, we 
took the Ministry of the Interior (BZK) as our baseline, which implies that all 
other organizations are compared against BZK. 
The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 10.16 A separate text box 
gives some guidance on interpretation. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B Exp B B Exp B B  Exp B 
Age -0.025*** 0.975*** -0.024*** 0.977*** -0.026*** 0.975*** 
Income 0.231*** 1.260*** 0.199*** 1.220*** 0.156*** 1.169*** 
Seniority 0.012* 1.012* 0.006 1.006 0.007 1.007 
Education level 0.159 1.172 0.095 1.100 0.090 1.094 
Policy preparation   0.882*** 2.416*** 0.933*** 2.541*** 
Oversight   1.116*** 3.054*** 1.138*** 3.120*** 
Management   0.409** 1.506** 0.548*** 1.730*** 
Research   0.770*** 2.159*** 0.811*** 2.251*** 
Policy implementation   0.603*** 1.828*** 0.688*** 1.989*** 
Secretariat   0.232 1.261 0.346 1.414 
Other types of work   -0.011 0.989 0.168 1.183 
LNV     1.367*** 3.924*** 
BZ     1.100** 3.004** 
V&W     0.723* 2.060* 
EZ     0.730* 2.074* 
                                                                                                                                            
13 In the logistic regression, we did not use the categories of Table 4, but the precise number of years in 
the current job. 
14 ‘High’ includes Polytechnics (‘HBO’) and university degrees; ‘low’ includes all other types of 
education. The category ‘other’ was treated as missing. 
15 Because of the low numbers of respondents in them, the Prime Minister’s Office, the ‘Hoge Colleges 
van Staat’ and the category ‘other’ were combined into a new category ‘other’. 
16 The analysis of residuals and of influence statistics (Cook distances, leverage values, and DFBetas) 
revealed no undue influence on the model from outliers or specific cases. Multicollinearity diagnostics 
give some cause for concern regarding the organizational dummies ‘Belastingdienst’, ‘Justitie’ and 
‘DJI’ – this will be noted in the discussion of the results where appropriate. 
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SZW     0.177 1.194 
VROM     0.232 1.262 
Financiën     0.374 1.454 
IND     0.265 1.304 
VWS     -0.024 0.977 
Belastingdienst     0.188 1.207 
Rijkswaterstaat     -0.019 0.981 
OCW     -0.777* 0.460* 
Justitie     -0.492 0.612 
DJI     -1.042*** 0.353*** 
Other organizations     0.148 1.160 
Constant -0.981*** 0.375*** -1.353*** 0.259*** -1.208*** 0.299*** 
Step χ2 121.809*** 258.175*** 
Model χ2 
245.740*** 
367.549*** 625.724*** 
R2 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) .049 .074 .126 
R2 (Cox & Snell) .059 .087 .143 
R2 (Nagelkerke) .083 .122 .202 
Table 10. Logistic regression model for EU involvement, using forced entry with three blocks of variables 
(N=4059) * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpreting the logistic regression model in Table 10 
The most interesting columns in Table 10 are labeled ‘exp B’. These columns show how 
each variable affects the likelihood of a civil servant being involved in EU-related work. An 
exp B greater than 1 indicates that as the variable increases (for variables such as age and 
income), a civil servant is more likely to be involved in EU-related work. An exp B smaller 
than 1 indicates that the likelihood of being involved in EU-related work decreases. 
For dummy variables, the interpretation is slightly different: an exp B greater than 1 
indicates that civil servants are more likely to be involved in EU-related work if they belong 
to the group coded by the dummy compared to the group that we selected as our baseline 
(here: ‘support staff’ and ‘BZK’). 
 The asterisks (*, **, and ***) indicate whether the exp B is statistically significant. 
If there is no asterisk behind the exp B, this means there is a serious probability that the exp 
B value may actually point in a different direction than the value we found (that is, it may 
actually be smaller than 1 although we found a value greater than 1, and vice versa). In that 
case, we cannot say that the variable in question has an effect on the likelihood of being 
involved in EU-related work. If there is an asterisk behind the exp B, however, we may be 
confident that the variable does have an effect, and the more asterisks the better. 
 The bottom rows show some overall measures of the three models. The χ2 shows the 
contribution the model makes to explaining the likelihood that a civil servant is involved in 
EU-related work. The ‘model χ2’ does so for all variables taken together; the ‘step χ2’ does 
so for the new variables that were added to the model in comparison to the previous step. 
The asterisks have the same meaning as they had for the values of exp B. 
 The R2’s also give a measure of the overall explanatory power of a model. They 
range between 0 and 1, with 1 meaning complete explanation and 0 meaning no explanation 
whatsoever. 
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In Table 10, the three models represent the three steps in which the variables were 
added, relating to individual characteristics, type of work, and organization, 
respectively. The model shows the following things: 
• From the individual characteristics, ‘age’ and ‘income’ are significantly 
related to the likelihood that civil servants are involved in EU-related work: 
o The older a civil servant, the less likely he or she is to be involved in 
EU-related work. This may be surprising given the figures shown in 
Table 3, but two points are in order here. First, even though age is 
significantly related to EU involvement, the impact is rather small 
(which is borne out by an exp B close to 1). Second, the lower age 
classes in Table 3 contained relatively few respondents, so the scores 
in older age classes have a greater impact than the scores in low age 
classes. 
o The higher a civil servant’s income (indicating a higher rank), the more 
likely he or she is to be involved in EU-related work. This conforms to 
the findings of Table 6. 
Seniority and education level are not significantly related to the likelihood of 
being involved in EU-related work. For seniority, this confirms the 
conclusions drawn from Table 4 above. For education, it implies that the 
differences between levels of education are explained by the other variables.17 
• The type of work a civil servant does adds significantly to explaining the 
likelihood of being involved in EU-related work. We took ‘support staff’ as a 
baseline. Looking at the individual dummies for type of work, we find that: 
o Civil servants involved in policy preparation, management, oversight, 
research en policy implementation are significantly more likely to be 
involved in EU-related work than support staff; 
o Civil servants involved secretarial or other types of work are not 
significantly more or less likely to be involved in EU-related work than 
managers. 
This confirms the conclusions drawn from Table 7. 
• The set of dummies coding for the organization a civil servant works for 
makes a statistically significant contribution to explaining the likelihood of 
                                                 
17 In addition, the dichotomization of the education variable for the logistic regression may have 
reduced the impact of this variable. 
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being involved in EU-related work. Moreover, this contribution is relatively 
large, as can be seen from the step χ2. This means where a civil servant works 
is a more important determinant of EU-involvement than the type of work 
(s)he does. Looking at the individual organizations, the model largely 
confirms the impressions from Table 8: 
o Civil servants from LNV, BZ, V&W and EZ are significantly more 
likely to be involved in EU-related work than civil servants from BZK; 
o Civil servants from OCW and DJI are significantly less likely to be 
involved in EU-related work than civil servants from BZK. 
Civil servants from all other organizations are not significantly likely to be more or 
less involved in EU-related work than civil servants from BZK.18 
The R2’s listed in the bottom rows of the table indicate the total explanatory 
power of the models. A value close to 1 indicates that the model fully explains 
whether or not civil servants are involved in EU-work, while a value close to 0 
indicates the model does not explain anything. The values found are moderate, 
indicating that in the end the variables included in the models can only explain EU-
involvement to a limited extent.  
In sum, our analysis implies that Europeanized civil servants do not differ very 
much from non-Europeanized civil servants. Insofar as they differ, it is mainly in 
terms of the organizations they are likely to work for, the type of job they do, and (to 
a very limited extent) age and income. 
 
3.3.4 What do civil servants do when they deal with EU matters?  
In addition to EU-involvement and the number of hours spent on EU-related 
activities, respondents were also asked to indicate how important certain specific EU-
related activities were in their work. As can be seen in Appendix I, eight specific 
activities were discerned: 
• Preparation of EU meetings 
                                                 
18 Compared to Table 8, ‘Justitie’ and ‘Other’ are not significantly different from ‘BZK’. There may be 
two explanations for this: 
• The model takes into account a whole range of variables at the same time. Hence, any 
difference between organizations may also be explained by differences in other variables 
between these organizations; 
• Multicollinearity diagnostics identify a potential mulicollinearity problem between 
‘Belastingdienst’, ‘Justitie’ en ‘DJI’. This may have suppressed the impact of the ‘Justitie’ 
dummy. 
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• Participation in Council Working Groups 
• Participation in Commission Working Groups 
• Bilateral contacts with colleagues from other member states 
• Transposition of EU law 
• Enforcement of EU law 
• Taking into account EU policies during national policy-making 
• Involving local governments in EU policymaking or implementation 
For each activity, respondents could indicate whether it was completely unimportant, 
not so important, neutral, fairly important or very important in their work. These 
answers can be used to gain a better understanding of the kinds of activities civil 
servants engage in and how these activities are related. For analytical purposes, these 
answer categories were later recoded into a separate dichotomous variable with the 
following two categories: 
• ‘Important’: answer categories ‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’ in the 
original question; 
• ‘Unimportant’: answer categories ‘completely unimportant’, ‘not so 
important’ and ‘neutral’ in the original question. 
Table 11 gives an overview of the importance of each of the eight specific activities 
among Europeanized civil servants. As follows from the table, ‘top-down’ activities 
are the most important EU-related activities. Two thirds of Europeanized civil 
servants indicate that implementation is an important aspect of their work. More than 
half point towards the importance of considering EU policies in national policy 
preparation and 44 % of the respondents are involved in transposition. The activity 
that is least widespread amongst the respondents is the participation in Council 
working groups, which is an activity 17 % of Europeanized civil servants say is 
important in their work. 
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 Important  Unimportant Total 
 % Frequency % Frequency N 
Implementation  67 852 33 417 1269 
Consideration of EU policies  51 640 49 619 1259 
Transposition 44 555 56 701 1256 
Bilateral consultation 33 420 67 843 1263 
Preparation of negotiations 33 417 67 853 1270 
Commission working groups 25 317 75 940 1257 
Involving local government 25 309 75 947 1256 
Council working groups 17 211 83 1048 1259 
Table 11. Importance of specific EU-related activities among Europeanized civil servants 
 
An interesting follow up question is how these activities relate to each other: do 
respondents specialize in one or a few of these activities or is there considerable 
overlap and do civil servants tend to do most of these activities at the same time? A 
first stab at this question can be obtained by looking at the associations between the 
various activities. If we do so, a number of things become apparent: 
• There are very strong associations among the activities that are related to 
decision-making in the EU. ‘Preparation of EU meetings’, ‘participation in 
Council Working Groups’ and ‘Participation in Commission Groups’ have a 
Cramer’s V of at least .550 among themselves, and the relationships with 
bilateral contacts are also very strong.19 
• ‘Transposition’ and ‘enforcement’ are fairly strongly associated, although less 
so than the decision-making activities among themselves. 
• There is also a fairly strong relationship between ‘transposition’ and each of 
the decision-making activities, indicating considerable overlap between these 
activities. 
• ‘Taking into account EU policies’ and ‘involving local governments’ have 
fairly strong relationships with each of the other activities. 
The strength of associations between the activities gives some idea about the extent to 
which activities go together. It does not show, however, what precise form these 
associations take. To find this out, we need to examine the cross tables between the 
                                                 
19 Cramer’s V is a measure that can be used to establish the strength of associations between 
categorical variables. A value close to 0 indicates that there is no relationship between the two 
variables; a value close to 1 indicates a very strong relationship. The numbers reported in the text were 
calculated on the basis of the dichotomized variables. Calculating Cramer’s V with the original five-
point variables yields almost identical outcomes. However, the dichotomized variables are used here 
because the accompanying cross tables are easier to interpret. 
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activities. Doing this for all possible combinations would yield an unwieldy number 
of cross tables, so we will look at a cross table that is representative of the broader 
pattern in the data. 
Table 12 shows the cross table for ‘participation in Council Working Parties’ 
and ‘participation in Commission Working Groups’. The columns show the 
percentage of respondents that find participation in Commission Working Groups 
unimportant and important, respectively. The rows indicate how many respondents 
find participation in Council Working Groups (un)important. The percentages behind 
‘% within Council Working Groups’ add up to 100% across rows, while the 
percentages behind ‘% within Commission Working Groups’ add up across columns. 
As can be seen from the percentages in the table, the association between the two 
activities is not completely symmetrical. The vast majority of those who find 
participation in Council groups important also find participation in Commission 
groups important (85%). Yet a much smaller proportion of those who find 
participation in Commission groups important also find participation in Council 
groups important (57%). 
 
  
Participation in 
Commission Working 
Groups Total 
  Unimportant Important   
% within Council 
Working Groups 
87,0% 13,0% 
  
 Unimportant 
% within Commission 
Working Groups 
96,7% 43,0% 
1039 
% within Council 
Working Groups 
14,8% 85,2% 
  
Participation in 
Council 
Working Groups 
  
  
 Important 
  
% within Commission 
Working Groups 
3,3% 57,0% 
210 
Total Count 935 314 1249 
Table 12. Cross table between ‘Importance of participation in Council Working Groups’ and ‘Importance 
of participation Commission Working Groups’, based on the dichotomous variables for each (N=1249) 
 
This pattern can be explained by taking into account the absolute number of people 
who indicated that they find these two activities important. As was shown in Table 11, 
25% of Europeanized civil servants found participation in Commission working 
groups important, compared to only 17% who said the same of Council working 
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groups. Hence, participants in Council Working Groups may form a subset of the 
(larger) group of participants in Commission Working Groups. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that similar patterns can be found 
between preparation of EU meetings (which scored higher still in Table 11) and 
participation in Council and Commission groups. Moreover, the same holds true for 
the relationship between ‘transposition’ and ‘enforcement’: 88% of respondents who 
indicate that transposition is important also indicate that enforcement is important, but 
the other way around only 58% of respondents who say enforcement is important also 
say transposition is important. This pattern even holds for the two ‘extremes’ in Table 
11: 78% of respondents who indicate Council Working Groups are important also say 
enforcement is important, but the other way around it is only 20%. 
The pattern of activities therefore resembles a Russian Matryoshka doll, in 
which the smaller dolls (here: activities less frequently mentioned as important) fit 
into the larger dolls (here: activities more frequently mentioned as important), but not 
vice versa. 
 A closer look at the way the specific activities relate to each other can be had 
by doing a factor analysis on these activities. A factor analysis is a statistical 
technique designed to find out if there are clusters of variables that are strongly 
related. A factor analysis extracts a number of factors (i.e. clusters) from the data and 
shows how the individual variables relate to those factors. 
 Table 13 shows the outcomes of the factor analysis. The analysis was carried 
out on the original questions on specific activities with five answer categories.20 Since 
we used a technique called ‘principal component analysis’, the factors are called 
‘components’. The analysis revealed two underlying clusters of activities 
(components 1 and 2). Table 13 shows how closely each of the activities is related to 
these two components (the so-called ‘factor loadings’ of each activity). The closer a 
factor loading is to 1, the stronger an activity is related to that component. Factor 
loadings have only been indicated if they are greater than .4. 
Component 1 consists of all activities related to EU decision-making. Each of 
these activities has a factor loading of more than .85, indicating a strong correlation. 
Moreover, ‘involving local governments’ and ‘taking into account EU policies’ also 
                                                 
20 The factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis. Factor rotation was carried out 
using direct oblimin, because all activities are correlated to some extent. Factors were extracted if their 
eigenvalues were greater than 1.0. Tests for multicollinearity and sample size adequacy all scored well 
above minimally required values. 
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load highly onto this component. In addition, transposition loads fairly highly on 
component 1, although it loads more on component 2. As a result, we can interpret 
component 1 in two ways, in a broader and a stricter sense: 
• In a broader sense, component 1 shows that most EU-related activities are 
related. Hence, if respondents find one activity important, they are likely also 
to find other activities important (with the exception of enforcement). 
• In a stricter sense, component 1 relates to EU decision-making or, stated 
differently, the Dutch input into EU decision-making. 
Component 2 consists of enforcement (which loads most highly onto this component), 
transposition (more so than onto component 1) and ‘taking EU policies into account’ 
(but less so than onto component 1). The most obvious interpretation of this 
component is therefore that it relates to the implementation of EU policies or, stated 
differently, EU input in Dutch regulation and policymaking. 
 
 Component 
  
1 
‘Dutch input into 
EU policymaking’ 
2 
‘Implementation of 
EU law and policies’ 
Commission Working 
Groups 
,930  
Preparation of EU meetings ,920  
Bilateral contacts ,878  
Council Working Groups ,878  
Involving local 
governments 
,624  
Taking into account EU 
policies 
,498 ,453 
Transposition ,455 ,581 
Enforcement  ,904 
Table 13. Factor loadings of the specific EU-related activities on the two extracted components (factor 
loadings shown if they are greater than .4; the total explained variance is 73%). 
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Having completed our analysis of individual work patterns, let us now move on to 
explore our second key question in this chapter: the organizational dimension of 
‘Eucrocracy’ in the Dutch civil service. 
 
 
3.4 The organizational contexts of Eurocrats 
 
3.4.1 Dispersion of EU-related activities within organizations 
Above, we showed how many civil servants are involved in EU-related work and how 
much time they spend on these activities. Apart from this overall EU involvement, it 
is also important to look at the way these activities are embedded within the broader 
organization: is the EU the province of a small number of specialists or are EU-related 
activities spread across a wide range of civil servants? The figures on time spent 
already indicated that although almost 30% of respondents report EU involvement, 
most of these respondents spend 2 hours or less on EU-related activities a week, while 
some spend up to 40 hours a week. 
 In order to take a closer look at the spread of EU-related activities and at 
differences between organizations, we have constructed a ‘dispersion index’. The 
dispersion index ranges from 0 to 1. If it is 1, all respondents in an organization spend 
exactly the same amount of time on the EU, so EU-related work is widely dispersed. 
If, by contrast, the index is close to 0, EU-related work is concentrated in one or a few 
respondents, indicating a low dispersion. The way in which this index was calculated 
is explained in a separate text box. For purposes of interpretation, it is important to 
keep in mind that dispersion is not the same as EU involvement. For example, if in an 
organization everyone spends 1 hour a week on the EU, the dispersion index will be 
1. If, however, half of the people spend 10 hours a week and the other half 30 hours, 
the index will be 0.8. Even though EU involvement is much higher in the latter case, 
dispersion is lower because some people spend more time on the EU than others. 
 Table 14 shows the dispersion indexes for each organization in Dutch central 
government and for the whole sample. It also repeats the levels of EU-involvement 
reported in Table 8. 
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Organization Involved in 
EU-related 
work 
Dispersion 
index 
(total) 
Dispersion 
index (among 
Europeanized 
civil servants) 
Number of 
respondents 
LNV 61% 0.29 0.47 276 
BZ 56% 0.18 0.32 113 
V&W 52% 0.19 0.35 111 
EZ 52% 0.18 0.34 115 
SZW 38% 0.10 0.27 114 
VROM 37% 0.11 0.31 167 
Financiën (not including 
Belastingdienst) 
37% 0.12 0.33 100 
IND 34% 0.07 0.22 101 
VWS 33% 0.12 0.35 141 
Belastingdienst 31% 0.11 0.34 1237 
Rijkswaterstaat 31% 0.10 0.32 340 
BZK 30% 0.08 0.25 86 
Hoog College van Staat 25% 0.12 (0.49) 52 
OCW 18% 0.07 0.38 116 
Justitie (not including DJI 
and IND) 
17% 0.03 0.16 687 
AZ 17% 0.17 (1.00) 12 
DJI 11% 0.01 0.10 554 
Other 39% 0.11 0.28 66 
Total 30% 0.09 0.31 4388 
Table 14. EU involvement and dispersion indexes by government organization (N=4388) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculating the dispersion index 
The dispersion index is based on the measure for the ‘effective number of political 
parties’ in the political science literature. This number is calculated by dividing one 
by the sum of squares of the shares of votes each party has in parliament (or 
elections). In a formula: 
Effective number of parties = 1 / (Σ vi2), in which v is the share of votes a 
party has (and ‘i’ stands for ‘the i-th party’). 
For instance, if there are three parties in parliament that each have one third of the 
votes, the effective number of parties will be 3. But, if one party has 50% of the votes 
and the two others each have 25%, the effective number of parties will be 2.67. A 
similar formula can be used to calculate the ‘effective number of Europeanized civil 
servants’ in an organization, using the time spent by each civil servant as a share of 
the total time spent on EU-related activities in that organization. This share then 
becomes the vi in the formula. Since the size of organizations differs considerably, the 
‘effective number of civil servants’ does not tell us much. Hence, we divide it by the 
total number of civil servants from that organization to obtain a figure between 0 and 
1. The formula then becomes: 
Dispersion index = 1 / (n * Σ vi2), in which vi is the share of the i-th 
respondent in the total amount of time spent on EU-related work, and n is 
the total number of respondents. 
 65
 
The figures in the column ‘Dispersion index (total)’ have been calculated on the basis 
of all respondents from a given organization, whether they indicated that they were 
involved in EU-related work or not.21 The pattern of dispersion indexes more or less 
follows that of EU-involvement (the percentage of respondents involved in EU-
related work) in the sense that higher levels of EU-involvement tend to go together 
with higher levels of dispersion. Nevertheless, within this broader pattern, some 
organizations score relatively high on dispersion (e.g. LNV and VWS) while others 
score relatively low (e.g. SZW, IND and Justitie). 
 Since overall EU-involvement and overall dispersion tend to be associated, we 
can obtain a clearer picture of the extent to which dispersion is higher or lower than 
expected by looking at the dispersion of EU-related work among Europeanized civil 
servants only. This is done in the column ‘Dispersion index (among Europeanized 
civil servants)’. Since these figures have been calculated only among respondents who 
reported EU-involvement, they are not influenced by the overall level of EU-
involvement in the organization. 
 This column shows even more clearly where the differences are. LNV now 
has by far the highest level of dispersion (at 0.47), while most organizations between 
BZ and OCW score between 0.30 and 0.40. Organizations with relatively low levels 
of dispersion are SZW, IND, BZK, Justitie and DJI.22 Put differently, in organizations 
with relatively low levels of dispersion, EU-related work is concentrated relatively 
strongly among a small number of civil servants. 
 Overall, the dispersion index reinforces the ‘league table’ derived from Table 
8. LNV is the most highly Europeanized government organization, in terms of EU-
involvement, median time spent and dispersion. BZ, V&W and EZ are also fairly 
strongly Europeanized. The group behind these shows a more mixed picture, with 
organizations scoring higher on some indicators than others. In general, however, the 
level of Europeanization tends to be lower among organizations in the justice side of 
central government (Justitie, DJI and, perhaps, IND). The other organizations are in 
between and may be characterized as ‘moderately Europeanized’. 
                                                 
21 For the purposes of calculation, all respondents who indicated they were not involved in EU-related 
work were assumed to spend 0 hours on EU-related activities. 
22 AZ and the Hoge Colleges van Staat score even higher than LNV but given the small number of 
Europeanized civil servants in these organizations these figures are not very meaningful. For instance, 
AZ has a score of 1.00 because two respondents indicated EU-involvement and they each spend 1 hour 
a week on EU-related activities. 
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3.4.2 Organizational support for EU-related work 
As a final element in the survey, we asked respondents to react to six statements about 
the way EU-related activities are embedded in their organization. These six statements 
read as follows: 
• My organization offers sufficient training opportunities for EU-related 
activities  
• When selecting candidates for EU-related activities, my employer takes 
sufficient account of European experience 
• Experience with EU-related activities offers an advantage for my career 
development  
• When I participate in EU-level meetings, I receive a clear negotiation mandate 
• In my organization, EU-related activities have a lower priority than purely 
national activities 
• In my policy area, there is sufficient co-ordination between those who 
negotiate at the EU-level about European policies, and those who are 
responsible for transposing and implementing those policies 
For each statement, respondents had a choice of five answers: ‘completely disagree’, 
‘largely disagree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘largely agree’ and ‘completely 
agree’. 
 Table 15 shows the distribution of answers across the five original answer 
categories for each of the six statements. The statements are indicated with key words 
that refer to the full statements listed above. 
 
Statement Completely 
disagree 
Largely 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Largely 
agree 
Completely 
agree 
N 
Training 8% 18% 27% 35% 12% 810 
Selection 9% 16% 43% 28% 4% 661 
Career 15% 15% 32% 28% 10% 772 
Mandate 11% 14% 44% 22% 9% 504 
Priority 20% 32% 28% 14% 6% 802 
Co-ordination 9% 19% 37% 27% 8% 668 
Table 15. Overall responses to the six statements 
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Two things can be noted about these overall patterns: 
• As can be seen in the last column (‘N’), the non-response to these statements 
was considerable. Out of a total of 1329 respondents who indicated that they 
dealt with the EU in their work, the number of respondents reacting to the 
statements ranged from 504 (for the statement on mandates) to 810 (for the 
statement on training). This may reflect the fact that not all statements are 
relevant to all Europeanized civil servants (e.g. the statement on mandates is 
only relevant if one is involved in EU-level meetings). This also means, 
however, that we should be cautious about the extent to which the answers 
reflect broader patterns in our sample, let alone in the wider population. 
• Substantively, the results show a mildly positive response to all statements 
(bearing in mind that the statement about priority was formulated in a negative 
way, so that ‘disagree’ becomes a positive statement). 
At the same time, there are no clear differences between the overall responses to the 
statements. A more interesting question is therefore whether there are differences 
among respondents from different types of organizations. We have analysed this by 
dividing the responses according to: 
• The type of work respondents do 
• Whether they work for a policy department or an executive agency 
• Whether they work for an organization that is Europeanized to a great, 
moderate or limited extent. 
In sum, it turns out that analysing the responses by individual organizations does not 
deliver many clear insights, since most organizations only had relatively few 
respondents who reacted to the statements. As a consequence, it is more useful to look 
at aggregated results. Moreover, these aggregated outcomes give an indication of why 
differences in responses occur, something that cannot be derived from differences 
between individual organizations per se. For the purposes of the analysis, the five 
original answer categories for the statements were recoded into a new variable with 
three categories: ‘disagree’, ‘neutral’ and ‘agree’. 
 
3.4.3 Organizational support and type of work 
One may assume that the responses to the statements differ between different types of 
respondents in terms of the work they do. To analyse this further, we took the eight 
 68
types of work that were introduced in Table 7 to see if there were any systematic 
differences between the groups. In analysing these differences, we relied on the 
recoded variable with three (rather than five) answer categories. The number of 
respondents for ‘secretarial work’, ‘support staff’, ‘research’ and ‘other’ was too 
small too make any meaningful comparisons, so we will concentrate on the other four 
types: ‘management’, ‘policy preparation’, ‘policy implementation’ and ‘oversight’. 
Each of these groups comprised at least 100 respondents for each statement.23 
Table 16 lists the percentage of respondents in these four groups who were in 
the ‘agree’ category for each of the six statements. Because the statement on priority 
was formulated negatively, the significant percentage is that of respondents answering 
‘disagree.’ 
 
Statement Management Policy preparation Implementation Oversight 
Training 53% 51% 46% 45% 
Selection 47% 31% 28% 24% 
Career 39% 47% 34% 32% 
Mandate 46% 52% 20% 9% 
Priority 56% 51% 50% 53% 
Co-ordination 43% 45% 30% 27% 
Table 16. Percentage of respondents answering ‘agree’ to each of the statements, by type of work 
(Note: for the statement on priority, the percentage of respondents answering ‘disagree’ has been taken) 
 
The statements on training opportunities and the priority accorded to EU-work show 
very little variation among the four groups, so apparently there is little difference in 
the way these issues are perceived by each of the four groups. The other statements 
show clearer differences, however. A number of patterns can be seen in these 
answers: 
• Respondents who describe themselves as working in management or policy 
preparation tend to answer more positively than those working in 
implementation or oversight. 
• This ‘split’ is clearest for the statements on mandate and co-ordination. Here, 
those working in management and policy preparation answer much more often 
positively than those working in implementation and oversight. This can be 
                                                 
23 The only statement for which some of these groups fall below this threshold is the statement on a 
mandate for EU-level meetings. Here, three groups have less than 100 respondents, with the smallest 
group (implementation) comprising 77 respondents. 
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seen most clearly for the statement on mandates, where 46% of managers and 
52% of policy officials indicate they receive a clear mandate, as compared to 
only 20% and 9% for implementation and oversight officials, respectively. 
The implications of the differences are probably different for these two 
statements: 
o For the statement on mandates, the differences seem to imply that 
respondents working in management or policy preparation are 
generally more closely tied to organizational mandates than 
respondents working in implementation or oversight positions. 
o For the statement on the co-ordination between EU negotiations and 
implementation, the answers may reveal a gap in perception, with 
managers and policy officials (who will tend to work mostly on the 
development of EU policies) being much more positive than 
implementers and oversight officials (who work on the implementation 
of EU policies). 
• For the statement on the extent to which European experience is taken into 
account when selecting people for EU-related work and the statement on the 
importance of EU-related experiences for one’s career, the split between 
management/policy preparation and implementation/oversight also exists, but 
here one group clearly scores higher than the others: 
o For the statement on selection, managers indicate much more often that 
European experience is taken into account than the other three groups. 
o For the statement on career prospects, officials involved in policy 
preparation indicate a much greater importance than the other three 
groups. 
 
3.4.4 Organizational support and type of organization 
The differences between responses to the statements may also be related to the type of 
organization civil servants work in. One way of distinguishing between the 
organizations in our sample is by dividing them into policy departments and executive 
agencies. As we saw in Table 10 above, respondents in policy departments tend to be 
involved a bit more often in EU-related work than respondents in executive agencies, 
but these differences are not particularly large. Table 17 shows how respondents in 
these two types of organization responded to each of the six statements. 
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  Disagree Neutral Agree N 
Executive agency 27% 29% 44% 322 
Training 
Policy department 25% 26% 49% 467 
Executive agency 26% 50% 24% 255 
Selection 
Policy department 25% 37% 38% 387 
Executive agency 34% 39% 28% 315 
Career 
Policy department 30% 27% 44% 438 
Executive agency 28% 56% 16% 187 
Mandate 
Policy department 23% 36% 40% 303 
Executive agency 50% 33% 17% 317 
Priority 
Policy department 54% 25% 21% 463 
Executive agency 31% 43% 26% 263 
Co-ordination 
Policy department 27% 31% 42% 388 
Table 17. Responses to the six statements by respondents in executive agencies and policy 
departments 
 
As above in the analysis according to type of work, the answers to the statements on 
training opportunities and the priority of EU-related work show little difference 
between executive agencies and policy departments. For each of the other four 
statements, however, respondents in policy departments tend to answer much more 
often in the ‘agree’ category than respondents in executive agencies, although the 
differences are much smaller in the ‘disagree’ category. This implies that: 
• European experience is taken into account in job selection for EU-related 
activities more often in policy departments than in executive agencies; 
• EU-related work experience is better for the career of respondents in policy 
departments than in executive agencies; 
• Respondents in policy departments receive clearer mandates for EU meetings 
than respondents in executive agencies; 
• Co-ordination between negotiation and implementation is viewed more 
positively by respondents in policy departments than in executive agencies. 
These outcomes reinforce the results we found for the different types of work in Table 
16. In fact, they may reflect the fact that relatively many implementation and 
oversight officials work in executive agencies. 
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3.4.5 Organizational support and the organizational degree of Europeanization 
In addition to the differences between policy departments and executive agencies, 
differences in organizational support may also result from differences in the degree to 
which organizations as a whole have been Europeanized. In Table 9 above, three 
groups of organizations could be discerned: the Eurocatic bulwarks (high: >50% 
Europeanized civil servants), the eurocratic runners-up (moderate: between 30 and 
40%) and the national champions (low: <30%). Table 18 shows the answers to the 
statements from respondents working in each of these three types of organization. 
 
Statement Degree of 
Europeanization 
Disagree Neutral Agree N 
Low 37% 21% 42% 83 
Moderate 26% 27% 48% 398 Training 
High 24% 28% 48% 260 
Low 33% 31% 36% 64 
Moderate 26% 47% 27% 322 Selection 
High 24% 39% 38% 221 
Low 38% 23% 38% 73 
Moderate 32% 37% 31% 384 Career 
High 25% 29% 46% 248 
Low 26% 38% 36% 47 
Moderate 28% 52% 21% 239 Mandate 
High 22% 36% 42% 176 
Low 39% 34% 27% 82 
Moderate 50% 30% 21% 389 Priority 
High 62% 24% 14% 264 
Low 31% 36% 34% 59 
Moderate 29% 43% 28% 332 Co-ordination 
High 28% 37% 43% 221 
Table 18. Responses to the six statements by respondents in organizations that a Europeanized to a 
high, moderate and low degree 
 
As before, the responses to the statement on training hardly show any difference, 
although respondents from national champion type organizations are a bit more 
critical than the others.24 Contrary to what we found above, however, differences do 
turn up for the statement on priority: respondents in Eurocratic bulwarks disagree 
more often than those in runner-up organizations, while respondents from national 
                                                 
24 Using Cramer’s V to assess the strength of the association does not reveal a statistically significant 
difference between the cells. 
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champions disagree least often.25 For the ‘agree’ category, the differences are less 
clear but still fairly sizeable. 
 For the other four statements, the following patterns can be observed: 
• In the ‘disagree’ category, the differences between groups are as expected 
(i.e., with more highly Europeanized organizations scoring lower), although 
the differences are not large. 
• In the ‘agree’ category, bulwark organizations score highest (as can be 
expected), but national champions score higher than runners-up.26 
The latter outcome is a bit puzzling, since we would expect the order to be ‘high’-
‘moderate’-‘low’ on each statement. There is no plausible theoretical explanation for 
this pattern. The most reasonable conclusion to draw is perhaps that the crucial 
difference is between bulwarks and the rest. In EU bulwarks, European experience 
plays a greater role in selecting people for EU-related work, is more important for 
one’s career development, civil servants going to EU meetings receive clearer 
mandates, and the co-ordination between negotiations and implementation is seen to 
be better than in the other two clusters of organizations. Moreover, in bulwarks EU-
related work is much less often accorded lower priority than national activities. All of 
these outcomes seem to reflect the fact that in bulwarks, EU-related work has been 
integrated much more strongly into organizational structures and daily work routines. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
Let’s sum up what we have found in this survey study. Firstly, as regards the EU-
involvement of individual civil servants, the data enables the following observations to 
be drawn: 
• Overall some 30% of Dutch civil servants are involved in EU-related activities 
to some degree or other. 
• However, the vast majority of these ‘Europeanized civil servants’ only devote 
relatively few hours to EU-related activities. 
                                                 
25 These differences are statistically significant, with Cramer’s V=.110 (p<.01). 
26 Since respondents from the tax service (‘Belastingdienst’) make up a large proportion of respondents 
in the ‘moderate’ category, we re-ran the analysis without the tax service. This reduced the differences 
between the moderate group and the others somewhat, but it did not reverse the order between these 
groups. 
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• In terms of background characteristics, Europeanized civil servants do not 
differ greatly from non-Europeanized civil servants. Off all individual and 
organizational background variables that we took into account, differences in 
EU involvement are associated most strongly with the organization for which 
a civil servant works, followed by the type of job the civil servants holds. 
Individual characteristics account for very little, although age and income 
show a significant association with EU involvement. 
• The questions on specific EU-related activities show that there are two clusters 
of activities, one centered on the Dutch input into EU policymaking, the other 
on implementation of EU law and policies. 
• Yet, these clusters are also strongly related among themselves, indicating that 
respondents to whom one activity is important also tend to find other activities 
important. 
• The general pattern of relationships among activities that emerges from the 
analysis is one of nested activities or a ‘participation ladder’ of EU-related 
activities. The bottom rungs of the ladder consist of activities that are 
important to a relatively broad range of Europeanized civil servants (in 
particular enforcement and ‘taking into account EU policies’). Going up the 
ladder, civil servants who engage in more specific activities (culminating in 
participation in Commission or Council Working Groups) tend also to find the 
lower rungs important but not the other way around. 
 
In terms of organizational embeddedness and support, a second set of observations 
can be made: 
• EU-related work tends to be spread more evenly among employees in 
organizations in which the overall EU involvement is higher (even if we 
correct for this higher level of overall involvement). As a result, EU-related 
work will tend to be embedded more strongly in those organizations. In 
organizations with a low overall level of EU involvement, EU-related 
activities also tend to be concentrated among a smaller number of civil 
servants. 
• Overall, slightly more respondents make a positive than a negative assessment 
of the organizational support for EU-related work in their organization. 
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• Managers and civil servants involved in policy preparation are more positive 
about the organizational support for their EU-related activities than 
respondents involved in policy implementation or oversight. 
• Respondents working in policy departments are generally more positive about 
the organizational support for their EU-related activities than respondents 
working in executive agencies. 
• Respondents generally answer more positively when they work in highly 
Europanized organizations. 
• In terms of specific aspects of organizational support, the following 
observations are relevant: 
o The assessment by respondents of training opportunities does not show 
any systematic variation between types of respondents. 
o The co-ordination between EU-level negotiations and the 
implementation of EU policies is evaluated more positively by those 
on the ‘policy-making side’ of the process (managers, civil servants 
involved in policy preparation, and respondents working in policy 
departments) than by those on the ‘implementation side’ (civil servants 
involved in policy implementation or oversight, and respondents 
working in executive agencies). The perception of co-ordination 
therefore differs substantially according to the position a respondent 
occupies. 
 
Overall, then, our findings suggest that there is a ‘virtuous circle’ of Europeanization 
in Dutch civil service organizations: the more civil servants are involved in EU-
related work and the more evenly this involvement is spread across the organization, 
the better EU-related work is supported. This, one may assume, will in turn lead to 
greater awareness of EU-related activities within the organization and, hence, greater 
EU involvement. The findings also suggest that there may be a critical threshold for 
this effect to occur. Our data show small differences between moderately and weakly 
Europeanized civil servants, but a strong difference between highly Europeanized 
organizations and the rest. 
 Of course, the extent to which an organization is involved in EU-related 
activities is determined by the policy area that organization is working in and the 
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specific responsibilities it has. It is no more than logical that the Ministry of 
Agriculture should show higher levels of EU-involvement than, for instance, the 
Ministry of Education. The key challenge in organizational terms is therefore how to 
assure sufficient support for EU-related work in organizations for which the EU is not 
a central concern. 
 Since organizational support for EU-related activities is linked to the existence 
of a ‘critical mass’ of Europeanized civil servants, efforts to improve the 
organizational support of EU-related work could focus on creating that critical mass. 
This could be achieved by building networks of civil servants working on EU-related 
activities in organizations that are not strongly Europeanized. Through these 
networks, best practices can be developed and shared among organizations that deal 
with EU-related activities. Moreover, EU-related work can be strengthened by giving 
more attention to the implementation and enforcement of EU policies. After all, this is 
the activity through which most civil servants deal with the EU in their work. 
Moreover, from the perspective of those working in implementation-related activities, 
the co-ordination between policy-making and policy implementation is an area that is 
open to improvement. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EUROCRATIC WORK AS STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR: MOVING 
BEFORE THE COMMISSION DOES IN VETERINARY POLICY  
 
 
4.1 Representing the ‘national interest’ in Brussels: introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the work of Eurocrats through the lens of the representation of 
national interests. It zooms in on one particular aspect of EU policy work: the 
manoeuvring that takes place during the early stages of the policymaking process in 
First Pillar settings, e.g. when the Commission is considering formulating a proposal. 
At this stage of the policy process, the Commission has the exclusive right to set the 
agenda, launch new policy ideas, and draft and submit proposals to the Council and 
European Parliament.  
 This chapter, in other words, examines how individual Dutch civil servants 
practise public policy-making for and within European arenas. Through this focus, we 
seek to find out where ‘European’ policy-making ‘happens’ and how Dutch civil 
servants ‘make it happen’. Herewith this chapter will address a substantial part of the 
topics listed under question 1 section 1.1. We will, however, extend beyond the work 
and practice of individual civil servants.  Strategic interaction with other civil servants 
is part and parcel of a civil servant’s work, i.e. with colleagues from other member 
countries, their superiors at their home departments, and the officials of the 
Commission. In other words, acting towards getting things done in Europe is a 
collaborative effort in which the embedding of individual civil servants within their 
departments is a prerequisite for successful strategic interactions. Hence, by looking 
at strategic manoeuvring, a number of topics listed under research question 2 (i.e. 
instruction and guidance, feedback and accountability, top management commitment) 
will also be dealt with in this chapter. 
National governments have ‘strong incentives … to monitor the Commission 
services so that when the early signs of action are detected the interested departments 
at home can be alerted and begin to take steps to decide a policy’ (Kassim 2001: 16). 
Throughout the many interviews and the 5 expert meetings with Dutch officials we 
held, the importance of this stage, and the possibilities it offered to even small states 
such as the Netherlands to exert their influence in the shaping of EU policy, were 
emphasized time and again. Remarkably, however, there is scant attention within the 
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academic literature to the strategies member state governments employ during the 
proposal formation (or pre-proposal) stage. The majority of studies on the European 
policy process focus on the formal structures of national position coordination after 
the Commission has launched its position (Kassim et al 2001, 2003) or deals 
exclusively with the decision-making process at the supranational level (Thomson et 
al 2006). Although Trondal (2000, 2002), Rhinard (2002), Egeberg et al (2003), 
Trondal and Veggeland (2003), Laegreid et al (2004), and Larsson and Trondal 
(2005) do focus on the role of national governments during the policy initiation phase, 
their focus rests either on the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of the European committee 
system, participation and networking patterns, or the role allegiances and identities of 
national civil servants attending European committees. One notable exception is the 
study report of Larsson (2003) but his report exclusively focuses on the workings of 
expert committees at the various stages of the European policy process. 
 The omission of member state governments’ strategic behaviour during a 
crucial phase of the EU policy process becomes more striking when it is compared to 
the study of private interest group lobbying within the EU (see Woll 2006 for a 
review of this literature). There is a growing literature on the styles and patterns of 
private interest that lobby the European Commission that examines the channels of 
access of national and supranational federations of interest groups, and variations of 
lobby strategies across various sectors and issues (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Van 
Schendelen 1998; Coen 1998). The absence of studies on the strategic behaviour of 
national civil servants during the pre-proposal phase misleadingly suggests that 
member state governments define and advocate their interest solely through their 
‘Byzantine coordination mechanisms’ (Schneider and Baltz 2005: 23). However, for 
member states the stakes during European policymaking are high in so far as they 
have conflicting views and interests regarding the modes of governance and the 
substantive policies that are to be adopted by the EU and implemented by the member 
states (Heritier et al 1996; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). Rational member state 
governments, as we will show in this paper, can not afford to sit back and wait for the 
Commission to move first and leave the choice for a mode of governance up to the 
Commission. And it is up to national civil servants to do so on their behalf. It is this 
aspect of the Eurocratic craft that we shall study more carefully in this paper.  
Although we will mainly limit our focus on the proposal formation process we 
do conceive of this pre-proposal or policy development phase (Larsson 2003; 
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Rometsch & Wessels 1996) as a process that is connected to the formal EU decision-
making phase in the same sense as ‘connected’, ‘two-level’ or ‘nested’ games 
(Putnam 1988; Pahre 1997 Mayer 1992; Tsebelis 1990). In this chapter we thus 
employ the logic of connected games to elucidate the strategic choices of a single 
(representative of a) ministerial department within a member state in the initial stages 
of European policymaking. However, the situation in which member states find 
themselves with regard to the pre-proposal phase does not entirely accord with the 
formal situation that the logic of two-level games addresses. In contrast to the highly 
formalized arena of legislative decision-making at the supranational level, the 
proposal formation process is a highly informal arena with little formal rules and 
procedures that guide the policy process. In other words, the rules of the game are 
loose and a broad set of strategic options exist for member states. A central question 
addressed in this paper is hence which strategic options are available to national civil 
servants and which of these options they are inclined to use in this phase. 
In order to answer this question, we shall start with a stylised model of the pre-
proposal phase first. In brief, the main elements of the proposal game are the 
following. The outcomes of the game are modes of governance that must be adopted 
by member states in order to harmonize the internal market. Regarding each specific 
policy issue, the players are the Commission and the member states’ national 
ministries with responsibility for the policy area. Both Commission and the member 
state governments have preferences over what mode of governance the Commission 
should propose to the Council and European Parliament. Knowing that the content of 
Commission proposals can only be defined or amended under stringent decision rules 
by the Council and European Parliament, member states will employ strategic options 
to determine the content of the proposal before its is formally submitted to the 
Council and European Parliament.  
 Our findings on the strategic behaviour of national civil servants in EU 
settings pertain to the case of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Security, particularly its civil servants who are responsible for veterinary policy. 
Veterinary policy is an old and well-established field of EU activity and part of the 
First Pillar of the EU. This implies that the Commission is a crucial actor. 
Furthermore it represents a highly institutionalized regime and one in which a 
technocratic orientation is dominant, although sometimes things tend to get politically 
explosive.  This chapter will therefore offer a nice comparison with the next chapter 
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where the focus will rest on officials involved in making and implementing European 
police cooperation on behalf of the Dutch government. Police cooperation is a Third 
Pillar issue area, which means that it is governed by a much less ‘transnationalized’ 
regime of collective decision making than the First Pillar area of veterinary policy. In 
other words, we first examine a highly institutionalized and technocracy-oriented 
policy area in order to be able to compare this area to the less institutionalized and 
more volatile domain of European police cooperation. 
We conducted interviews and participatory observations with civil servants for 
this purpose. From these interviews, we found that these civil servants employed three 
main types of strategies in trying to articulate and secure Dutch interests during the 
embryonic stages of the formation of EU policy proposals. We label these as follows: 
frontloading, signalling and coalition formation. With frontloading we mean the 
instrumental secondment of national civil servants within the agencies and 
directorate-generals of the European Commission that were of interest to the 
Agriculture ministry. Signalling is the systematic networking and informing of 
Commission officials by national civil servants. Finally the coalition formation 
strategy refers to the formation of coalitions during expert committee meetings by 
member state’s representative in order to forge a small but effective group of like-
minded member state representatives for the purpose of backing of one’s national 
interests. 
 This chapter unfolds as follows. The first section discusses the outcomes of 
the EU policy process. The following section discusses the logic of the pre-proposal 
phase, using simple game theoretic situations modelled after battle-of-the-sexes 
games. It also discusses the design of our field study. The key section in the chapter 
presents our findings regarding strategic behaviour of Dutch national civil servants 
operating within the field of veterinary policy. At the close of the chapter we draw 
some theoretical and practical conclusions. 
 
 
4.2 The stakes of the game: Determining EU modes of governance 
 
Studies on the domestic impact of Europeanization have produced several insights 
into how member states are ‘hit’ by and react to the policies of the EU (Börzel and 
Risse 2000; Green Cowles et al 2001; Heritier et al 2001; Knill 2001; Featherstone & 
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Radaelli 2003). Both the mechanisms of domestic impact as well as domestic 
response are highly variable (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) as ‘[D]omestic structures and 
policy legacies provide a mixture of resilience and flexibility’ (Radaelli 2000:15). The 
responses to the policies of the EU are found to vary between inertia, absorption, 
accommodation, and even retrenchment (Radaelli 2000). While our insight into the 
‘downloading’ of EU policies by member states has increased because of these studies 
we still relatively know little about how member states partake in the ‘upload’ of their 
most preferred policy preferences. Given the connectedness of the EU policy process, 
which we will discuss in more detail below, one may expect that factors influential in 
the determination of the uploading of national preferences into the EU policy process 
may have an effect on how the subsequent decisions of the EU are downloaded. 
Simply put, when a member states succeeds in uploading its most preferred policy, 
then, ceteris paribus, the probability that it will absorb the resultant EU policy will be 
much likelier than inertia or retrenchment. 
The neglect of studies on the strategic choices of member states during the 
pre-proposal or policy initiation phase is thus remarkable given the high stakes of the 
EU policy process. The study of the EU policy process (and domestic impact studies 
in particular) could benefit from the factors that affect the actions of member states 
and the outcomes that emerge very early within the EU policy process. This requires a 
systematic analysis of so-called pre-proposal or policy development phase as an arena 
where member states display strategic behaviour in order to influence the domestic 
impact of the EU (Larsson 2003). The pre-proposal phase is an arena where struggles 
over the preferred mode of governance or the regulatory styles that will be adopted by 
the EU take a start. It is a phase where rational member states will try to ‘upload’ their 
preferred regulatory style. The starting point of the EU policy process is in fact a 
pluralist setting with divergent ‘modes of governance.’ In the words of Eising and 
Kohler-Koch (1999: 271) 
 
‘EC decision-making does not start in a vacuum, but in a setting of varying 
national modes of governance. And precisely because the EC is still in its 
formative phase, the actors are struggling to introduce what they consider to be 
the most appropriate mode of governance… The negotiation of Community 
policies is always a competition about modes of governance.’ 
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In this setting member states are in (latent) competition over the best models of 
integration. The conflicts are partly ideological, as it pits liberals versus pro-
interventionists against each other, partly it has to do with the consequences of 
negative, respectively, positive coordination policies for different member states, 
policy sectors and powerful interest groups (Hix 2002: 215). 
Next the competition between member states, the pre-proposal phase is also 
set within a delicate balance of power between the member states on the one hand and 
the supranational actors on the other hand. Especially the Commission, being the 
‘engine of integration’ (Pollack 2003) has interests of its own that may contrast with 
those of the member states and the European Parliament.  
 
‘If member states are united in their opposition to Commission initiatives, or if 
highly salient national interests are strongly divergent, European solutions will 
be blocked, regardless of the involvement of Commission and Parliament. The 
role of supranational actors will be significant, however, in constellations 
where national interests diverge but are not highly salient or … in 
constellations where member governments disagree over the substance of a 
European solution but still would prefer a common solution over the status 
quo.’ (Scharpf 2001: 13). 
 
In conclusion, the early phase of the EU policy process requires strategic insight of 
Commission and member states whenever integration is required but the direction of 
it is unclear. This phase not only effectively filters policy initiatives that can reckon 
with the support of a the majority of the community but also offers strategic actors to 
upload their preferred policies at the expense of other member states. 
 
 
4.3 Strategic behaviour during the pre-proposal phase: Theoretical 
considerations 
 
We consider the process from the first development of a proposal until its formal 
launch and the subsequent transformation of the proposal into EU legislation as a 
connected or nested game. The hallmark of such games is that the same actors are 
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involved in a whole network of games, with the outcome of one game having 
consequences for the start of another game. Actors hence play simultaneously or 
sequentially multiple games and thereby they continuously contemplate not only the 
strategies of other actors and the outcomes of current games but also the actor 
strategies and outcomes of games that follow-up or take place parallel to the current 
game  (Tsebelis 1990; Putnam 1988; Mayer 1992). Relationships between the EU and 
member states have sometimes been modelled as two, even three, level games (Pahre 
1997; Payne 2000). Pahre (1997) for example examined how domestic institutions in 
parliamentary systems tie hands of national governmental negotiators when 
bargaining with European intergovernmental or supranational actors. Payne (2000) 
has employed a three-level game structure to understand why the negotiations 
between member states and fishermen on the one hand and member states and 
supranational institutions on the other hand have subsequently led to prisoner 
dilemma’s causing a failure of the Common Fisheries Policies within the EU. The 
characteristics of these two- or three level games, then, is that they are based on 
situations where international negotiations are followed by domestic (formal or 
informal) ratification procedures. 
Our focus here lies on the strategic behaviour of member states during the pre-
proposal stage. This stage follows the formulation of the national domestic position 
(cf. Schneider and Baltz 2005) and immediately precedes the official launch of the 
proposal by the Commission. As we will exclude a games connected to the pre-
proposal phase that nevertheless may have an impact on the game played during the 
pre-proposal phase we make a number of assumptions. The first is that we assume 
that the national positions of member states have purely emerged from the 
constellation of domestic interests only. In other words, we assume that member states 
will not for strategic reasons adopt a second- or third-best position on the basis of 
position of other member states.27 The second assumption is that member states are 
rational forward-looking actors (Horn 1995), i.e. that member states are aware of the 
temporal connectedness of the various EU policy phases and ‘calculate’ the 
consequences of each stage’s outcome for the process and outcomes of the following 
                                                 
27 In reality, in many  policy areas there exist networks of contacts between national civil servants of 
various member states. Also, international networks between pressure groups that in turn exert 
influence on their respective national governments is another channel through which the formulation of 
national positions may be connected. However, for reasons of keeping the model simple, we hold these 
connections constant. 
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phases. Third, we also assume that member states have unique (Euclidean) ideal 
positions that remain fixed during the entire policy process. Some EU policy process 
stretch out over long time periods, longer than domestic electoral cycles. Often 
member state governments therefore change colour after elections and time 
inconsistencies may occur when a new government adopts a new position towards a 
policy (cf. Shepsle 1992).  
 The rules of the game during the decision-making process and the pre-
proposal phase are different. While the rules governing the decision-making process 
are formal rules that precisely specify the inter-institutional roles and capacities of the 
Council, Commission and Parliament, the rules governing the pre-proposal process 
are in comparison vague and not clearly specified. Among the few clearly stated 
formal rules is the Commission’s right to initiate proposals that makes the 
Commission the first mover in the pre-proposal phase. When a proposal is accepted 
by the Commission, and this proposal is channelled to the decision-making stage of 
the EU, the policy process becomes a highly institutionalized setting (i.e. the 
consultation, assent or co-decision procedures). In this stage, specified procedures and 
decision rules deem it very difficult for the actors involved to reject or change (parts 
of) the Commission’s proposals. We can in fact argue that the moment the proposal is 
officially launched by the Commission it becomes locked-in and very difficult to 
change. For example, Hull (1993) once estimated that 80% of the text of Commission 
proposals survives the final stage of Council decision-making.  
 Given this, even forward looking member states who understand the crucial 
importance of the pre-proposal phase for translating their preferences into EU policies 
will find it very difficult to successfully compete for their preferred mode of 
governance. During the process of proposal formation, the Commission has a variety 
of discretionary authorities to shape the content of the final proposal (Larsson 2003). 
For example, the Commission enjoys the power to initiate and control expert 
committees. The Commission herewith not only learns the positions of member states 
through inviting their experts to these committees, but also benefit from the expertise 
to improve the quality of their proposal. Or as Wessel and Rometsch (1996: 226) 
argue, the 
 
‘Commission controls the game in this phase and its basic strategy is one of 
“engrenage”… i.e. to include relevant national civil servants and 
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representatives of lobby groups early enough in its work to get additional 
information and insights … From the point of view of the national civil 
servants, there is an expectation that there input will be taken seriously by the 
Commission and that its later proposals will not include unpleasant surprises 
for them.’ 
 
Even when mutuality forms the underlying culture of the relationship between the 
Commission and the national civil servants, the relationship is in fact unequal, to the 
advantage of the Commission. First, for example, the Commission may  
 
set up an expert group to find out whether the Member States and interest 
groups are interested in trying to formulate a common position. But should the 
Commission discover … that the support for a common approach is rather 
weak or seems to go in an unwanted direction, it can hold the group on hold, 
waiting for the right moment to reactivate it (Larsson 2003: 18). 
 
Other powerful instruments are the selection of the chairman and the selection and 
appointment of the participants; as Larsson (2003: 18) also wrote ‘allowing just a few 
experts, interest groups or Member States’ representatives to be part of a group … is a 
strategic decision that may affect the result and functioning of an expert group 
profoundly.’  
From the perspective of member states, the chances of having their preferred 
mode of governance translated in the text of the Commission proposal seem slim. 
Moreover, it seems that the powers of the Commission are overwhelming vis-à-vis the 
member states. Through the Commission’s power of initiative and the various 
channels of influence on the proposal formation phase that are hitherto discussed 
within the literature it seems that the member states are left to merely participate at 
this stage and react to the proposals only when it enters the Council deliberations; in 
other words, when the text of the proposal is largely written into a direction wanted by 
the Commission and only to be amended marginally by the member states and the 
Parliament. For the member states, the choice is between rejecting the proposal – and 
have the Commission refrain from starting a new proposal; or to accept a proposal 
that may lie at a distance from a member state’s ideal point but that is still preferred to 
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the status quo. The setting within which the member states and the Commission 
interact accords in fact to the logic of a battle of the sexes game (see figure 1; cf. 
Scharpf 1997, 2001).  
 
 
Figure 1. Battle of the sexes game during the pre-proposal phase 
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Member state 1’s ideal point is reflected by option 1, member state’s ideal point by 
option 2. When both member states choose their most preferred option they will end 
up with an outcome (1,1) that is worse for both member states.  In the case of one 
member state realizes its preferred option the other member state must accept the 
option that has a lesser payoff than when its ideal option was chosen – and vice versa: 
(4,3) or (3,4). This situation is usually been solved when the number of player is small 
as in this example, the game is an iterated game instead of a one-shot game, and when 
package deals are permitted. In reality, however, the number of member states is 
large, the distribution pf votes across the various member states make the calculation 
of majorities and blocking minorities extremely complex. In addition, the 
Commission also consults non-central and non-governmental actors during the pre-
proposal phase as well. Hence, to secure the support of the majority of the actors for 
its proposal, the largest common denominator is translated in the proposal, resulting in 
the least preferred thinkable payoff for the member states (1, 1). 
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Given this situation, we expect that forward looking member states will seek 
for strategies to influence the content of the Commission proposal that in the worst 
case produces an outcome that is not too far from their ideal position. In other words, 
rational member states will choose strategies that control the damage of the pre-
proposal phase. Given the structure of the pre-proposal phase, two types of strategies 
are possible. A member state can either (1) try to forge a critical mass of member 
states that during the pre-proposal phase forces the Commission to adopt a proposal 
that is closer to a policy that is acceptable to this critical mass of member states or (2) 
to act before other member states do and have the Commission formulate a proposal 
that is closest to its own ideal position.. Both situations are given in, respectively, 
figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2. Member state forges a critical mass during pre-proposal phase 
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The situation in figure 2 still has the basic logic of a battle of the sexes game, except 
that the damage that occurs when the least preferred outcome is selected is to some 
extent controlled for both member states: (2, 2) instead of (1,1). Member states will 
still play their dominant strategy and choose their most preferred policy, but the 
policy that the Commission now ultimately sets has a payoff that is closer to the 
member states most preferred pay-off . Member states have managed this through 
forging a coalition of a critical mass of member states that agree that the null option, 
i.e. the choice of the Commission when no majority for a single option exists, makes 
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them at least better off than the least common denominator policy the Commission 
would have adopted when such a critical mass failed to exist.  
Figure 3 shows the outcomes of a game where member state 1 moves first and 
manages to manipulate the position of the Commission such that the latter discloses a 
proposal that is close to the position of member state 1 (option 1). The upper right-
hand and the lower left-hand cells show the payoffs for both member states when the 
Commission after consultations with the member states and possibly other interest 
actors at the pre-proposal stage formally adopts a proposal. We see that for each time 
member state 1 plays its dominant strategy of choosing option 1, it is better off then 
member state two. In general, moving before another member state does in order to 
have the Commission adopt a final position will not result in the most optimal 
outcome for the first moving member state, but it enables the first mover to choose its 
most preferred strategy under all circumstances. 
 
Figure 3. Member state 1 influences the proposal’s content before pre-proposal 
begins 
                          Member state 2 
             Option1                   Option 2 
                                3
 
 4 
                                 1 
 
  2 
 
                               Option1  
Member state 1 
 
                              Option 2 
                                1
 
 2 
                                 4 
 
  3 
 
Member state 1 prefers option 1 to option 2 
Member state 2 prefers option 2 to option 1 
 
In brief, the argument unfolded so far is as follows. The EU policy process enters a 
highly formalized stage once a Commission proposal is launched in the inter-
institutional decision-making or legislative process. The content of proposal locks in 
as changes to the text of the initial proposal occur seldom. As the content of the 
proposal concerns fundamental battles among member states over the mode of 
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governance on the one hand and the member states and the Commission on the other 
hand, member states must act strategically during the pre-proposal phase to exert 
influence on the Commission proposal. Given the battle of the sexes nature of the EU 
policy process, we expect two basic member state strategies: 
1. A member state will form coalitions with member states with similar ideal 
positions close to each other in order to shift the ideal position of the 
Commission closer to the point where the proposal will be acceptable to these 
members; or 
2. A member state will move first and push the Commission adopting an ideal 
position that is close to that member state’s own ideal position. 
 
 
4.4 From theory to practice: research design 
 
Now let us turn to the practices of Dutch ministerial and agency bureaucrats in the 
veterinary policy field to illustrate the plausibility of these claims. Data for this 
research is collected from interviews with 21 civil servants working within the field of 
veterinary policies, especially on issues concerning animal welfare, animal diseases 
and consumer safety. We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews28 between 
November 2005 and July 2006 with 11 civil servants from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Safety (further: Agriculture), 1 from the Ministry of 
Public Health, Welfare and Sports (further: Public Health)29, 3 the Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority (Voedsel en Warenautoriteit; further VWA), 1 
working at the institute of Food Safety (further: IFS), and 2 respondent at the Dutch 
Permanent Representation at Brussels.); three respondents were from the VWA; 
finally, the remaining 16 respondents were part of the Agriculture. This group of 
respondents includes higher civil servants as well as civil servants with middle-level 
positions from both the ministries and the agencies. The sample also covers a variety 
                                                 
28 The interview topics were as follows: (1) career developments; (2) success interventions in the EU 
policy process; (3) role orientations and conflicts; and (4) the departmental organization of EU policy 
process. The data for this paper are mainly drawn from the responses on topics (2) and (4). 
29 The section dealing with animal diseases and welfare within this ministry amounted only to 3.5 full 
time equivalent strong at the time we conducted our interviews  
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of backgrounds: scientific veterinary experts, policy coordinators and directors and 
generalist departmental managers. 
 The observations are from a single policy area. The health and welfare of farm 
animals are a precondition for bilateral or multilateral trade. Institutionalization of 
animal health and welfare regulations predates30 the establishment of the EEC and 
became an integral part of the EU’s agricultural policies. Further, agriculture is the 
most Europeanized policy area compared to other policy sectors within member states 
(for various countries see Page 1998; Christensen & Blom-Hansen 2004; Bovens & 
Yesilkagit 2005). For these reasons, we must be cautious with inferring general 
observations taken from this single policy area. Still, this policy (sub)area constitutes 
an important area for study. Issues of regulations of animal disease and welfare are 
centerpiece not only within international trade conflicts (e.g. export bans on ill 
animals) but also within disputes between consumer organizations and/or animal 
rights organizations and the government. Finally, this policy area is rife with debate 
between member states because the regulation of animal disease and welfare is part of 
a fundamental debate between member states on regulatory styles or modes of 
governance (cf. Knill 2001). To give an example, the Netherlands prefers the 
deregulation of meat hygiene inspections, whereby the state devolves the sound 
treatment of animals and the hygiene at the slaughterhouses to firms whereas Italy for 
example insists on direct public supervision of the slaughterhouses by departmental 
inspectors.  
Veterinary policy may thus be somewhat of an atypical case. However, being a 
fully Europeanized and institutionalized area, the strategic behaviour at the pre-
proposal phase may reveal the shape of things to come in other Europeanizing policy 
areas. The insights gained from this research may indicate the ‘natural’ evolution of 
strategic behaviour of other national ministries the more their policy areas are 
integrated into the EU. In other words, we may expect that as more governments and 
departments are confronted with the (forced) implementation of EU policies that are 
less preferred, the more we may expect goal-seeking strategic interaction at this initial 
phase of the policy process. 
                                                 
30 The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) is an intergovernmental organization created by the 
International Agreement of 25 January 1924. In 1924 only 28 countries were members, currently is has 
more than 160 members. 
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4.5 Strategic behaviour in veterinary policy-making: Frontloading, signalling 
and coalition formation 
 
On the basis of the nature of the EU policy process, which is essentially a negotiation 
process between member states with a unique preference for a single style of 
regulation on the hand and the Commission on the other hand, we expected that 
member states would opt from between two basic strategies: forming a coalition with 
other member after the Commission has initiated a proposal or to influence the 
position of the Commission before it initiates a proposals. Our interview data yields 
three concrete strategic choices, of which two are strategies of the latter type and one 
of the former. We refer to the latter type as signalling and frontloading, and the 
former type simply as coalition formation.  
Signalling the Commission is the targeting and information of Commission 
officials who work on policy issues that are important to the member state and/or the 
national ministerial department. The lobby of the designated Commission services by 
civil servants working at the permanent representatives is an example of this strategy. 
They inform commission officials about their department’s position. Provided that the 
member states’ information is valuable to the Commission, the latter may use the 
information as an input to the proposal. Frontloading is a strategy that goes a step 
further than signalling. It concerns the exertion of substantial and substantive 
influence on the writing and the text of the proposal. The appointment of seconded 
national officials within the relevant Commission directorate-general is the central 
strategic instrument for frontloading. A seconded official is either instructed by his 
superiors to steer the proposal towards the department’s ideal point or it is expected 
that the seconded official will ‘automatically’ choose his or her national-cultural 
perspective as a point of reference when writing the proposal.  
Once the Commission has initiated a proposal a member state can seek to form 
coalitions with other member states if the position of the Commission is further away 
from a member state’s position. This strategy will typically unfold during committee 
meetings with national experts and civil servants (Larsson 2003; Rhinard, 2002). 
However, we expect this strategy to be less preferred compared to the other two. As 
already discussed, it requires the forging of a critical mass of member states with not 
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too divergent preferences. Moreover, the Commission is well-positioned to dominate 
the committee, as it can decide who is to sit on the committee, who its chairs will be, 
and so on (Larsson 2003: 73). In the remainder of this section we will offer examples 
from all three strategies. We will discuss how they are used and what the perceived 
pitfalls with each of the strategies are. 
 
4.5.1 Signalling the Commission 
In its basic form, signalling is the strategy whereby a sender chooses to send a 
message to a receiver upon which the receiver chooses to act upon that message. 
Within the context of this paper, civil servants representing their national department 
send a message to the relevant Commission official with the purpose of persuading 
him to choose an action that will benefit the former. This is the basic principle 
underlying all lobbies. In the practice of EU policy process civil servants engage in 
lobby activities just as much private interest groups. Signalling could also be well 
described as the lobbying of the Commission, not by private interest but by member 
states themselves. Research to member state lobbying of the Commission is rare. The 
best account is from Kassim et al’s volume on the role of permanent representations 
(2001). Located at the heart of the Union, permanent representatives fulfil many tasks 
for the various departments within their respective member states, such as foreseeing 
opportunities, collecting and circulating information, and elaborating negotiation 
strategies (Kassim 2001: 11). The role of civil servants at the permanent 
representative is crucial specifically at the pre-proposal phase if they  
‘propose action before the Commission has considered it or before it has 
drafted a text… This requires the assiduous cultivation of contacts by national 
officials in the permanent representation and domestic ministries with their 
opposite numbers in the Commission’ (Kassim 2001: 16). 
According to one of our respondents, signalling increasingly occupies an important 
place within the job descriptions of civil servants working at the permanent 
representation. Signalling forms the core business of these diplomat-civil servants at 
Brussels, the Permanent Representative. They know Brussels and their task is to 
inform and to be kept informed on all matters that are relevant to their field of 
expertise and that are of interest to their department. Civil servants at the permanent 
representation are expected to successfully put  
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‘issues on the agenda of the Commission that are of importance to the 
Netherlands. In this way we help the Commission with experience we have as 
a member state and you immediately learn it when the Commission does not 
think much of the information’  (civil servant at the Dutch permanent 
representation at Brussels).  
More than just agenda-setting, signalling involves ‘talking to the people in the 
Commission who are going to write the proposal’ (civil servant at the Ministry of 
Agriculture) and thus to direct the text of the final proposal closer to the preferences 
of the department. However, signalling is not a one-way process, but based on 
reciprocity. Information is a most precious asset, to both sides. 
‘The Commission always wants to be kept informed. That is an issue that is 
often forgotten in The Hague. When something happens in a member state 
[e.g. outbreak of a animal disease], other member states contact the 
Commission. The Commission always wants to provide answers to those 
member states. If the Commission fails to do so, danger exists that member 
states will take action by themselves, something that is not desired, of course. 
This way unity will be lost. I always try to prevent this by having contact [with 
the Commission] as much as I can so that I can contact them each time 
something occurs. So I can keep the Commission updated’ (civil servant at the 
Dutch permanent representation at Brussels). 
Signalling as described above is not only a part of the job of permanent representation 
officials, but increasingly that of civil servants at The Hague as well. This signalling 
can take different forms, varying from ‘just giving a call’ asking for a draft of an 
upcoming report or to ‘step into a Commission official’s office’ when a national civil 
servants happens to be in Brussels for a meeting (a civil servant at the VWA). The 
nationality of the Commission officials is then an important issue. Although our 
respondents told us that nationality played no major role in the approaching of a 
Commission official, it was clear from their further explications that the presence of 
Dutch within the Commission services (both permanent as well as seconded national 
civil servants; see below more) can make difference. Dutch Commission officials 
more often contact their countries’ department in case of getting information on 
specific subjects and vice versa they are more easily approachable by national civil 
servants and permanent representatives. But Dutch commission officials consider 
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themselves to act very stringent in obeying the Commission guidelines concerning 
loyalty and neutrality.  
Signalling seems most effective when it is embedded in enduring relationships 
between national civil servants and Commission officials. From our interviews ‘trust’ 
turns out to be the most important asset in building and maintaining lasting and 
effective relationships between national and Commission officials.  
‘I work a lot with personal relationships. I know two Commission directors 
very well. When I come, they know that something is happening. When there 
were conflicts I always was keen on seeing the problems from their 
perspective as well and not only tried to get the most out of it for the 
Netherlands’ (senior civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture) 
The same respondent, a higher civil servant within the department, explicated this 
through the following event that took place several years ago. 
‘Often the first meeting with these people [the higher Commission officials] 
occurs during an incident. In my case I built up trust during the handling of a 
crisis concerning the presence of hormones in animal fodder. The Commission 
proposed to destroy all animals that had been fed by the contaminated fodder. 
… I told them that we just have had foot and mouth and a lot of animals had 
been killed, but that this time there was not an immediate urgency public 
health situation. In the end we only had to destroy a far smaller portion of the 
animals than initially discussed. I then implemented the decisions we had 
taken carefully and transparently’ (senior civil servant Ministry of 
Agriculture).   
In conclusion, signalling is a strategy applied both by agriculture civil servants at the 
permanent representation as well as departmental civil servants. The permanent 
representation of veterinary affairs involves more than a ‘post box’ function for the 
department back home, but it is becoming actively a lobbyist for Dutch veterinary 
interests. The building up of networks by national civil servants with Commission 
officials is a way to institutionalize the signalling strategy. Just like in the case of 
private interests lobbies at Brussels, easy and swift access to officials coordinating or 
writing the text of the relevant proposals is an important asset for national ministries 
to build up. However, as to the effectiveness of this strategy we can not conclude that 
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signalling is a single strategy to rely on. From the perspective of the single national 
department, signalling may appear as a relatively cheap and direct strategy. From the 
perspective of the Commission officials, that is the target group of signalling, the use 
of this strategy by member state officials may have a different effect. Commission 
officials receive a large amount of signals from different sources. They are signalled 
not only by civil servants from other member states but also from private interest 
organizations. When the number of signals from a variety of sources increases, it will 
become more difficult for Commission officials to properly assess the value of these 
signals. From a certain level of signals, the value of signalling may decrease for 
member states. 
 
4.5.2 Frontloading proposals 
Frontloading concerns the exertion of substantial and substantive influence on the 
writing and the text of the proposal. The strategy that yields member states direct 
access to the process of writing a Commission proposal is the secondment of national 
civil servants at the targeted directorate-general. Seconded national officials are one 
of three categories of Commission officials. The first category consists of the 
permanent staff of the Commission services (i.e. grade A officials) who are recruited 
for the service after having successfully passed the ‘concours’. Seconded national 
civil servants stay for a temporary period. They form part of the directorate general 
where they are appointed and work on a specific file for a period of three years. One 
of the pragmatic reasons for their appointment is that SNEs aid the staff of the 
Commission services and bring expertise on issues of which the Commission lacks 
knowledge of or as the official logic behind secondments puts it  
‘Seconded National Experts (SNEs) have a dual role: to bring to the 
Commission their experience of the issues they are used to dealing with and to 
take back to their home administration the knowledge of Community issues 
which they acquire during their secondment. They are seconded in order to let 
the Commission benefit from the high level of their professional knowledge 
and experience, in particular in areas where such expertise is not readily 
available in various fields’ (EC, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/personnel_administration/sne_en.htm, 24 July 2006). 
 
 96
Research on seconded national civil servants is sparse, let alone their strategic 
position and roles. Seconded national officials to the EU are often alluded to in 
studies of the European Commission services, but have rarely been subject of as 
actors within the EU policy process. Trondal argues that seconded national officials 
are treated as ‘the under-researched “Cinderella” of the Commission’ within the 
academic literature, but in fact deserve the attention as being a ‘parallel 
administration’ within the Commission (Trondal 2001). He concludes that 
‘[S]econded personnel to the Commission are likely to put particular emphasis on pre-
established national and sectoral senses of belonging due to their primary institutional 
affiliations at the national level of governance’ (Trondal 2001: n.p.). 
Our interviews with civil servants at the agricultural department as well as the 
officials seconded from this department sheds a somewhat different light on the 
phenomenon of secondment. Although it is often officially denied by the Dutch civil 
service, the Ministry of Agriculture does strategically second civil servants to 
directorates-general of interest to the ministry. The ‘official’ denial stems from the 
fact that the Dutch perspective on the Commission has for long been that the 
Commission is a supranational body that should operate impartial to member states. 
One of our respondents told us that strategic use of secondment is something the 
French do, and not a Dutch thing to do: 
‘The French government positions civil servants at the Commission with an 
assignment. If they fail, they can shake [sic] the rest of their careers. We are 
less tougher, but we have our discussions on this issue’ (civil servant at the 
Ministry of Agriculture). 
 
We found that this view is ‘on-the-record’ policy. Off the record, secondment is 
perhaps the most important strategic instrument the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture 
employs in order to influence the contents of Commission proposals. This is 
expressed by one of the top officials, a director-general, at the department: 
‘The position one [a seconded national official] has is not chosen by 
coincidence. It [secondment] is not just [an instrument] for the careers of civil 
servants. Secondment is of course good for their careers, but the position they 
occupy is also of importance to the department. They are in a place where we 
have interests. The places are strategically chosen. You don’t give them 
instructions, but you may do anything to have them keep a feeling with the 
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department. But you also deliver a Dutchman to Brussels who will work from 
a Dutch perspective’ (senior civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture). 
 
The salience of secondments as a strategic instrument is signified by the fact that a 
special working group is established that coordinates secondments to the EU and 
other international organizations that are relevant to the policy areas of agriculture. At 
the end of the 1990s, the Directorate of International Affairs set up a Working Group 
for Mobility, headed by the vice-director of IA, to coordinate the appointment of 
SNEs.  As a respondent from this unit told us 
 
‘Within this department we consider international mobility to be very 
important. We have people sitting on positions who participate in important 
decisions. They do not directly deal with the Dutch position, but they are 
placed there strategically, so not a coincident at all. Secondments are strategic’ 
(civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture). 
 
The strategic importance of SNEs is also recognized by the Food and Consumer’s 
Safety Agency. The ultimate goal of secondments is here also the ‘pre-cooking’ 
(Larsson 2003) of Commission proposals.  
‘We [VWA] are in the process of developing [outcome-oriented] regulatory 
policies. I do not want our policies to be battered because the Commission 
decides to have the lowest common denominator. So what I want is that the 
Commission starts conceiving regulatory policy the way as we see it here at 
VWA. I ‘d like to steer the Commission to the direction we are heading to…I 
have permission from Agriculture to station two of our people [from VWA] at 
the Food and Veterinary Office at Dublin for a few years…I think the change 
[from output to outcome control] we have set in to be a very promising one. 
Therefore I try to exert influence at the source [of the policy process], to exert 
influence on the writing side…’ (senior civil servant at the VWA). 
 
The question is: how is this done? How is this strategy executed? It would not be 
entirely true to perceive the issue of strategic appointments as single-sided process. 
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Reciprocity between international organizations and national governments seems to 
be necessary condition for secondments.  
‘Often, international organizations want to address a problem, but have 
insufficient manpower at that time. The deal that we make is that we find it 
interesting as well [sic]. We second someone to the organization and pay all or 
part of the expenses. They then can deliver important work [e.g. against an 
outbreak of bird flu], that is of importance to the Netherlands as well. In this 
manner, can we acquire influence on things that are important to the 
Netherlands’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture) 
 
But this does not imply that the Ministry of Agriculture can freely choose from among 
the available positions: 
‘The input from the Netherlands should add to the work of the Commission. In 
the case of animal diseases and animal welfare, the Netherlands has a good 
reputation. The Netherlands stands a good chance of acquiring positions in 
these areas if the department decides to lobby for them’ (civil servant at the 
Dutch permanent representation at Brussels).  
 
Active lobbying involves a good network and preferably personal relationships 
between Dutch and European officials. ‘I know the director of the Food and 
Veterinary Office very well’, one respondent told us, ‘and he asked me for personnel. 
I immediately arranged that’ (higher civil servant at VWA).  
To what extent is this strategy effective in terms of policy outcome? Do 
seconding civil servants steer the direction of the policy process? Or is the ultimate 
benefit of having seconded officials within the Commission ‘to take back to their 
home administration the knowledge of Community issues’ as is the official statement 
of the Commission? Seconded national civil servants are expected to be loyal to the 
Commission and through their frequent interactions with the permanent staff to 
develop supranational identifications. Some of our respondents are clear about the 
role of seconded national servants: once they work they should be loyal to the 
Commission and they should not be put under pressure by their other departments. 
But actually no respondent denies the benefits that accrue to the department from 
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having a seconded official at a strategic position. One such benefit is that through a 
seconded official, the mother department can build a large network for the entire 
department: 
‘We try to stimulate the directors of the SNEs to visit the SNEs at location. 
The SNE makes an appointment with his unit head, the director of the unit 
where he works, and if possible, with the director-general or the vice-director-
general. They first talk about the project, but then will come to discuss a whole 
range of other issues. The purpose of these meetings is to get to know one 
another. It is much easier to pick up the phone when you know someone 
personally’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture) 
 
The goal is to use the SNE and his position to pave way for high level networks. 
SNEs are further provided the basic technical facilities to keep in touch with the 
mother department. They have the possibility to enter intranet and to mail easily with 
their colleagues, so that both sides are kept informed. The tightening of networks at 
the Hague occur through yearly ‘come back days’ where all SNEs stationed over 
international organizations around the world are invited for a two-day meeting. SNEs 
are asked to give seminars on ongoing affairs. Directors-general are excepted to 
attend these meeting. The two-day meeting is closed with an informal dinner with the 
DGs and SG. The presence of the top-level is to signal the rest of the department that 
this is an important meeting. 
The strategy of seconded national officials is not just for the sake of networks. 
Sometimes, if managed well and the situation allows it, a coordinated network of 
SNEs can lead to the exertion of significant influence on the policymaking process, 
even to agenda setting. One such instance occurred during a meeting on crisis 
management on avian influenza (bird flu) at the first half of March 2006. A higher 
civil servant of the Agriculture ministry was called to attend a meeting at Rome at the 
office of the FAO 
‘I have someone seconded at the FAO for avian influenza, someone at OIE 
and a couple persons at DG SANCO. What has happened is that suddenly all 
these organizations were occupied by avian influenza. Last week I was called 
to a conference at FAO to come and talk about crisis management in case of 
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avian influenza outbreak. The United States was invited, but also the Dutch 
lady from my directorate seconded at OIE, the European Commission through 
one of my people at [name of DG], Louise Fresco31 also with someone of my 
directorate and me. I said, “let’s hold the meeting in Dutch with an English 
translation”’ (senior civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture). 
 
The overt representation of Dutch officials, of whom a majority were our 
respondent’s seconded officials, could of course not be the result of a benign forecast 
by our respondent, but it does show that the purposive strategic use of  seconding may 
lead to situations where a (small) national state can have a substantial impact on 
decision-making and agenda-setting. 
But also more substantial results can be booked. Seconded national civil 
servants bring their own national belief systems to Brussels. They carry with them the 
Dutch ‘norms and values’ to Brussels.  
‘I think that everyone from the Netherlands, whether he is a seconded official 
or not, approach their work from the perspective of the Dutch norms and 
values. That is of great value. Therefore I think that as a member state you can 
gain influence here if a member state has a lot of officials seconded to the 
Commission, so that the process at Brussels becomes similar to that of your 
own country’ (a seconded national civil servant). 
 
This occurred to some extent when the Dutch were invited to second a national civil 
servant to work on the meat hygiene control dossier. The official was seconded at DG 
SANCO and has worked three years on preparing a proposal for meat hygiene control 
that was part of the General Food Law. The Netherlands has been in favour or 
developing and implementing a regulatory style whereby hygiene inspections are 
longer executed by the state but by the private sector itself. The core of this system is 
that the Dutch government only assumes ‘system responsibilities’, stays aloof from 
physical inspection of the slaughterhouses and meat processing industries, but only 
inspects the systems designed by the private sector itself. The proposal the 
                                                 
31 The Dutch Louise Fresco was until 1 June 2006 FAO’s Agricultural Department’s Assistant Director 
General. 
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Commission submitted to the EOP and Council contained the mode of governance 
preferred by the Netherlands. ‘However’, our respondent explains, 
‘the European Parliament took out a number of essential issues out of the 
proposal. This can mainly be attributed to the rapporteur. He was a former 
East-German veterinarian with a strongly developed ‘statist’ outlook. He took 
out a number of essential issues. The EP’s Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety Committee rejected some of the rapporteurs proposals but left 
others intact. The most essential element of the proposal that did not make it 
was the proposition that slaughterhouses would be allowed to control the 
hygiene of their meat themselves, under the control of a veterinarian. The EP 
preferred that government officials should do this …The amendments of the 
EP were quite a drawback to the Netherlands. It came very inconvenient for 
the sector, because this was the mode of governance preferred by the 
Netherlands’ (a seconded national civil servant). 
 
Despite this ANFS and the sector were content to some extent, as the surviving 
propositions left sufficient room for the Netherlands to implement the crucial 
elements of the preferred mode of governance within the Netherlands. This case 
illustrates that even though seconded nationals can not forge a preferred position, they 
can redirect the course of policy development in a specific direction. ‘Although our 
main points were tackled … we though the final result was a very modern regulation 
that enabled us to work with system-level monitoring of meat hygiene’ (civil servant 
at the Ministry of Agriculture). 
Until now, we described the secondment of national officials as a strategic tool 
for influencing the Commission proposal. However, this should not give the 
impression that the Commission can be simply manipulated or steered into the 
direction desired by a national ministry or agency that seconds its civil servants. 
Seconded national officials are confronted with opportunities as well as constraints 
when they work for their departments. Due to the information of seconded officials, 
national departments are better informed about the positions of other member states 
and oversee potential dilemmas and difficulties of shifting towards a certain of mode 
of governance. However, the Commission is very well aware of potential dangers 
with entrusting files to its seconded national officials as the seconded respondents we 
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interviewed. Seconded national officials have to operate in a highly political 
environment where the stakes for the Commission and member states can be very 
high. An example illustrates this. It concerns the dilemma of how to treat confidential 
information: 
‘When do you give what kind of information to the home front? The 
Commission makes internal reports of its negotiations. The Commission then 
says that the reports are internal we won’t share it with the member states. 
Well, on certain occasions, for example, the Netherlands wants to learn the 
content of that report. One thing you could do then is to give an oral summary 
of the report. A step further is that you do this by mail. Or you could just send 
the entire piece. You can do all this the day after the release of the internal 
report, or you could do this a month later. There is whole grey area of options 
and what the effects of it are is dependent on the number of interests that play 
a role. If the negotiation just concern a single country – well, in that case you 
could inform that member state what the Commission intends to do. But it 
changes when several member states, with diverging preferences are involved. 
As a seconded official, if you do not act carefully or according to rules of 
loyalty [which every seconded national official has to sign upon assuming 
office] you could awfully bang your head to the wall’ (a seconded national 
civil servant) 
 
Therefore, if the Commission  
‘has files that ought to remain secret, they give it to that person [a seconded 
official] and see what happens then. I don’t know whether the Commission 
does this consciously, but they are of course not naïve’ (a seconded national 
civil servant). 
 
Seconded officials, as already written above, are ‘hired’ for working on a specific file. 
As also stated above, they bring their own norms and values with them. Often this is 
because the Commission wants a representative of certain member state to work on a 
proposal. The moment a seconded official enters his or her directorate general, he/she 
will experience a clash of governance modes.  
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 ‘There was much ado when I was appointed at Brussels. A storm broke out in 
Italy as it was fiercely opposed against the Dutch approach to meat hygiene 
controls. They felt that the Netherlands squandered their meat inspection by 
privatizing the inspection and giving the state only a small role. The Italian 
CVO [Chief Veterinary Officer] has invested a lot of effort to prevent my 
secondment’ (a seconded national civil servant). 
 
The secondment could not be battered anymore, but our respondent did not have an 
easy start at Brussels. 
 
‘My secondment was looked upon very sceptically, especially by colleagues 
from Southern Europe. They were very suspicious and critical. It was my 
“patron” a Fleming, my head of unit, and director who supported me. My 
direct colleagues were most suspicious. Most of them were French or Italian. 
They were sceptical about the Dutch way of thinking about meat 
inspections…They were not instructed by their governments to oppose my 
work. It was their natural attitude. They have been brought up differently’ (a 
seconded national civil servant). 
 
To be successful in these circumstances requires a lot from the individual. Our 
respondent happened to be actively and passively fluent in French and Italian and this 
surely helped our respondent to establish cordial relationships with his colleagues. 
Our respondent also gave talks on meetings on this subject in Italy – in Italian – to 
explain the Dutch approach. And perhaps above all, ‘You have to show that you’re 
not a bad guy’ (a seconded national civil servant). 
In sum, the use of secondments is a highly preferred and strategic instrument 
for influencing the content and direction of Commission proposals, but it does not 
lead automatically to a successful outcome. Working as a seconded national civil 
servant is fraught with pitfalls and the Commission is constantly alert to check upon 
the loyalty of its seconded officials. 
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4.5.3 Coalition Formation 
Given the power of the Commission to shape the process and outcomes of the 
committee deliberations (Larsson 2003), we expect the pre-proposal process in which 
member states wait until the expert committees will produce an outcome that is the 
least preferred outcome from the perspective of the member states (see figure 1). 
However, despite the overwhelming constraints for member states to forge their 
preferred mode of governance within the final Commission proposal, our interviewees 
with experience in expert committee meetings still did point at a strategic possibilities 
that could be employed to increase the likelihood of achieving a proposal that would 
be more preferred than when no strategy would be pursued (see figure 2). This is 
coalition formation strategy, namely the forging of small coalitions with member 
states with more or less similar preferences and to act as a block during expert 
committee meetings. This strategy typically takes off when the representatives of the 
relevant national ministries for the first time convene during a committee meeting. A 
respondent gave us an impression of such a meeting, which was concerned with the 
draft of the regulation on control of foodstuff and animal fodder as part of the General 
Food Law: 
‘On the basis of a raw draft of the Commission we [a number of experts from 
different departments] took a look at the various draft provisions considering 
what the position of the Netherlands should be…We put our ideas on paper 
and went to Brussels and submitted our points very explicitly…The meeting 
begins with a round during which each member state makes clear its views. 
During this round, you immediately pick your potential allies on different 
issues. You decide on an issue-basis who your allies will be. The views of the 
member states remain quite stable throughout the subsequent committee 
meetings later on. So you find yourself in agreement with country A on issue 
X and with country B on issue Z. At the coffee machine you then exchange 
further ideas in a very informal manner.’ (civil servant at Ministry of 
Agriculture) 
 
Before a committee meeting takes place it is often very unclear what the positions of 
other member states are on the various issue. It is even more unclear who your allies 
will be and what the outcomes of the meetings will be.  
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A more activist stance is possible, however. In this respect we had interviews 
with respondents who explicated alternatives to letting the outcome of committee 
meetings be determined by the course the meeting assumes itself.  Many of our 
respondents who regularly travelled back and forth between Brussels to participate in 
Commission committees (and Council working groups) stressed the importance of 
informal discussions ‘around the coffee machine’ at breaks, the lunches, as well as the 
drinks and, occasionally, the dinners before or after a meeting.32 However, the 
informal circuit will be more effective if it is not confined to moments when the 
committee meets, as one of our respondents told us. This respondent, who worked on 
the inspection aspects of hygiene measures of the General Food Law, set-up and 
coordinated a so-called ‘four-country consultations’. Somewhere in 2004, during the 
presidency of Luxembourg, German, Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourgian civil 
servants began to meet the day before the committee meeting in order to discuss the 
agenda of the meeting next day, and to coordinate issues regarding the import of 
veterinary products.  
‘During these meetings we look for issues on which we can reach an 
agreement and where our views diverge. On issues where we agree with each 
other we support each other…. For these issues we take a similar position. 
And we discuss tactics: who will say what and when… The last time 
[committee meeting] it went it so well that we dominated the meeting…We 
had an alliance. What happened then was that none of the new member states 
said something – something that is not unusual. But it also occurred that 
countries such as France and the United Kingdom remained silent. The other 
countries then [apparently] think ‘when Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium already agree’ the issue is closed. We have to be careful with this, 
however. We must not get too dominant. We must sometime seek for 
variations. That is that we should sometimes openly say “I don’t agree with 
you”. You must not create the impression that the three of us have pre-cooked 
everything already on beforehand. I don’t think the Commission will be 
pleased with this. But we nevertheless keep doing it!’ (civil servant at VWA). 
 
                                                 
32 The informal circuit is, by the way, underexploited by the Dutch civil servants. Brussels is too close 
to The Hague and hence to stay overnight. Evening programs,  such as drinks and dinners, and 
meetings with fellow participants over breakfast at hotels are generally missed by Dutch civil ervants. 
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The ‘consultation’ between the four countries and the subsequent ‘domination’ of the 
committee meeting, it must be admitted, occurred during the rather weak Presidency 
of Luxembourg. A small group of member states managed to ‘pre-cook’ a position 
and presented themselves as closed front vis-à-vis the Commission and the remaining 
member states. Under a ‘normal’ presidency the room to operate strategically as this 
will be much lesser and the costs of coordination and negotiation between the member 
states higher. Nevertheless, this example shows that in a setting with a large number 
of member states, coalition formation and the pre-cooking of a common position a 
small core of member states can form a front against the Commission and overwhelm 
other member states. 
However, the above cited example of close cooperation between a limited 
number of member states is an incidence that depends for a large extent on the 
weakness of the presidency but also the personal relationships between the involved 
civil servants. They often held informal meetings and if this for financial reasons 
could not take place in a restaurant, they cooked something themselves. As our 
respondent admitted, the chemistry between the officials was extremely well: ‘The 
German and Luxembourgian colleagues offered to cook a meal themselves, whereas I 
wrote that I love German apple pie!’ Nevertheless it show the basic logic of the of our 
argument very well, namely that well-informed actors may seek ways to limit the 
entry of players to a battle of the sexes game and so limit the set of alternatives to 
those that are closer to their own ideal point. 
In a more general sense, expert committee meetings further impede strategic 
action by member states because of the lack of information of other member states’ 
initial positions. Add to this the complex voting structure and it is not difficult to 
imagine that it has become difficult to estimate what kind of coalitions are possible, 
let alone to predict the outcome of the meeting or the final decision of the 
Commission what to do with the information that has emanated from the meetings. 
One important point should be stressed here, however. Our interviews were conducted 
two years after the enlargement of the EU. Before the enlargement coalitions were 
predictably clustered around the larger member states. Since enlargement, agreements 
within this arena are very difficult to predict. But since the EU has been enlarged with 
the ten Central and Eastern European countries: 
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‘strategic insight is no longer important. In the old days the voting blocks were 
almost as fixed. If the Netherlands were in favour of something, the Italians 
opposed. Then we approached the Germans to advocate our point and when 
Germany said it, the issue became settled. We only needed to sit back and 
relax and say nothing. Also, you used to have member states with so and so 
many votes that you could make calculations. Nowadays, it has become so 
complex that it is not worth to do something about. With twenty-five member 
states, calculations have become impossible. With which variants do you 
achieve a blocking majority? The number of parameters has grown so large 
that strategic interactions with representatives of other member states within 
the committee has become useless. Too many variants are possible’ (civil 
servant of the VWA).   
 
In conclusion, despite the options for the forging of small blocks of likeminded 
countries and the possibilities to dominate the meeting and have the Commission 
adopt parts of the positions expressed this way, expert committee meetings will still 
be less effective than frontloading and signalling. Expert groups are established once 
the Commission has already adopted a direction. It requires a civil servant’s 
networking skills and long-term personal devotion to an issue to invest in coalition 
formation in order to bend the discussion within an expert group in the direction of his 
country’s interests. But still then the Commission remains in the driver’s seat and 
determines to large extent the substance of the proposal it submits to the Council and 
Parliament. 
 
 
4.6 Eurocatic work as strategic behaviour: Conclusions 
 
This chapter explored the strategic behaviour of national civil servants during the pre-
proposal phase. Not only does it contribute to the research on a relatively unexplored 
phase of the EU policy process but also to the study of organizational and individual 
behaviour of national ministries and civil servants of the EU member states. Hitherto, 
ministerial departments have been examined by students mainly for the purpose of 
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mapping an assessing the effects of Europeanization on the structure and functioning 
of national administrative systems. Civil servants enjoy more and more attention from 
students of Europeanization, but following the studies on (changing) role perceptions 
and attitudes of EU civil servants (Hooghe 2001) the focus has mainly rest on the role 
perceptions and attitudes of Europeanizing national civil servants. The attention that 
political scientist devote to the politics of the EU policy process at the supranational 
level has enjoyed, however, has not been given to the politics of the proposal 
formation phase. 
 This chapter is perhaps one of the first studies of the strategic behaviour of 
national ministries and civil servants during this phase. The pre-proposal phase is 
conceptualized as a crucial phase where the first-mover advantages of member states 
can be disproportionably high. If a member state manages to move successfully 
before the Commission initiates a proposal for a directive or regulation, our 
theoretical argument goes, it can impose its preference on the other member states 
through forming the text of the proposal. For other member states to alter the text and 
bend the position within the proposal is required a forging of a coalition with a critical 
mass of other member states during subsequent committee meetings. Given the 
powers of the Commission during this phase and the difficulties of successful 
coalition formation (i.e. due to a battle-of-sexes game), the first moving member 
states actually succeeds to lock-in its ideal position when the Commission formally 
submits the proposal to the Council and European Parliament. 
 This chapter has identified three strategic options on the basis of this logic. 
Two of those options yield first-mover advantages. The first of these is signalling. We 
found that in contrast to the literature that signalling is not only the main task of civil 
servants at the permanent representation of the Netherlands, but also actively 
employed by departmental civil servants. Moreover, not only middle-level civil 
servants but also the higher civil servants we interviewed reported that actively 
contacting and informing Commission officials constituted an important part of their 
work practices. A difference is the lower frequency with which higher civil servants 
as compared to the middle-level civil servants meet their counterparts at Brussels.  At 
all levels, then, individual civil servants are required to practice within and develop 
informal networks across a variety of policy-making arenas at Brussels. They have to 
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know what is going on at their home departments and which Brussels arenas and 
channels are best to signal their message. 
As regards to frontloading, we are able to report that secondment is actually 
considered a highly strategic instrument during the pre-proposal phase, a point that 
has largely remained unexplored in research on SNEs. Secondments will surely to 
some extent affect role perceptions of seconded national officials and eventually, 
upon their return to their own departments, instigate a process of Europeanization of 
the culture and social practices at national departments.  What has been overlooked 
hitherto is the strategic use of seconded national civil servants in the uploading of 
national preferences into the EU policy process. In our interviews we found that the 
’natural’ national perceptions and outlooks of the seconded national experts more than 
top-level instructions were considered as the most important mechanism through 
which national preferences are translated into Commission proposals. Once uploaded 
and launched into the supranational policy process, the preferences of the member 
state are locked into the highly institutionalized policy process at this level, leading to 
the ‘survival’ of the core of the ideas laid down in the proposal (80% according to 
Hull 1993). In addition to the individual skills and practices that civil servants have to 
develop and foster when employing the signalling strategy, frontloading requires their 
departments to organize for influencing Brussels. The departments need to make 
available sufficient resources to staff Brussels’ positions, recruit and motivate their 
skilled people, and top management commitment to the networks that evolve through 
seconded officials. 
Finally, the findings we presented on the coalition formation strategy of 
member states during the proposal formation phase underscore the findings in the 
literature thus far. The Commission has extensive formal and informal powers during 
the pre-proposal phase; it has not only the right to initiate proposal but also capacities 
to steer and shape the committee deliberation process during the pre-proposal phase. 
The growing number of member states and the risen complexity of voting weights of 
the member states within the Council working groups during the subsequent decision-
making phase has deemed it almost impossible for member states to operate 
strategically during the proposal formation phase. The only successful we reported 
above is in a sense exceptional therefore; the coordination of national positions during 
the four countries occurred in one specific area during a weak presidency. Like 
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signalling, individual civil servants are ‘alone out there’ negotiation with their 
counterparts from other member states; they need to know how the game is played 
and master sufficient knowledge and expertise to earn the necessary standing and 
reputation. However, the coalition formation strategy will fail if civil servants do not 
have clear mandates with clearly specified discretionary authorities. Top management 
therefore needs to guide and steer the efforts of their civil servants at the Brussels 
floor. 
As studies of the politics of the pre-proposal phase have been scarce, our study 
has been explorative more than explanatory. We have chosen for conceptualizing the 
pre-proposal phase as a battle-of-the sexes game and fleshed out a number of possible 
strategies that may emerge out of a situation that is conceptualized in this way. Future 
studies should critically assess the theoretical underpinning of this study that led us to 
focus on two main strategies. To be more precisely, we need a better understanding of 
the rules of the game during the pre-proposal phase. In contrast to the supranational 
decision-making process where the process is highly structured and can easily be 
constructed as a game structure, the structure of the pre-proposal phase is less well 
understood. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EUROCRATS AS DIPLOMATS AND AS ENTREPRENEURS: 
GETTING THINGS DONE IN EUROPEAN POLICE 
COOPERATION 
 
 
‘I am here to represent The Netherlands, and my colleagues back home sometimes have difficulties in 
appreciating that. They do the individual ministries’ bidding. Their arena is about pulling and hauling 
between ministries. Here the arena is about pulling and hauling between countries’ (An official at the 
Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU). 
 
Q: Are you a Dutchman, a European, or a Euregional citizen? 
`I am first and foremost a Euregional policeman. As far as my organizational back office is concerned I 
am embedded in the Dutch system, but the actual job lies in this transnational region, and this is on the 
increase. So I have to play chess simultaneously on two boards: the Dutch and the Euregional board. 
That implies an additional work load.’  
Q: Do you behave differently because of this? 
`There is no hierarchy in the cooperation with the other countries. It is more a social, network-like 
thing. Cooperation is all you’ve got. It is much less direct than working in a national command 
hierarchy. You must actually place yourself in the other person’s shoes’ (A senior police official in the 
Dutch province of Limburg). 
 
 
5.1 Another logic of Eurocratic work? 
 
The European Union has often been called a governance system sui generis, and a 
veritable industry of scholars attempts to grasp what one of them, Thomas Risse 
Kappen (1996), has referred to as ‘the nature of the beast.’ Our contribution to this 
effort is to look at European governance through the eyes of people who routinely 
‘do’ European governance as part of their jobs as national civil servants. We want to 
know how these civil servants operate in European arenas and in which way this EU 
related work is embedded in and facilitated by the organizations they are part of. To 
attain insights into this we selected two cases to study in depth. They seemed to us to 
be most different cases with which it would be possible to compare at least two very 
different ways of doing European governance. In the previous chapter we examined 
the case of veterinary policy. We selected this case for several reasons. One of them 
being that veterinary policy is part of the First Pillar of the EU. This implies that the 
Commission is a crucial actor. Furthermore it became clear that this is a highly 
institutionalized regime and that the technocratic arena is dominant, although 
sometimes things get to be politically explosive. Examples include BSE and avian 
influenza. We demonstrated that in this context Eurocrats sense the opportunity to act 
as tacticians. They strategically move to influence proposals by signalling, 
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frontloading and coalition formation.  In this chapter we focus on officials involved in 
making and implementing European police cooperation on behalf of the Dutch 
government. They reside mainly at the ministries of Interior and Justice, in the 25 
regional and single national police force; a few of them are stationed at the Dutch 
Permanent representation in Brussels or at organizations like Europol. Police 
cooperation is a Third Pillar issue area, which means that it is governed by a much 
less ‘transnationalized’ regime of collective decision making than the First Pillar area 
of veterinary policy. We suspect such an arena offers national Eurocrats different 
types of incentives for ‘getting things done’ than faced by their veterinary 
counterparts described in chapter 4. Hence we expect there to be differences in the 
craft of being a national Eurocrat between these two sectors. 
 The quotes cited above illustrate what we want to argue here: that the role 
orientations and rules of thumb that the officials who work on police cooperation have 
developed in the course of their European experiences vary markedly. They ‘do 
Europe’ in very different ways. We shall demonstrate that holistic concepts such as 
‘Europeanization,’ ‘European policymaking’ or ‘Eucrocrat’ hold little sway as tools 
for understanding the practical realities and experiences of national officials. 
Depending on the issue area and their positions, they operate in very different kinds of 
policy networks at the European level which performing markedly distinct functions. 
Grasping these different logics and examining how they complement and conflict 
with one another is pivotal to understanding what it takes to operate at the nexus 
between national and transnational policymaking.  
 
 
5.2 The case of data availability: ‘messy’ policymaking in Europe 
 
Data availability is a hot topic on the agenda of European Justice and Home Affairs 
institutions. Transnational sharing of information on anything – such as people, 
communication data, (stolen) vehicles, arms, explosives, poison, money - that might 
lead to a threat of safety and security in Member States is widely considered vital by 
all governments. Yet plans to facilitate this information sharing have aroused serious 
privacy concerns, fears about a loss of sovereignty in this key domain of state activity, 
as well as charges that these measures may undermine the rule of law. Different 
national viewpoints on data sharing have surfaced repeatedly in the preparations for 
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the European Council of JHA Ministers, and as such this case provides us with a 
poignant view on how Dutch Eurocrats deal with such a hot topic. Below we report on 
our observations and interviews in several arenas where this issue gets processed and 
plays out in terms of both policy making and implementation. 
 
5.2.1 An expert committee: Working Party on Police Cooperation 
On 25 January 2006, a meeting was held at the Dutch Ministry of the Interior in The 
Hague. Its purpose was to prepare the Dutch position on a proposal from the Austrian 
Presidency for a European Council decision on improving police cooperation between 
Member States of the European Union. A major part of the proposal concerned 
procedures for improving transnational information-sharing among police forces. The 
leader of the Dutch delegation would have to present the Dutch position on the 
proposal the day after, during a meeting of the Police Cooperation Working Party, one 
of the countless committees that prepare and help implement European policies and 
programs. The delegation leader was a senior official from the Interior Ministry and 
he was chairing the discussion. Attending it were four of his counterparts from the 
Ministry of Justice (the ministries of Interior and Justice share responsibility for 
Dutch policing policy). There were also two representatives from the Dutch National 
Police, both veterans who had seen their last operational action years ago.  
They discussed the Austrian proposal. There was much talk about technical 
aspects: could the Dutch police departments meet the requirements envisaged in the 
proposal, would they have to adjust their information systems, and could one expect 
other countries’ police forces to do likewise? The relevant treaties which might bear 
upon the measures proposed were presented. No mention was made of ministerial or 
parliamentary decisions or opinions on the subject. There was no real debate about 
anything on the agenda: the participants seemed to agree, and the ‘Dutch position’ 
simply emerged from that consensus. Some of the policemen present did not seem to 
be fully aware of European procedural ‘nitty-gritty’ of the European policymaking. 
They asked about the role the European Parliament plays in all of this. With narrowly 
concealed condescension, one of the civil servants of the Justice Department 
suggested they attend ‘a course on European matters’ that would be taught soon.  
The next day, 26 January, the meeting of the Police Cooperation Working 
Party took place in Brussels. The meeting was a full-day affair in the same enormous 
conference room where the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of Ministers 
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meets, the eventual ‘end station’ for all these preparatory meetings. Every participant 
could speak in native tongue as interpreters translated to and from all official 
languages of the Member States. All participants wore earphones throughout the 
meeting. Cameras were an essential part of the interaction process: everyone had a 
screen on their desk on which the speaker appeared in close up, for everyone to read 
his facial expression. There were also several enormous screens hanging from the 
ceiling on which the same picture appeared. The Dutch delegation was small. Next to 
the delegation leader sat an official from the Dutch Permanent Representation to the 
EU. The most striking part of the meeting ritual was that participants were referred to 
not by their own name, but by their country’s. Every participant was seated at a huge 
oval table, behind a shield which bore the country’s name. A participant who wanted 
to make a statement put this shield on its side for everybody to see. The chairperson 
would then grant him permission to speak, saying things like ‘The Netherlands, the 
floor is yours,’ and would close the interjection by words like ‘Thank you, the 
Netherlands.’ Another striking thing was the little amount of contact between people 
of different delegations.  Everybody was polite but controlled, and sticking strictly to 
known formulae. There were only few informal greetings or casual asides. 
Participants also acted very formally toward the chair. The Presidency had just 
changed hands, as it does every six months in the EU. And so, all speakers prefaced 
their opening remarks by formally wishing the Austrian presidency well and 
expressing their intention to co-operate with the presidency. And the politeness was 
reciprocal: all participants had found some small presents at their desk when arriving 
in the conference room, bureaucratic gifts like a tie or a booklet with the logo of the 
new presidency on it.  
Nor was there any sign of the much vaunted Brussels lunching-cum-lobbying 
circuit. The members of the Dutch delegation had lunch together at the Salle Blue, 
one of the restaurants within the building: bread and a salad, pasta or baked potatoes 
with meat. The delegation leader did leave lunch before the others to have a talk with 
the Irish delegation on a project the Irish proposed which partly overlapped with a 
Dutch proposal that was also up for discussion. He also made a phone call to The 
Hague with one of his colleagues to check on something.  
During the meeting the various proposals on the agenda were discussed in 
depth. It was a long day  with arcane technical matters receiving sustained attention. 
The key proposal under scrutiny had  been discussed before in other Council working 
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groups  like ENFOPOL, ENFOCUSTOM, CRIMORG and COMIX. Remarkably, 
hardly anyone ever referred to these discussions in other forums; it appeared as if the 
participants had not been briefed about them.  
The Austrian chairperson meanwhile tried to reach agreement on as many 
parts of the proposal as possible. She had little asides with her assistants and members 
of the Secretariat of the Council and then would propose a different wording of some 
part of the proposal. This meeting was about weighing, shaping and bending words 
until everybody agreed. At the end of the discussion the chairperson gave a short 
summary of the suggested changes to the proposal on which she took there to be 
general agreement. She also summed up issues for which no consensus-inducing 
words had been found. The proposal was now forwarded to next week’s Comité de 
l'Article Trente-Six (CATS), a coordinating committee of more senior civil servants. 
CATS would zoom in on those parts of the proposal on which no consensus had been 
reached, i.e. what were now referred to as the more ‘political’ parts of the proposal. 
After CATS had discussed, perhaps modified and signed off on it, the resultant 
proposal would be sent further up the European policymaking hierarchy, to the 
Comité de Représentants Permanents (COREPER), the meeting of the Member 
States’ ambassadors to the European Union. Once approved there, the proposal would 
finally come up for political decision in the JHA Council of ministers.  
 
5.2.2 A high-level committee: CATS 
An official from the Ministry of Justice and formerly at the Permanent Representation 
in Brussels who participated in the preparation of  the CATS committee pointed out  
that he was acutely aware of the disjointed nature of the working group system. He 
thought the European Commission actually exploits the ‘organized anarchy’ in the 
third pillar by offering its proposals to different working groups, hoping that at least 
one of these channels will serve to lead this proposal up to the Council. Yet the leader 
of the Dutch delegation to the CATS committee disagreed with the idea that the 
Commission was playing the system. He thought it would be a great improvement if 
all proposals to the Council in the third pillar would be made by the Commission. 
This would at least bring some consistency in the messiness if there would be one 
actor in this process who maintains an overview of the entire terrain. Currently there 
is none. His chief concern with the current system was that political pressures might 
lead the high-level actors in CATS and JHA to fall for a hasty, patchy proposal 
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coming ‘from nowhere.’ According to him, ‘the culture of the European arena is such 
that any decision is considered better than taking no decision at all’. He deplored the 
adhocracy this tended to bring about, citing instances in which decisions taken clearly 
conflicted with prior CATS decisions, or with a decision made by another forum in 
the JHA field.  
The Dutch delegation leader also observed another form of pressure on the 
CATS committee process. At the end of the day all participants in CATS are 
accountable to their national bureaucratic constituencies. Hence he and all his 
counterparts from other countries is to vet each proposal put before them with one key 
criterion in mind: is there something in it for ‘us’? The bottom line of the CATS 
meetings is that all participants are first and foremost national civil servants, and feel 
compelled to act as such - or face uncomfortable questions back home.  
The CATS delegation leaders identify themselves first and foremost as 
national civil servants, at least as much as the participants in the Working Party on 
Police Cooperation described earlier, even though they seem to know each other 
better than their lower-level counterparts do, addressing each other (by way of the 
chairperson) by their first names during the meeting. The Dutch delegation leader said 
that he himself would like to act more as a genuine ‘European’, taking the common 
good instead of the Dutch interest as his reference point for judging proposals and 
taking positions. Unfortunately, he said, his colleagues in The Hague, as well as his 
counterparts in forums such as CATS are overwhelmingly locked into their national 
perspectives and seem primarily intent on preserving their existing national policies, 
procedures and judicial systems. He welcomed the pressure put on his colleagues by 
the Foreign Ministry and Permanent Representation, ‘who regularly argue that 
something has to happen, some improvements have to be made. If it weren’t for that, 
everybody would simply lay back and wait.’   
A member of the Permanent Representation confirms this point of view: 
‘There is very little vision on which way to head in police cooperation. The general 
idea is to try to avoid inconveniences because of anything new. It would be so much 
better to try and benefit from new initiatives.’ A colleague from the Ministry of 
Interior hints at why civil servants seem to act the way they do: ‘As long as there is no 
clear political vision about a certain theme, there is not much vision developed among 
civil servants either. We stick to the political vision.’  This, he said, breeds 
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conservatism: ‘'We are against a proposal because we have always been against it 
even if no one knows anymore what exactly was the reason for taking that position.’ 
The CATS delegation leader considered himself lucky to have a ‘Europe-
minded’ minister. This gave him a lot of support in urging his colleagues to ‘get on 
with it’. The Dutch Minister for Justice had made crime fighting his top priority and is 
strongly aware of its European dimension. After the CATS meeting he pointed out 
that this provided him with opportunities. ‘Within the Netherlands, you often act as 
representative of an EU position: you overact your European allegiance in order to 
create room to manoeuvre. You do the reverse in Brussels, by saying: “I cannot 
possibly take this back to my superiors at home.”’ 
 
5.2.3 An operational arena: Europol 
As far as data availability is concerned, it is all about trust, according to many 
policemen – as indeed is the case in other areas of European police cooperation. Even 
if police officers are aware of the necessity of international collaboration in fighting 
crime, they will not necessarily share information with foreign colleagues. They cite 
various reasons. First, professional jealousy: ‘why should we allow others to show off 
in cracking cases that we did all the work on?’ Second, reputation: ‘who knows what 
police departments in “funny” countries will do with our information?’ The new 
Member States especially are treated with considerable caution. Most policemen we 
spoke cite this as the main reason why any EU decisions on making data available to 
police forces from states other than a carefully selected batch of trusted and liked ones 
would prove difficult to implement - even when the political pressure to comply is 
enormous. A case in point is Europol, a Europe-wide agency specifically set up to 
advance transnational information sharing and police cooperation. Politicians and 
high ranking civil servants wanted to create a central data system to analyze key 
criminal and terrorist threats. In practice, police departments in most Member States 
deliver too little data too late for the system to getup and running: ‘They just don’t do 
it,’ observed a recently retired Dutch policeman who had spent years at Europol, and 
‘this is a source of enormous frustration to the management board of Europol.’ 
The bumpy road of Europol’s efforts to advance information sharing and its 
own stifled institutional development bear testimony to an iron law of police 
cooperation: police officers need to feel an operational urgency (and payoff) to 
cooperate, and to be able to trust one another. If one of these is so much as doubtful, 
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they won’t move – whatever is being decided in Brussels and national capitals. This is 
worsened by practices at Europol’s Management Board. There has been little interest 
for Europol in the Dutch police; only recently one of the regional police chiefs has 
taken up the task to represent the Dutch police force at Europol’s Management Board. 
The chair of the Dutch delegation is head of a department at the Ministry of Justice. 
By way of an example, we recount the second day of a two-day meeting of Europol’s 
Management Board in The Hague. It started at 10 a.m. with a closed session on who 
should be formally proposed to the JHA Council as replacement of one of the deputy 
directors of Europol. Only delegation leaders were allowed into the conference room. 
The rest of the delegation members were waiting outside in the lounge. The Dutch 
delegation had four members waiting outside. At 11.30 there was a coffee break and 
the delegation leader mentioned that the discussion was still going on about the first 
candidate out of three. Representatives of some Member States were quarrelling 
despite intensive prior quite diplomacy and agreements. At 13.00 there was another 
break, now for lunch. Discussion restarted at 14.00 and finally at 15.00 the closed 
session was finished. As was envisioned by one of the delegation members during the 
closed session, after about half an hour some participants began leaving the meeting 
in order to be able to catch their planes at Schiphol airport to be able to get back home 
that same day. At 17.00 when the chair wanted to discuss and confirm minutes of the 
last meeting there were not enough participants left to have a qualified majority. 
 
5.2.4 Cooperation on the ground: Euroregional policing   
Yet another transnational site where data availability is considered to be pivotal is in 
the so-called ‘Euregions:’ border areas where, for example, police officials from the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany collaborate closely to combat trans-border 
organized crime. These policemen are in the thick of that fight and they consider the 
sharing of information about criminals and criminal acts with their foreign colleagues 
essential to make headway. They don’t care about legal niceties, they want workable 
procedures. They are convinced that these are impossible to design for 25 Member 
States at once, as the civil servants at the working group meetings attempt to. They 
instead have formed ‘experimental’ multinational teams with their neighbouring 
colleagues to find out what is possible, legally speaking, and what works for them. 
They have formed units like the Bureau of Euregional Cooperation in Maastricht in 
which the judicial base for this cooperation is laid out and a unit called Epic in which 
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police representatives from all three countries work to accommodate information 
requests from their partners.  
Epic is located in Heerlen, a city near Maastricht. It is a pretty unique 
situation. There is no fixed hierarchical structure. Rules of the game evolve as they go 
along. People from all three countries sit mixed at large round tables with computer 
screens in front of them. In stead of formally having to formulate information 
requests, they just ask for the necessary information across the table. Legal experts are 
available to handle the requests for legal assistance from other countries.  
The linguistic mechanics of making it work are fascinating. The Dutch living 
in the south of the country speak a dialect resembling German. The Dutch, German 
and Flemish speaking Belgian policemen communicate with each other in German or 
Dutch dialect. The French speaking Belgians are mostly assisted by the Flemish 
speaking Belgians, or by some of the Dutch who do speak French.    
One of the Dutch policemen who had initiated the Euregional Bureau said that 
the key ingredients for successfully starting it were: practical expertise on crime 
fighting, personal relationships, intercultural respect, a sense of urgency to make a 
difference in tackling universally abhorred crimes such as child pornography, and the 
ability to align working methods across borders. Seen from up close, Epic’s every day 
practice is still quite mundane. About 80 percent of its work remains confined to 
answering to simple requests like identifying car owners by checking license plates. 
Moreover, cops from one country are legally not allowed to search each other’s data 
systems. Once this changes, Epic must gear up to the much more complicated task of 
not only rapidly delivering information on request, but also analyzing the available 
information in the more than 90 data banks it can enter. Its current staff - mostly 
officers who have left operational service because of one problem or another - is 
hardly up to that. But the ambition is clearly there, as is the knowledge that the current 
political mood – information sharing is widely advocated as a pivotal component in 
the ‘wars’ on crime and terrorism - is ticking in Epic’s favour.  
 
 
5.3 Species of Eurocrats   
 
The case of data availability illustrates that ‘European governance’ or ‘Europeanized 
policymaking’ is produced in a series of loosely coupled arenas, whose participants 
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are not necessarily aware of their counterparts’ existence, postures and decisions. Nor 
are they always well-informed about the bigger institutional configuration in which 
these are embedded. Working on European data availability and police cooperation 
mobilizes very different sorts of national civil servants driven by different rationales, 
operating in different ‘European’ arenas, often with considerable discretion, 
employing different notions of the ‘rules of the game’ in ‘doing police cooperation’. 
The data availability case and many others like it suggest that conventional 
accounts describing it as ‘governing by committee’ (Christiansen and Kirchner, 2000) 
and ‘expertocracy’ where policies are crafted by ‘epistemic communities’ of experts 
(Haas 1992) are only partially correct. It would be more accurate to describe the EU 
governance  as evolving through multiple, loosely coupled, multi-level networks (cf. 
Egeberg, Schaeffer and Trondal, 2003).  
To be sure EU working groups and committees constitute focal points for 
crafting European policies.  They are multi-national settings in which national civil 
servants operate as both policy experts and representatives of their countries, and in 
that way as the functional diplomats we wrote about in chapter 2. Although the 
policies they agree on are post-national in the sense that these are more than just 
piling up national policies and regulations, the policy process through which they 
arrive at this is multi-national (Thedvall 2006). Although working groups and 
committees are often said to be about experts talking to experts, our observations and 
interviews strongly suggest that they still are first and foremost about countries 
talking to countries, through their representatives.  
The multi-national perspective is being reinforced by the rituals that are 
performed during the meetings. As we saw, for example, participants are referred to 
not by their own but by their country’s name. Some representatives seek coalitions 
with others in order to get the meeting to adopt the policies or regulations they prefer. 
This is not only done during the official meetings, but also during lunches, dinners, 
and coffee-breaks: these constitute the back stage of European committee governance, 
which is much more intense in first pillar affairs than in the third pillar. Sometimes 
representatives come together the evening before the meeting with the intention to 
prepare the meeting and form allegiances. Sometimes they sound one another out by 
e-mail or telephone prior to meetings.  
The national outlook of Eurocrats dominates not only their encounters with 
their counterparts in working groups and committees, it also governs their relations 
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with the primary representatives of a post-national logic of European policymaking: 
Commission officials. Representatives of Member States come in with a focus on 
their national interests and somehow have to arrive at post-national policies through 
deliberative and negotiating processes. This can be time-consuming, and the 
compromises and package deals that emerge from it may produce watered down 
policies that satisfy no one. The Commission wants to maintain speed and focus in the 
policymaking process by intervening in discussion in working groups and delivering a 
steady stream of post-national proposals, which representatives of Member States 
time and again interpret as attempts to control their national affairs.  
National Eurocrats experience a dilemma in all of this. Some of our Dutch 
interviewees expressed a sense of despair at the predictable and stifling way in which 
all representatives of Member States seem to only want to agree upon policies that fit 
their national systems. They detest the ‘conservatism’ that it breeds, as one of them 
labelled it. However, at the same time they are trapped in doing exactly the same 
themselves. At the end of the day, they too define their professional success in terms 
of getting their national positions to prevail – and at least to avoid them being 
disregarded altogether. After all, this is what they are held accountable for by their 
peers and in their national back offices. And so they too display reluctance to embrace 
truly post-national solutions, and play the tedious game of multi-national bargaining 
instead.     
So far so good. But to leave it at this would obscure as much as it reveals 
about how Dutch officials do their European business. The various Dutch policing 
Eurocrats we studied were engaged in rather different types of international 
transactions. The nature of what it was they cooperated on across borders seemed to 
reflect the kinds of transnational network arrangements in which they did so. 
 
5.3.1 Bureaucrat-diplomats 
Take the data availability issue that was just presented. The Brussels’ working party 
on police cooperation and the CATS committee represent what we may call 
bureaucratic-diplomatic arenas of making European policy. The craft of the Eurocrats 
that populate these arenas revolves around two stages: first, as bureaucrats at home 
they need to construct a national position out of an often heterogeneous sets of views 
and preferences of various (sub-) departmental and other stakeholders (i.e. the police), 
often without clear political positions steering them; then, as diplomats, they need to 
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represent and defend those national positions whilst bargaining with representatives of 
other member states. To some this is simple stuff. One ministry of Justice official 
boasted: 
‘Working in EU settings is actually very straightforward. Everybody knows 
this but it is rarely ever said aloud. When you go to Brussels you say to your 
colleagues at home: “It will be tough to achieve this.” When you are in 
Brussels you tell your fellow committee members: “I must be able to sell this 
at home.” And so you always have an explanation for the result you achieve’  
 
The bureaucratic-diplomatic view of Eurocratic work corresponds closely to the 
traditional picture of the EU as a multilevel system of committee governance. We 
found it to be prevalent among two groups of Dutch officials. Firstly, among ministry 
officials of the kind labelled ‘policy bureaucrats’ by Page and Jenkins (2005): 
academically trained professionals charged with policy development and maintenance 
in particular issue areas. Their involvement in European policy processes flows from 
their portfolio responsibilities and is issue-based, sporadic and often does not 
constitute a major part of their working week. They are not specifically interested in 
EU institutions and processes, nor have they received any formal training in their 
modus operandi. They are just ‘following their dossiers:’ to preparatory meetings 
within and between Dutch ministries, and occasionally to expert or working group 
meetings in Brussels. To many, acting at the European stage may be a regular, but 
quite often infrequent part of their jobs. Nor is it necessarily the most important part 
of their jobs. Much depends, as always, on the priority given to the topic by the 
departmental hierarchy.  
In many cases, these policy bureaucrats are not particularly well-prepared for 
the new world they are about to enter when they are first assigned EU-related tasks. 
We cite two voices from a much bigger chorus:  
‘They just let you go to Brussels. It isn’t a very structured thing. You just go 
there and begin to operate. You learn by doing, and by observing others doing 
it.’  
And:  
‘I stumbled into the European scene in 1985 because my portfolio required me 
to attend meetings in Brussels. Your older colleagues or your head of unit 
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would give you some coaching. They would come with you once or twice and 
after that it was “you’re on your own now - good luck with it.”’   
 
Some of these officials may continue to be charged with European portfolios for long 
periods of time. In the organizations studied, this was far more likely to happen to 
officials at the Agriculture and Justice ministries than to their colleagues at the 
Interior and Health ministries. Those that do, build up considerable experience in the 
do’s and don’ts of operating in Brussels. Taken together, this constitutes a potentially 
valuable body of rules of thumb and ‘survival techniques’ that could be codified and 
transmitted much more systematically from EU veterans to EU novices within the 
various departments. At present, this does not seem to happen. People are sent to 
courses at the Dutch Institute of International Affairs (Clingendael) or the National 
Government Training Institute (ROI). This is deemed useful by many to get a grip on 
the institutional framework of the EU, learn about intercultural negotiation and so on. 
Such formal training remains useful even for those with hands-on experience, as one 
official confirmed:  
‘After two years on the Brussels circuit I went to the Dutch Institute of 
International Affairs to do a course. It was interesting to finally get the bigger 
picture about the entire EU project – how all the pieces of the puzzle are 
supposed to fit. If you are only attending committee meetings you don’t grasp 
this at all.’  
 
The second group which practices and espouses the bureaucratic-diplomatic view of 
Eurocratic work are the ‘EU insiders’: EU coordinators at ministries, officials 
attached to the Permanent Representation, and high-level officials who chair 
delegations to high-level meetings. For all the differences between their ‘average 
working days,’ all of these people describe their work as proceeding in more or less 
scripted, predictable fashion. Theirs is the world of institutionalized bargaining – both 
at home and in multilateral forums. In that world, which they regard as not very 
unlike that of other multilateral institutions such as the UN or the WTO, the scope of 
the possible is determined by existing treaties, agreements and regulatory frameworks, 
as well as by balances of power, veto players and coalitions. Knowledge about these 
things tends to be widely shared among the participants, all socialized over time to 
become EU insiders.   
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Being effective in this world, these civil servants hold, requires astute 
anticipation of the institutional balance between Council, Commission, Parliament 
and Member States. Preparatory work may also involve ‘massaging’ key gatekeepers 
within EU institutions, particularly Commission policy bureaucrats who are shaping 
the proposals, but also pivotal MEPs. More generally it requires smart ‘venue 
shopping’ within these constituent forces: talking to the right people in the right 
bodies at the right time in the right way. The actual EU working group, committee 
and Council meetings are seen as pivotal occasions for bargaining and issue by issue 
coalition-building that build on this preparatory work. Those that do their homework 
well ought not to be surprised by what transpires there, and they should be well-
placed to shape their decision-making processes, if only by short-circuiting them in 
advance (as became clear in some of the examples we gave above. By virtue of their 
institutional and tactical know-how, EU insiders are ideally able to foresee how 
particular issues will play out, and take timely action to steer the process in desired 
directions. However, the sheer complexity of the processes involved, makes fool-
proof prediction and control of the policy process difficult to achieve.   
In the domestic ‘back office’ of EU policymaking, Eurocratic work boils down 
to aligning departmental and interdepartmental policy coordination to the rhythms, 
procedures and routines of scheduled EU meetings. In these preparatory meetings ‘the 
national interest’ and therefore the ‘national position’ on any given topic on the EU 
agenda get defined. Civil servants attending these preparatory meetings formulate 
what the national interest is, often in the absence of clearly articulated ministerial 
preferences, let alone cabinet policy. They are flying blind quite a lot of the time.  
On touchy topics like data availability and information sharing in the criminal 
justice field Ministers do formulate opinions, but on politically less salient issues the 
civil servants at the meeting construct a ‘national perspective’ all by themselves. They 
brief Dutch delegation leaders in the working group or committee in Brussels on these 
positions. Delegation leaders then make their own judgments on how to interpret the 
instruction; they know full well that much of what The Hague feeds them does not 
come straight from the top, and thus can be taken with a grain of salt.  
Discretion is the name of the game in this process. A representative in the 
Multidisciplinary Working Group on Organized Crime observed:  
‘Often it is individuals themselves who determine the national position. I think 
that is weird. If something does not have a fire-alarm character or very high 
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priority you can decide yourself what to do. [The delegation leader] does that a 
lot of the time. But he also discusses it. When he decided no longer to defend a 
certain position in CATS he came by to tell me. That was a unique occasion. 
Generally you never hear about anything again...In the international arena 
your autonomy is bigger than in the national arena. That is because it has less 
priority. The national and the international are completely separated.’  
A Head of Delegation to one of the committees echoed this:  
‘You must know your instruction well, but you should also know the entire 
process that produced the instruction in order to gauge the weight of the 
various interests involved. You try to achieve your instruction, and if that’s 
impossible you try to at least achieve its bottom line. However, the 
instructions are often useless, frankly. The official who actually attends the 
working group knows its dynamics best. You must not lose on the really vital 
issues. You have a lot of discretion, but you must of course anticipate the 
Hague’s reactions.’    
 
The coordinators at ministries are at the hub of this process of defining positions, 
drafting instructions and monitoring outcomes. As one puts it:  
‘Most EU dossiers touch upon the work of two or more parts of this ministry: 
the EU’s way of dividing up policy issues does not correspond perfectly with 
the Dutch departmental division of labour. There is a need for a “sorting 
station.” That’s what we do.’  
 
In some ministries (Justice, Agriculture) these units provide a comprehensive, 
centralized system of coordinating EU policy matters across the full range of the 
ministry’s portfolio. Others, such as the Ministry of the Interior, have opted a more 
hybrid system where a central coordination unit focuses on procedural matters, 
whereas international sections within some of the policy or executive decisions deal 
more closely with the substantive preparation of meetings in specific issue areas (such 
as policing and intelligence). Yet others, such as the Ministry of Health, have no such 
coordination unit at all. The domestic EU affairs coordinators we encountered seem to 
agree that two things are particularly important in their job. The first is getting those 
that matter in one’s own department to accord appropriate priority to the issues. This 
may be an uphill struggle. In the four ministries examined here, differences in 
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ministerial involvement were marked: low, passive and almost non-existent in Health 
and Interior; the opposite in Agriculture and Justice. When ministers have other 
priorities, the ministry’s top officials tend to have likewise.  
The second part of a coordinator’s job is to develop a clearly articulated 
departmental position on any given issue, and making sure this position carries weight 
in interdepartmental coordination processes prior to EU meetings. Bureaucratic 
politics does not stop at borders: the domestic coordination of EU policy is a known 
bureaucratic battleground in many countries (Kassim et al, 2000). The Netherlands is 
certainly no exception to this rule: its ministries are big and internally heterogeneous, 
and where ‘joined up government’ has proven an elusive ideal at best, and where the 
machinery of interdepartmental coordination of EU affairs has been the subject of 
repeated investigations, discussions and tugs of war between the Foreign Ministry and 
the Prime Minister’s department.   
 
As on any policy issue of significance, interdepartmental scuffles are no exception in 
the run-up to high-level European meetings.  
‘We at the Ministry of Interior often prepare texts to be delivered by our 
minister at the JHA Council. Sometimes our minister decides not to attend the 
meeting because of limited time when few of the decisions to be taken are in 
the domain of the Interior. Then he leaves it to the Minister of Justice to 
represent us. The Minister of Justice always does that very well. He is very 
much internationally orientated, and communicates well with his colleagues 
from other countries. But it weakens the position of the Ministry of Interior 
vis-à-vis the Ministry of Justice.’ 
 
Those who sit in the hot seat as delegation leader in Brussels obviously have leverage 
over the other departments and other stakeholders whose interests are at stake in these 
meetings. That is why interdepartmental sensitivities like the one mentioned above 
occur. Ministries whose top ranks do not accord high priority to European issues tend 
to be on the losing side of the interdepartmental scuffles. It is hard for the EU 
coordinators in these ministries to get their organization’s voice listened to in the 
interdepartmental preparations for EU meetings. They lack their ‘prize-fighters’ that 
can be brought into the ring if other departments attempt to grab and wield power, e.g. 
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by securing Head of Delegation spots in crucial EU committees and working groups, 
and by dominating the crafting of Dutch positions on important issues.   
 
5.3.2 Street-level entrepreneurs 
How different is the world of the other species of Eurocrat we encountered. These 
were people whose main orientation was their profession, whose natural habitat the 
operational practices in the field (e.g. ‘street-level’), and whose main drive to engage 
themselves on the international/European stage was to solve practical problems they 
encountered in these practices in whichever way that works (e.g. ‘entrepreneurs’).  
Eurocratic work is experienced quite differently by people working in the Euregional 
Bureau. Theirs is an entrepreneurial perspective: forging street-level cooperation 
aimed to solve pressing problems in public service-delivery. Entrepreneurial 
Eurocrats are busy setting up of trans-border investigations or enforcement measures 
and officer training programs.  
The dichotomy of national versus post-national identities (with traces of 
departmental identities) that bureaucrat-diplomats struggle with does not capture the 
role orientation of these operational practitioners: they are, above all, experts in their 
field. Technical knowledge and professional skills are their stock in trade, and form 
the prime lens through which they view and assess their foreign counterparts and the 
possibilities for cooperative ventures. Combining an expert’s knowledge with a 
zealot’s drive in a context of at best embryonic European institutions and policies 
circumscribing what is to be done and how, can get a national Eurocrat a long way in 
shaping policies with a small band of kindred spirits. Here is what police 
commissioner Ad Hellemons, director of European Affairs of the Transport Police 
Division of the Dutch National Police Agency, told us when we asked him to describe 
a ‘typical working day on the European circuit’. He picked one and recounted: 
‘My alarm clock goes off at 3 AM. I live in the west of Brabant (in the 
Southwest of the Netherlands) and can hop in and out of Paris in a day. I am in 
my car half an hour later and get to Paris in time to beat the rush hour. I reach 
the Gendarmerie’s headquarters well on time to share a coffee with the duty 
officers in the General’s secretariat. I  knows them from previous visits and 
since I am reasonably fluent in French I can chat a bit to get a sense of the 
mood of the day. I visit the French that day to get them to commit certain new 
initiatives of TISPOL [see box, auth], which I helped found and was president 
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of for many years. When I get there I know that my immediate counterpart in 
the French traffic police division is already on board, but the French hierarchy 
dictates that the matter has to be taken all the way up to the very top before 
anything happens.  I know I have to open the conversation with the General in 
such a way as to enable him to conduct himself in French without having to 
draw attention to his limited fluency in English. That hurdle taken, we make 
some small talk. Then I gently steer the conversation to the topic at hand. I 
stress the pivotal importance of French “leadership”, you know the stuff he 
likes to hear. In fact, it is not all that difficult to get people like the General’s 
to cooperate. They know I am not a loose canon. TISPOL has a good 
reputation because since its inception the number of road deaths in Europe has 
started falling dramatically. An hour later my business is done. I hit the road 
and am back home in the early afternoon.’ 
 
Hellemons epitomizes the ideal-type of the ‘other Eurocrat’: the doers, the 
experimenters, the rule-benders, the venue shoppers. People like him were most 
conspicuous in the police cooperation field: police commissioners and public 
prosecutors in border regions, narcotics and road safety specialists, police educators. 
The open, not yet highly institutionalized, non-supranational structure of Third Pillar 
policymaking invites this kind of behaviour. Officials of this ilk are mainly people 
driven to reduce trans-border threats to safety affecting their forces’ day-to-day 
operations which they could not possibly tackle all by themselves. They need 
information and collaboration from foreign colleagues to be able to do their core 
business. Cooperation to them is a means to a clear end rather than a generic, ongoing 
task of managing Dutch participation in the EU committee system and working group, 
as it is for the bureaucrat-diplomats in ministerial back offices and at the Permanent 
Representation.  
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TISPOL Mission Statement  
"The TISPOL Organisation has been established by the traffic police forces of Europe in order to 
improve road safety and law enforcement on the roads of Europe. Our main priority is to reduce the 
number of people being killed and seriously injured on Europe's roads. We believe the enforcement of 
traffic law and education, where appropriate, will make a significant contribution to reducing the 
carnage on our roads. This is evident in a number of TISPOL member countries."  
The objectives of TISPOL 
 
1. To reduce road deaths and casualties on European Roads.  
2. To bring together the Roads and Traffic Police Forces in Europe to work together and 
exchange best practice.  
3. Organizing and co-ordinating pan-European operations and campaigns  
4. To encourage enforcement and education based on research, intelligence and information so 
as to establish an effective and targeted education and enforcement programme.  
5. Initiating and supporting research on road safety  
6. Providing an informed and co-ordinated police opinion on road safety issues  
 
 
TISPOL, the object of Ad Hellemon’s Eurocratic entrepreneurship is by all accounts 
very successful. He explained how it came about:  
‘The problem of transport policing in Europe is that roads and mobility policy 
is made by our cousins in the First Pillar whereas our family inhabits the Third 
Pillar. This implies that the policy and rules that the transport police is 
supposed to enforce, are made in the First Pillar, in the complete absence of 
the enforcers. That Third Pillar is a monstrosity with unanimity rule and a 
serious lack of interest in policing matters. If it is not about terrorism or 
organized crime, they ignore it, but the reality is that no less than 30% of all 
the cops’ available time in Europe is involved in traffic one way or another. 
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Contact between the First and Third pillar on this issue is non-existent. When 
decisions are taken in your absence, all you get to do as police organization is 
to clear up the mess afterwards, e.g. having to enforce policies that are 
unenforceable or outright self-defeating. Activities in these two pillars should 
be linked, but that wasn’t happening. And so we as traffic police forces have 
drawn an arrow from the Third to the First Pillar. That arrow constitutes my 
role orientation… we have set up three different networks, but the biggest and 
most developed is TISPOL. It has all the EU members on board as well as 
several candidate states and Switzerland and Norway. It is fully financed from 
First Pillar money… for me it means driving a lot. Trips such as that one to 
Paris. They are about making contact, looking the other guy in the eye. Use 
old contacts as a stepping stone for making new ones. This network has been 
built and is now fully financed by the Commission. It is officially a British 
foundation and we have a president, financial director and executive board. I 
am the executive director. The owners are all the participating police forces. 
We have five working groups for exchanging information, develop joint 
training programs, develop pilot projects and reporting systems, and plan joint 
operations. We are quite operational. We run 50 to 60 pan-European 
enforcement operations each year… To fund various projects we compete for 
Commission money by submitting proposals. We maintain good contacts with 
Commission officials and have had about 19 of our proposals funded. We 
compete for funding these projects  
Q: How did you get into the Commission on this? 
Very simply: you check on the Web who are dealing with traffic safety issues 
and you walk in. To give you an idea: there are only seven people in the entire 
Commission doing road transport and they all sit in adjacent rooms. Each of 
them is happy to do business with you. We feed them with ideas and proposals 
that help them achieve the stated Commission objective in this policy domain, 
which is to reduce road deaths in Europe by 50% in 2010. The Commission 
put this on paper but had no idea how… At that time we stepped in and the 
Commission discovered that it needed the police, and needed the know how 
from certain countries…. And things are marching along beautifully now: we 
are at the midway point in the time line and we are right on schedule. And this 
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is about a structural annual reduction in the number of road deaths of no less 
than 11.000.’      
 
TISPOL’s director is clearly a man with a mission: to reduce traffic deaths and 
casualties by beefing up prevention and enforcement on a pan-European scale. 
Operational necessity got it going, but trust among professionals across borders is 
what makes it tick. The same goes for all the other police cooperation networks we 
studied: with trust, they can be vibrant – as in the case of Epic case described above - 
but when trust is lacking – as in the Europol case - progress is limited. The following 
exchange with another senior Dutch police officer highlights this: 
 
Q: Is there such a thing as a policy framework that dictates whether or not you 
engage in cooperation with other countries’ police forces? 
Yes. It is very simple: do you trust someone or not? It begins with the people 
involved, and only after that it becomes a matter of organizations or countries. 
Q: What must I do to gain your trust? 
Be open and transparent. You get to know people through international 
committees and networks. It all starts with interpersonal relationships. 
Q: This trust appears to be very personal. Isn’t there some sort of guideline? 
There is a kind of division, for example through Interpol: we do business with 
so and so, and not with these others – there is a list of this kind. But most of it 
is individual. You look at the other person’s country’s democracy and all that.  
Q: What is the ultimate aim for the Dutch police when it comes to international police 
cooperation? 
It would be good if policemen and the mayors and public prosecutors who 
work with them take international cooperation as something that is self-
evident. This implies that they should also be convinced that they should 
devote time to it and be courageous in doing it. It means they will cooperate 
on the basis of solid agreements and institutionalized trust. Most of all, it is 
about cooperation becoming taken for granted. 
 
Street-level entrepreneurs have no intrinsic commitment to the EU project and its 
main institutions. They try to work through these institutions, but often run up against 
legal and political constraints. This is especially relevant in the Third Pillar, where 
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development of EU-wide cooperation is slow and the main advocate for truly post-
national policies, the Commission, occupies a weaker position vis-à-vis the Member 
States. Street-level Eurocrats in this domain are constantly confronted by the gap 
between their felt needs for deeper cooperation and the murky realities of EU 
practices: they want things for which there are no policies in place yet. Their coping 
strategy is one of circumvention: by-passing the obstacles of working within the EU 
institutions by developing alternative forms of cooperation, showing that these do the 
job, and over time trying to integrate them into the EU mainstream.   
They tend to strive for autonomy, and regard the role of ministries as 
gatekeepers to participation in relevant EU networks as unhelpful meddling in affairs 
that could more effectively be settled among professionals. A police chief: ‘I don’t 
think that the current government’s orientation on putting the citizens first by letting 
the professional do their job is properly safeguarded by having us represented in 
Brussels predominantly by departmental bureaucrats. They are not sufficiently on top 
of the substance of the issues, which can be quite intricate. It is easy to get it wrong or 
gloss over the important ‘details’ if you’re not a professional yourself. Besides, it is 
much easier to build transnational rapport among professionals in a particular field.’ 
They are not comfortable with the world of instructions, mandates, interdepartmental 
coordination, procedural intricacies, forced inclusiveness and logrolling strategies that 
is part and parcel of the bureaucrat-diplomats’ cooperation paradigm.  
They instead prefer to build cooperation from the ground up by nurturing 
personal and professional networks and creating prototypes of practical joint problem-
solving that work. One police commissioner put it so eloquently that it is worth 
quoting him at length:  
‘Since the process of developing European regulation is so extraordinarily 
time-consuming in the Third Pillar, we at the operational level simply need to 
create movement in smaller entities. You must of course respect state 
sovereignty and all that, but within these boundaries you must create facts. 
Take the example of “joint hitting” in serious crime investigations: we first 
formed a cross-border team and only asked for The Hague’s permission to do 
so after the fact… In a way it is all about seduction. Take a concrete shared 
headache first. You start with sharing information. You start small: concrete 
and feasible projects. And you take ‘safe’ forms of cooperation first, such as 
liaison officers and joint education and training. Then you just happen to 
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organize a conference with your partners from other countries, and then you 
get the ball rolling… The trick is to transpose the operational sense of urgency 
towards the strategic level, the politicians and the very top of the civil service. 
If at all possible I try to keep the tactical level of middle-level officials out of 
it, since they tend to be the ones producing all the hurdles. They are more 
engaged in fighting one another about who gets to head the delegation to the 
Brussels committees than in facilitating practical cooperation. They are like a 
thick, impenetrable layer of clay that mutes every movement… They have 
another set of roles and responsibilities than we do. They are to safeguard the 
uniformity and coherence of Dutch law and policy; we represent the voice of 
professional service delivery to citizens. And it is a pity that our does not get 
heard sufficiently directly in Brussels. This is why we are lobbying hard to 
establish a national “Police House” in Brussels. We number 54.000 policemen 
and women in this country; if we are not prepared to invest in freeing up some 
100 to 150 of them to deal with international cooperation and EU affairs in all 
their various manifestations, we will simply miss the boat.’ 
 
 
5.4 Understanding national Eurocrats: conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have studied Dutch Eurocrats in the field of European police 
cooperation in order to understand the worlds they work in, and the ways in which 
they define and do their work. We suspected that in the relatively open institutional 
environment of a Third Pillar sector such as police cooperation, Eurocratic work is 
less focused on the influencing the European Commission and the drafting of its 
policy proposals then in a First Pillar sector such as veterinary policy, as the 
Commission has little scope for such initiative under the Third Pillar. So ‘getting 
things done’ must entail a different type of craft, to be practiced in different types of 
arenas. The research reported in this chapter bears out this expectation. It does 
however yield a differentiated picture – there is no single, shared notion of ‘European 
policymaking’ and ‘Eurocratic work’ in this sector, there are multiple ones which co-
exist. Strategic behaviour on the part of member state officials is certainly part of this, 
but it takes rather different forms than the tactics described in chapter 4 on veterinary 
Eurocrats.   
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Looking closely at the world of police cooperation, we distilled two quite 
distinct logics of the Eurocratic craft (see figure 1). In seeking an answer on our first 
research question, we found civil servants operating in different ways in different 
European arenas. We found bureaucrat-diplomats at the ministries as well as in 
working groups and committees in Brussels, bargaining about national positions. We 
found street level entrepreneurs building transnational coalitions of the willing, as 
they are confronted with transnational crime. These are, of course, stylized, ideal-
typical pictures, whereas real-life officials may display these traits to different degrees 
and in all sorts of hybrid combinations. But we think the distinction is useful for 
analytical and policy purposes. 
In part, these different role conceptions simply reflect individual differences, 
and differences between ‘policy bureaucrats’ and operational ‘do-ers’. But they are 
also shaped by the differentiated nature of the European polity. European governance 
is produced in bundles of highly different types of policy networks of functional 
diplomats, depending on the nature of the collaborative challenge at hand (such as 
exchange, regulation, enforcement, see Slaughter, 2004) the institutional context in 
which joint action was being shaped (e.g., the position of the issue area in the EU 
Pillar structure), and the level of action involved (policymaking versus operational 
collaboration). And so, when compared to the ‘old’ and deeply institutionalized world 
of EU veterinary policy or the equally scripted world of the Brussels committee 
system, there are few precedents and rules to observe for those involved in developing 
European police cooperation from the ground up. In that arena there is considerable 
scope for bottom-up agenda-setting and experimentation. There are no fixed 
allegiances; the challenge is to build coalitions of the willing and find resources to get 
them going. So this is part of the answer on the second research question we posed: 
the way in which the European work is organizationally embedded and facilitated is 
hugely differentiated.  
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Bureaucrat-diplomats 
 
 
 
Street-level entrepreneurs 
Natural habitat Formal working parties and 
committees and national 
preparatory process. 
Networks in which information 
and good practices are 
exchanged and which 
strengthens enforcement. 
Role orientations Preparing and representing 
national positions in multilateral 
forums 
 
Getting things done 
Activity and contact patterns Centred around scheduled 
national preparatory meetings 
and scheduled EU-level working 
group and committee meetings 
 
Developing contacts and 
networks as the need arises and 
the opportunities for joint action 
present themselves 
Arenas and channels  
Mainly formal EU forums 
 
 
Mainly emergent joint ventures 
Measures of quality and 
effectiveness 
Shaping EU agendas and 
achieving EU policies in 
accordance with previously 
agreed-upon Dutch preferences 
 
Achieving tangible operational 
successes   
Knowledge and expertise Knowledge of formal and 
informal rules of the game in EU 
system 
 
‘Classic’ diplomatic skills 
(intercultural empathy, language, 
negotiation, networking etc.) 
 
Broad network across the various 
EU institutions, particularly 
Commission and EP 
 
Bureau-political skills and clout 
in the  
domestic  preparatory 
coordination process  
 
Sound grasp of issue substances 
 
Professional know-how 
 
Broad trans-border and/or trans-
national network  in own 
professional domain 
 
Knowing where to get money 
and how to overcome potential 
obstacles in EU system  
 
 
Figure 1: Dutch Eurocrats: two ideal-types 
 
What is more, bureaucrat-diplomats and street level-entrepreneurs clearly inhabit 
worlds apart. Street level-entrepreneurs complain about bureaucrat-diplomats 
knowing too little about ‘the real work’ (which is about preventing crime and catching 
criminals in whichever works); bureaucrat-diplomats complain about street level-
entrepreneurs’ tunnel vision and zealotry disrupting the even-handed development of 
policy across the full range of the dossiers that together constitute the police 
cooperation portfolio.  
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Whereas the departmental civil servants are focused on articulating and 
defending the national point of view in multilateral forums, operational zealots  seek 
to create vehicles for cooperation in truly post-national fashion. Their sense of 
interdependence is strong, simply because the nature of the phenomena they deal with 
makes it impossible to belie this. Treading cautiously in the formal EU committee 
settings is not for them, and they seek to work around them. One way to do so is to 
draw on the ambitions and the fleshpots of the European Commission to gain support 
for smaller-scale ‘experiments.’ A related way is to build informal ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ to find out if and how new forms of cooperation across borders can be made 
to work, both on the ground and in legal terms. In doing so, they hope to create 
irreversible facts. The Bureau of Euregional Cooperation in Maastricht described 
above is one such attempt.  
Currently, street-level entrepreneurs rather than bureaucrat-diplomats are the 
main engines of cooperation and ‘integration’ in the police cooperation dossier. This 
may not last. Paradoxically, highly dynamic and successful street-level entrepreneurs 
to some extent sow the seeds of their own demise. As the operational practices they 
create become more visible and elaborate, pressures to formalize, regulate, and embed 
them in EU-wide institutional arrangements will grow. To make sure these 
formalization processes unfold in desired directions is not something that street-level 
entrepreneurs are inclined or indeed equipped to do. It will be up to their bureaucratic-
diplomatic counterparts to secure and consolidate the fruits of their labour.  
Some bureaucrat diplomats go even further. They are no longer inclined only 
to produce new rules and regulations, but show a growing awareness that it is part of 
the problem in police cooperation that for every problem new regulation is decided 
on. These ‘new’ bureaucrat diplomats are aware that to facilitate police cooperation in 
a way that the police themselves perceive as useful, devising new regulation is not 
enough. According to them, national departmental officials should cooperate with the 
police and the European Commission in focusing on practical aspects like facilitating 
exchange of information, producing handbooks and who-is-who lists. Perhaps they 
are representative of a broader phenomenon: national bureaucrat diplomats who share 
the typical street-level official’s sense of urgency to beef up functional cooperation in 
areas where it can make a big difference, and in doing so revitalizing the European 
project. Some street-level bureaucrats have expressed a similar need for such new 
ways of cooperation. If their numbers increase, perhaps the various species of 
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Eurocrats discerned in this paper will blend into on hybrid - the ‘complete street-level 
diplomat.’ But for the time being, the day-to-day reality of national administrations 
seeking to get things done in Europe will continue to involve a delicate balancing act 
between the different outlooks and operating styles of bureaucrat diplomats and 
street-level entrepreneurs.  
 138
 
 
 
 139
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 1, we formulated the following two main questions for our study: 
1. How do Dutch civil servants experience and practice the craft of policymaking 
for and in European arenas? 
2. To what extent and how do these civil servants consider themselves to be 
facilitated and constrained by existing ways of organizing European affairs in 
their respective organizations?  
Each of these questions was specified in a number of more specific research 
questions, which were then tackled by employing an intricate mix of analytical 
perspectives and research methods (survey, interviews, observations). 
In this chapter, we will review the evidence about each of the specific 
questions gathered through the various research methods. In doing so, we aim to 
achieve three things. First, we will summarize some of the points brought forward in 
the preceding empirical chapters. Second, we will bring together and compare the 
findings from the survey and the two qualitative case studies in order to arrive at a 
more comprehensive understanding of the issues raised in chapter 1 and draw a 
number of overarching conclusions. Finally, we will confront our empirical results 
with the outcomes of the expert meetings that were held at the end of our research. 
These expert meetings were meant to provide a sounding-board for our observations, 
allowing us to assess better to what extent they were shared by people working on 
EU-related matters within a wide range of organizations in central government. 
Hence, they may serve to corroborate our conclusions, as well as to specify them or 
place them into the proper context. 
We will structure our discussion along the lines of the specific research 
questions of chapter 1, starting with the questions on the individual ‘EU craft’ and 
then moving on to the organizational context within which individual activities take 
place. Subsequently, we will draw two overarching conclusions that come out of our 
study. The chapter will end with a number of reflections with a view to strengthening 
the Eurocratic craft within the Dutch administration. 
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6.2 Eurocracy as individual craft 
 
In chapter 1, Question 1 about the individual dimensions was broken down into six 
specific research questions. These will be discussed in turn below. 
  
6.2.1 Role orientations 
The original question here was: what do national civil servants see as their chief tasks 
and aims when participating in European policy processes? This study clearly shows 
that there are different ways of conceiving of Eurocratic work, which conform to the 
two main categories of ‘street-level diplomats’ discerned in chapter 5. A majority of 
bureaucrat-diplomats see themselves as having a dual role: 
• In EU arenas, their role is to articulate and represent ‘the Dutch interest’ vis-
à-vis other member states and the European institutions; 
• In the Netherlands, they see their role as ‘selling’ the EU to their colleagues 
and creating a better understanding of the possibilities and constraints 
inherent in European co-operation. 
These people are truly intermediaries, who operate on the cutting edge of two worlds: 
the world of European co-operation and the world of domestic policymaking. These 
dual role requirements may conflict when there are clear tensions between Dutch 
preferences and EU’s policy directions. At the same time, various interviewees 
confided that they often use that tension creatively, telling constituents in one arena 
that they are under severe pressure from the other, and vice versa. The job is perhaps 
more difficult for policy bureaucrats operating in organizations where the overall 
degree of Europeanization is low, and where ‘doing business in Europe’ enjoys much 
lower interest and prestige than ‘doing business in The Hague.’ They face constant 
scepticism from colleagues and quite often their direct superiors when trying to raise 
their awareness of the significance of EU arenas and policies to the work of their 
section - let alone when trying to argue the case for investing more time, expertise and 
money in developing an EU presence.  
In contrast, most street-level entrepreneurs within departments or executive 
agencies are more driven to see their roles at the European/international stage as 
simply an extension of their generic drive to ‘get things done’ with regard to concrete 
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needs, problems and opportunities arising at the ‘shop floor’ of policy implementation 
and service delivery. Their sense of identity when acting in European arenas is more 
complex than that of  bureaucrat-diplomats as they seek to marry their ‘Dutchness’ 
with their sense of ‘professionalism’ in the exchange with their peers at the 
Commission and from other countries.  
These observations tie in with the literature on role conceptions of street-level 
diplomats discussed in chapter 2, which shows that participants in EU decision-
making tend to oscillate between representing national positions, on the one hand, and 
the beliefs and ambitions of their own policy area, on the other. Moreover, our study 
confirms the conclusion from earlier research that purely supranational (i.e. EU-
related) loyalties tend to be scarce among national civil servants: their allegiance is 
primarily with their own government and/or with their policy area. What our study 
adds to this literature is our identification of predominant role conceptions with 
certain types of civil servants, who operate within specific types of international 
policy networks. This may help to understand why certain role conceptions are 
dominant. 
In terms of practical daily policymaking, the contrast between the two types of 
civil servants is clear, and each presents a distinct ‘risk’. Fully Eurocratized policy 
bureaucrats tend to risk being seen to have ‘gone native’ vis-à-vis ‘Brussels’, and to 
focus more on the formal and diplomatic exigencies of European policymaking than 
on the practical needs of people working in their policy field. Operational experts, by 
contrast, have to be careful not to be seen as using their roles as Dutch representatives 
in expert committees to indulge in professional hobbyism with like-minded foreign 
experts, whilst eluding hierarchical control designed to induce them to represent 
Dutch rather than collegial outlooks and interests with regard to the matters at hand. 
 
6.2.2 Activity and contact patterns  
How big a part of civil servants’ daily work is taken up by European matters, and how 
do they spend that time? The survey study demonstrated that, although around 30 per 
cent of respondents indicate that they are involved in EU-related activities, most of 
these ‘Europeanized civil servants’ only devote a small segment of their average 
working week (0-2 hours) on EU-related work. A much smaller but still sizable group 
counts it among its going concerns and spends a significant amount of their time on it. 
An even smaller number of ‘fully Eurocratized’ civil servants (around 10 per cent of 
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all respondents indicating that they are involved in EU-related activities) have EU-
work as their core business and spend all or very large chunks of their time on it. The 
survey also revealed important differences in the degree of ‘Europeanization’ among 
central government organizations. Generally speaking, in organizations in which more 
civil servants were involved in EU-related activities, respondents also spent more time 
on those activities and the activities tended to be dispersed more widely across the 
organization, while the opposite held true for organizations with fewer Europeanized 
civil servants. 
The three general clusters of Europeanized civil servants were reflected in the 
results of the comparative case study into the veterinary and police cooperation 
domains: 
• In veterinary policy, interviewees find it difficult to distinguish between time 
allotted to EU-related and non-EU-related activities, since their policy area has 
been thoroughly Europeanized. As a result, ‘EU-related’ and ‘domestic’ 
policies and activities have become intertwined and concrete activities relate 
to both levels at the same time. This is not only true for the relation between 
the EU-level and the domestic level: veterinary policy is also embedded in 
global networks, blurring the distinction between the EU and the global level. 
• In police co-operation, the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘EU-level’ 
work is much clearer. Large parts of police work and criminal policy are 
firmly domestic in scope. As a result, officials in the field of police co-
operation tend to differentiate more sharply between activities that relate to 
each of these levels. Within the field of police co-operation, the extent of 
involvement in EU-related activities depends on one’s position within the 
organization. EU-related activities appear to be allocated to a small number of 
specialized officials who have made it their main job. For them, EU-related 
activities take up a considerable part of their work, whereas for others it is 
only a minor or negligible part of their daily work. 
 
In terms of contact patterns, e.g. what working on EU-related matters actually entails 
in terms of the ways they spend their time, another distinction emerges: 
• Some officials operate in the ‘front line’ of contacts with officials from other 
governments and the EU institutions. They are the true ‘street-level diplomats’ 
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we discussed in chapter 2. This group encompasses both the bureaucrat-
diplomats and the street-level entrepreneurs of chapter 5. 
• Others officials, let us call them departmental coordination bureaucrats, 
occupy a ‘back office’ position. They co-ordinate EU-related work inside their 
own departments and in relation to other departments, but rarely engage in 
direct contacts with foreign counterparts themselves. They mainly interact 
with their departmental colleagues (including the departmental liaison at the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels) as well as with their counterparts from 
other ministries. 
The two types of jobs are very different in terms of activities and required skills, but 
both are relevant in terms of understanding patterns of activity around the EU in 
Dutch central government. Any attempt to enhance about EU-focused ‘capacity-
building’ within the Dutch administration should take this into account. You need 
Eurocratically astute street-level entrepreneurs and bureaucrat-diplomats; but you also 
need well-positioned, well-resourced, effectively joined-up EU coordination 
bureaucrats.   
 
6.2.3 Arenas and channels 
Where does ‘European’ policymaking ‘happen’ for Dutch civil servants? Again, the 
answer is a qualified one. Where their European work takes them depends on what 
kind of job civil servants have. As the survey showed, most civil servants who deal 
with the EU do so in terms of policy implementation and transposition or are 
confronted with EU policies in making domestic policies. A smaller number of civil 
servants are involved in EU policymaking processes, be it directly in European 
forums or indirectly in the process of preparing and coordinating the Dutch input into 
EU decision-making.  
The activities of civil servants involved in EU policymaking were the focus of 
our case studies. Based on these cases, we can discern three main ‘loci’ of EU-related 
policymaking activity: 
• For coordination bureaucrats, European policymaking happens in The Hague. 
They form the central figures in (inter)departmental networks that are involved 
in EU policymaking and/or the implementation of EU law and policies. 
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• For bureaucrat-diplomats, European policymaking happens in Brussels. They 
go to committee, working group and high-level meetings in Brussels and meet 
their colleagues there. In the case of police co-operation, which falls under the 
EU’s third pillar, contacts with foreign counterparts outside of these formal 
meetings are comparatively rare. In veterinary policy, which falls under the 
EU’s first pillar, contacts also take place outside of the formal meetings in 
order to form coalitions for decision-making in the committee. 
• For Dutch street-level entrepreneurs, European policymaking may happen 
anywhere in Europe. These officials are actively engaged in forming networks 
with foreign counterparts in order to exchange information, enhance mutual 
understanding, and undertake joint action in response to commonly felt 
problems. These informal networks and their joint activities  may be 
formalized in EU decision-making forums, but often this is not the case, or EU 
actors only come in as targets for lobby activities, sponsors or simply ‘people 
to talk to.’ 
 
6.2.4 Formal and informal rules of the game 
How does policymaking unfold in these arenas? The literature on EU committees has 
pointed out that different policymaking arenas within the EU operate under different 
‘rules of the game,’ and that these differences matter for how their participants can 
operate within them. As demonstrated in chapter 5, in Council Working Parties, the 
nationality of participants is much strongly emphasized, leading to stronger ‘national’ 
role perceptions by member state representatives, whereas in Commission expert 
groups, national backgrounds are de-emphasized, leading to a stronger identification 
of the participants with the EU or their professional roles. Also, prior research has 
emphasized that institutional changes to the EU fabric such as enlargement and the 
diffusion of co-decision procedures greatly affect the incentive structures for 
individual member states and their representatives. 
Our study echoes these findings in so far as it pertains to these formal EU 
arenas. During the expert meetings, several participants noted that the advent of co-
decision in their issue areas has meant that they are now channelling more efforts into 
lobbying MEPs than they used to. The same goes for the outreach to national 
parliamentarians: as national parliaments are brought more and more into the loop of 
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European policymaking, national Eurocrats (will have to) adjust their support-
building strategies.  
 In sum, the officials interviewed and observed in this study emphasized how 
the context within which they operate shapes their behaviour in different ways: 
• The coordination process prior to and following European meetings: 
departments oscillate between centralized and decentralized models of 
coordinating their EU-related work, choices which obviously influence the 
discretion and support experienced by individual Eurocrats.  
• The main basis for engaging with foreign counterparts: formal EU arenas have 
acquired their own institutional momentum and encourage and constrain 
particular forms of ‘street-level diplomacy’; at the same time, officials 
operating in Third Pillar and/or implementation settings emphasize the pivotal 
role played by informal networks, driven not by formal decision rules but by  
strongly motivated, proactive individuals from various countries and the 
‘coalitions of the willing’ they are constantly seeking to build and maintain. 
• The implicit understanding of participants in terms of which roles Eurocrats 
should play when and where, and which roles they can expect their domestic 
and foreign counterparts to play. These expectations pertain, among others, to 
the (de)emphasizing of national, departmental and professional identities and 
loyalties, or to the allocation of attention to particular arenas, networks and 
relationships at the European level. 
 
Different loci of European decision-making differ in terms of these elements, as 
highlighted by the comparison of civil servants’ beliefs and practices in the veterinary 
and policing field, respectively. The former were clearly focused on the Commission-
led process of proposal development and formal decision making that characterizes 
First Pillar contexts. The latter, operating in the less institutionalized, more pluralistic 
Third Pillar context naturally gravitated more towards informal networking as a 
predominant mode of doing business in Europe. 
The expert meetings confirmed this picture. The closer officials are to formal 
EU decision-making and the more closely they are integrated into the departmental 
organization in The Hague, the more formalized the rules of the game will be and the 
more strongly these officials will see themselves as representing the interests of The 
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Netherlands as a member state and/or of their ‘native’ department. Likewise, the more 
peripheral officials and their operative domains are to formal EU decision making and 
to the core international agenda of their departments, the less formalized the rules of 
mutual cooperation, the greater the discretion accorded to the individual issue experts, 
the greater the reliance on interpersonal ties between (often long-standing) members 
of ongoing expert committees, and the more strongly officials will see themselves as 
representatives of an international profession dealing with common, borderless 
problems. 
 
6.2.5 Measures of quality and effectiveness 
What do Dutch civil servants consider to be ‘a proper job’ in operating at the 
European stage? In chapter 4 we started from the presumption that individual civil 
servants simply strive to achieve European policies that accord with the national 
preferences they are tasked with representing. Achieving these national preferences 
then is the overriding measure of effectiveness. In chapter 5, we further disaggregated 
this general measure of effectiveness, by empirically discerning two main views of 
success among the two types of civil servants working on EU-related activities: 
• The ‘bureaucratic-diplomatic view’ counts success in terms of getting things 
on the agenda and factoring Dutch interests into EU decisions. This view is 
held by most departmental coordination and policy bureaucrats, the latter 
representing The Netherlands in formal EU decision-making arenas; 
• The ‘street-level entrepreneurial view’ counts success in terms of solving 
(operational) problems in co-operation with foreign counterparts. This view is 
held by the bulk of the more operational bureaucrats who participate in expert 
and comitology committees. 
 
These views reflect different ideas about the role and purpose of European co-
operation. They also reflect different work contexts within which these civil servants 
operate. Officials who hold a ‘bureaucratic-diplomatic’ view operate within a set of 
incentives and constraints that closely resembles the preoccupations of civil servants 
working on domestic issues within central government departments: contributing to 
the shaping of policy decisions and helping the minister to shine or at least to avoid 
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problems. Particularly in policy areas that are fairly politicized at the European level, 
these classical imperatives of departmental bureaucratic life become more important. 
 Those who hold a ‘street-level entrepreneurial view’ tend to be faced with a 
different set of incentives and constraints that focuses much more on daily service 
delivery, which translates in a different set of criteria for quality and effectiveness. 
When the two worlds meet, there is often a certain degree of friction, as these 
different logics of EU policymaking are not necessarily easily aligned. Hence 
entrepreneurial executive agency officials frequently expressed bemusement at the 
‘meddling’ and ‘limited added value’ of the departmental middle managers they were 
forced to deal with. Likewise, departmental officials said they were sometimes 
exasperated with the go-at-it-alone instincts of operational experts, as well as with 
their ‘inability to grasp the big picture’ of European policy in a particular domain.. 
The expert group meetings provided a corrective to the analyses of chapters 4 
and 5. They harboured three lessons. First, the national position is not always clearly 
and unambiguously formulated, and the dynamics of EU meetings may be such that 
individual representatives have to make on the spot decisions about how to interpret 
the national position in as yet unanticipated contexts. Without a clear picture on what 
to maximize, maximization becomes difficult and improvisation begins. To the extent 
that this is considered undesirable, efforts should be made provide Eurocrats with 
more, more detailed but above all ‘smarter’ (clear yet versatile) instructions and 
guidelines on what to aim for under various contingencies during the negotiation 
processes in and around EU meetings.  
Second, Eurocrats’ motivation structures are more complex than simply 
achieving their brief. Grand statements about ‘representing the national interest’ do 
not hold sway in the complex realities of EU policymaking. The expert meeting 
participants agreed that civil servants’ perceptions of their aims – and thus the criteria 
for judging whether they perform effectively in their roles - may be a matter of ‘where 
one stands’ with respect to the issues and policy domain at hand. Where one stands is, 
as always, partly determined by where one ‘sits’ in the larger fabric of the 
organization: strategic departmental actors go for ‘big pictures’ and are willing to 
make complex trade offs; operational experts feel they succeed only when European 
policies produce workable and helpful ‘street-level’ practices.  
In addition, Eurocrats’ aims are influenced by issue characteristics, e.g. 
concrete ones that are dealt with in discrete and reasonably speedy decision processes 
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versus complex ones that evolve gradually in fuzzy and drawn-out processes. In the 
former instance, the predominant success criterion can and should be the extent to 
which Dutch preferences can be found in the eventual EU outcomes (policies, 
standards, rules, time tables, budget allocations), as implied in chapter 4. In the latter 
instance, however, success is much more difficult to assess, particularly in the short 
run. Several next-best criteria were proposed during the expert meetings, ranging 
from simply getting one’s voice heard during meetings; being taken seriously by the 
Commission and/or other member states in the relevant EU arenas; and, more 
ambitiously, controlling the (evolving) framing of the issues on the agenda of the 
relevant EU arenas.  
Finally, what can be aimed for is also determined by strategic political stakes 
involved. One distinction kept popping up. There are ‘defensive’ issues, where the 
strategic aim is to prevent EU policies from coming into being that require changes to 
existing and valued Dutch ones. And there are ‘offensive’ issues where the aim is to 
further the adoption of certain EU measures seen as advantageous to the Dutch 
interest. In both cases Dutch Eurocrats have to engage in advocacy work, but clearly 
trying to block, delay or modify something presupposes a different set of trade-offs 
and tactics than trying to make something happen.  
 
6.2.6 Knowledge and expertise 
What do civil servants who work intensively in the EU domain regard as crucial 
professional competencies for operating on the European stage? When asked about 
crucial competencies, interviewees come up with a list of relatively unsurprising 
items: 
• One should be able to operate in networks. ‘People skills’ are important in this 
regard; 
• One should have a solid understanding of how the European arena works: the 
formal as well as the informal  rules of the European governance game; 
• One should speak at least one foreign language well but preferably more. 
• One should be able to empathize with and ‘read’ one’s foreign counterparts, 
e.g. by being informed about their various national systems, practices and 
policy priorities. 
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Surprisingly, in both the interviews and the expert meetings even the most 
experienced Eurocrats play down the specific nature of the knowledge and expertise 
required at the European level when compared to the national level. Of course, they 
say, there is some specific knowledge about European policy processes that people 
who work in or with ‘Brussels’ need to have, but acquiring this knowledge is no big 
deal. Any capable civil servant can learn most of that quickly. Likewise, language 
skills are sometimes mentioned as a great asset but, significantly, a lack of 
multilingualism is not generally seen as debilitating effective operating in the EU 
(particularly in the more formal decision arenas). This observation is also borne out 
by the results of the survey, in which respondents evaluated the facilities for training 
most positively among the six statements on the organizational context of EU-related 
work. 
Virtually all of the officials we spoke emphasized that the real key lies in 
generic networking skills (sociability, empathy, reciprocity, reliability), and add that 
in this regard there are no fundamental  differences between what is required ‘in 
Europe’ and what is required in The Hague and environs. They did note that not 
everyone possesses these skills. All recounted instances of having worked in EU 
settings with Dutch colleagues who clearly lacked some of these essential qualities – 
and duly created problems for themselves and for the Dutch position. These 
experiences were not highly frequent, however, and in many cases a ‘quiet word’ was 
sent back via the appropriate channels to their superiors, encouraging them to find 
replacements or get the individuals involved to lift their game.  
 These findings may of course be read in two different ways, depending upon 
one’s own vantage point and preconceptions. They can be taken as a much-needed 
‘demystification’ of Eurocratic civil service work, breaking through the conspiracy of 
insiders and calling into question the key role that the Foreign Office tends to see for 
itself in the European domain. Yet they can also be interpreted as evidence of the 
casual, off-handed, almost cavalier approach that Dutch civil servants apparently take 
towards the role of training and skill development in enhancing their capability to 
operate effectively in European policy processes.  
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6.3 Organizational preconditions for successful Eurocratic work 
 
Our second main question in chapter 1 related to the organizational context within 
which civil servants operate. We broke that question down into seven more specific 
ones. Our findings with regard to each of them are presented below.  
 
6.3.1 Job structure  
Do civil servants feel they have sufficient time and opportunity to devote themselves 
to the European dimension of their portfolio? As indicated above, the survey showed 
that EU-related activities are either an integral part of the activities in one’s 
organization and job or concentrated in a limited number of specialized officials 
within the department. Either way, the question is not so much whether individual 
jobs allow sufficient time to be devoted to EU-related activities but whether EU-
related activities are integrated into the departmental work in such a way that the 
organization devotes sufficient attention to them. The correlation is evident: the 
various officials who noted during interviews that they felt they should devote more 
time to European issues and arenas tended to work in organizations (or parts of 
organizations) where such activities did not enjoy a high priority. 
Likewise, the survey findings reported in chapter 3 revealed a consistent 
relationship between the degree of Europeanization and the priority accorded to EU-
related work in an organization. Based on the three-fold distinction between 
‘Eurocratic bulwarks’ (highly Europeanized organizations), ‘Eurocratic runners-up’ 
(which are moderately Europeanized) and ‘national champions’ (which are hardly 
Europeanized), we found that the more highly Europeanized an organization is, the 
higher the priority accorded to EU-related work. This outcome is all the more striking, 
since there are no systematic differences between respondents in terms of the type of 
work a respondent is doing or whether s/he is working in a policy department or an 
executive agency. 
Moving from empirics to evaluation, an important question is whether 
‘national champions’ devote too little attention to the EU. If so, it would be tempting 
to label these organizations ‘Eurocratic laggards’ (in neat semantic contrast with the 
two other clusters of Eurocratic bulwarks and Eurocratic runners-up), but this would 
be unfair. We ended up calling them ‘national champions’ to reflect the reality that 
these departments/agencies tend to bear responsibility for policy portfolios that at 
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present are simply not Europeanized. Like any other organization in Europe, public or 
private, they too are bound by EU law in many and important aspects of their 
operation. As such they need to have a degree of awareness and skill in dealing with 
the consequences of that reality. But to the extent that these organizations do not 
really have a core role in making or implementing EU policy, their low degree of 
Europeanization does not reflect a parochial or backward attitude at all. It is simply a 
logical by-product of the institutional division of responsibilities and powers in their 
portfolio domains.  
 When should the few remaining ‘national champions’ prepare themselves to 
join the ranks of the ‘Eurocatic runners-up’ and thus start to invest more heavily in 
freeing up and enabling their members to become more active in European arenas? 
This is not an easy call. Ten years ago, when the speed of the integration process was 
high, it seemed there was a ‘EU domino effect’ of sorts on the march. It seemed only 
a matter of time before each and every hitherto national policy domain would be 
Europeanized. Not preparing for that onslaught would have been bad management. 
Nowadays, the pace has decreased, and the imperative to ‘shape up’ is perhaps 
somewhat less compelling. However, looking back at the long-term dynamics of 
European integration suggests that the process has always gone in spurts interrupted 
by periods of impasse. We are now clearly at such an impasse, but if history is 
anything to go on in preparing for the future the lesson here is that sooner or later 
there will be a further ‘deepening’ of the European Union. National departments and 
agencies currently not yet in the European front line would do well to anticipate this 
and continue to invest in capacity-building.    
 
6.3.2 Education and training 
What facilities and incentives do departments and agencies offer to civil servants 
when it comes to acquiring the skills necessary to be an effective player in European 
policy arenas? As was already noted above, the statement on training elicited the most 
positive responses of all six statements on organizational context and facilitation that 
were included in the survey. Almost half of all respondents ‘largely’ or ‘completely’ 
agreed with the statement that their organization ‘offers sufficient training 
opportunities for EU-related activities’. Also, in contrast to the other statements, there 
are no systematic differences in the answers among respondents according to the type 
of work they do, whether they work in a policy department or an executive agencies, 
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and whether their organization is highly Europeanized or not. These findings indicate 
that training opportunities are seen as relatively unproblematic, in all types of jobs and 
organizations. 
The same picture arises from our qualitative empirical materials. Some 
mentioned and valued formal coursework they had engaged in at places like 
Clingendael and ROI, but few if any regarded such educational experiences as truly 
essential for operating in European arena. Many were thrust into European dossiers 
and jobs with little preparation and encouraged by their superiors and peers to learn 
through observation and experience. During the expert meetings it became clear that 
most departments currently have or work towards some sort of ‘EU for beginners’ 
course. No one disputed the relevance of such courses. But all said that the more 
important investments were in facilitating on the job learning (through mentoring by 
EU veterans, purposeful use of international secondments, frequent and well-run 
feedback meetings and so on).  
 
6.3.3 Career development  
To what extent are placements in Europe and posts that have a strong European 
component considered to be ‘good career moves’ in the civil servants’ organizations? 
The survey revealed important differences in this regard between respondents in 
‘Eurocratic bulwarks’, on the one hand, and respondents is less Europeanized 
organizations, on the other. Civil servants in Eurocratic bulwarks indicated much 
more often that experience with EU-related activities offered an advantage for their 
career development than civil servants in other types of organizations. 
Similar differences emerged between the departments we studied in the two 
case studies: 
• In the Ministry of Agriculture, which we included in the case study on 
veterinary policy, having European experience is considered to be good for 
one’s career. This Ministry distinguishes itself by an active placement policy 
to place people with European experience in important positions within the 
Ministry. European experiences are therefore an integral part of one’s career 
development, and the Ministry actively seeks to integrate these experiences in 
its HRM policies. 
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• At the other end of the spectrum, in the Ministry of Health, which was 
included in the veterinary policy case study, and the Ministry of the Interior, 
which was included in the police co-operation case, European experience is 
much less valued in the career development of officials. In these departments, 
it was even felt that a spell at the EU-level could be an impediment for one’s 
further career and that officials themselves actively had to search for a new 
position if they had worked in Brussels and wanted to return to The Hague. 
The same was true for officials working within the police organization, 
although several key police interviewees said there were clear signs of a 
change there towards an ‘upgrading’ of European/international job 
experiences. 
 
Overall, the role of European experiences in the career development of individual 
civil servants appears to be directly linked to the priority accorded to EU affairs by 
the political and administrative leadership of a department (see further below). But as 
the expert meetings revealed, even in highly Europeanized departments (‘EU 
bulwarks’ in chapter 3) factoring in European expertise and placements abroad into 
HRM policy in general and MD policy in particular proves to be a tough nut to crack. 
Several key challenges were identified: 
• Out of sight out mind: departments tend to ‘lose sight’ of the civil servants 
seconded to post in Brussels and elsewhere. Not so much in a policy sense – 
departments are increasingly organizing ‘comeback sessions’ for all their staff 
placed abroad to compare notes, coordinate policy positions and to convey 
departmental priorities – but in a career planning sense. People lose track of 
how long someone’s secondment was planned to be and how long they have 
been away for. Directors looking to fill positions will be more aware of people 
they see on a regular basis, and there are few institutional mechanisms of 
reminding them that there are possible candidates for the job currently 
working abroad.  
• The same goes, to some extent, for the civil servants involved. Many of them 
get drawn into their new lives, acquire a taste for operating in the fast lanes of 
Brussels and other foreign capitals, and bank on sticking around. As a result 
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they may not be as proactive in maintaining the informal networks in their 
home ministries as needed to keep their careers afloat.       
• The tendency to send out people who are ‘too old’, e.g., occupy relatively 
senior positions in the department. By definition, the number of jobs for them 
is smaller than for relatively junior staff, which makes them more difficult to 
place back into the department upon their return from abroad. The added 
complication that at both lower and middle-management levels there is much 
less interdepartmental job mobility than at the highest levels. Many people’s 
career focus is within their own silo. As a result of these factors, the average 
returnee from the EU circuit tends to fish in a relatively small pond. 
• This being the case, each department has various cases of EU returnees who 
ended up stuck between a rock and a hard place, career-wise. Stories about 
these cases circulate around the organization, and provide a disincentive for 
others to go down the route of a European placement. 
 
6.3.4 Instruction and guidance  
How are policy priorities to be achieved at the European level developed and 
communicated to the civil servants who operate in European arenas? What degree of 
discretion are they given? In the survey, respondents were asked whether they 
received a clear mandate when participating in EU-level meetings. The answers to 
this question varied in two ways. To begin with, respondents in policy departments 
indicated much more often that they received a clear mandate than respondents in 
executive agencies. Furthermore, respondents in European bulwarks said they 
received clearer mandates than respondents in other types of organizations. 
These survey results offer a broad-brush picture of the perceived clarity of 
mandates among civil servants, but they hardly give an insight into the dynamics of 
mandate formation in day-to-day EU-related work. These dynamics came out more 
clearly in the two case studies, however. In both of the case studies it was found that 
civil servants enjoyed a considerable degree of discretion in determining the Dutch 
position in European forums. Several officials indicated that they wrote their own 
mandates and that interference from higher political and administrative levels was 
limited. The backgrounds for this are somewhat different in the two cases: 
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• Veterinary policy is part of a closely-knit expert community in which officials 
have considerable leeway to determine their own priorities and positions. As a 
result, officials experience only limited steering from the department’s 
political and administrative leadership; 
• European police co-operation has a rather low priority, particularly within the 
Ministry of the Interior. As a result, officials dealing with the trans-border 
policing, particularly police officers in the field, have considerable discretion 
to formulate their own positions and take their own initiatives. Officials were 
not particularly happy with this way of working, however, since they felt they 
lacked the strategic ministerial support needed to be effective at the EU-level. 
In the ministry of Justice, the degree of centralization of EU policy 
formulation was considerably bigger, partly because of the minister’s personal 
interest, and partly because that ministry occupies the head of delegation role 
in several crucial European arenas in this policy domain.  
The expert meetings confirmed this picture of variety in the origins, specificity and 
significance of official instructions and other coordination mechanisms such as 
departmental ‘dossier teams.’ Some officials prided themselves on their status as a 
virtual ‘free agent’: 
 
‘Q: Suppose you feel that EU developments in your area are moving in a 
certain direction and that a Dutch position is called for, what do you do? 
A: I then prepare a memo for my minister. I obtain his signature on my 
proposal. Whether he actually reads it is a different matter, but I have the 
political mandate I need.’ 
 
This is perhaps a defensible strategy for highly specialized, technical, low-politics 
issues. But what might be an arcane technical matter at the time when EU policy is 
prepared and decided upon, may evolve into a more public and politicized affair 
further down the track. Several participants to the expert meetings noted that new 
governments/ministers may sometimes redefine their EU priorities. They also had 
experienced that incidents and disturbances in hitherto technical policy domains can 
propel them to sudden political prominence on the wings of sudden publicity about 
hitherto hidden costs and risks of European policies, and the parliamentary interest 
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this generates. To take a recent example: when major construction projects had to be 
scrapped or delayed because of some ‘obscure’ EU environmental guideline, the 
political equation regarding that issue area changed overnight.  In cases such as this 
one, critical questions get asked about how and why the Netherlands had agreed to 
now contentious pieces of EU regulation. It does not reflect well if the key answer to 
these questions is: “because Mr. X in subsection A, who normally handles these 
matters, thought it was a good idea.” Other tactical reasons for ensuring oneself of 
more substantial ministerial commitment and involvement were also mentioned: 
 
‘If you have ideas and want to create a Dutch position on an issue, it is 
essential that the minister agrees to it. If and when it needs to be defended at 
the strategic level, the minister needs to be able to do so with full conviction. 
Suppose I go out on my own and fight hard for a position, and I ask the 
minister for backup and he responds “oh well, let’s forget about it” because I 
have not really kept him into loop. The net result of this is that other Member 
States will take me and the Dutch position less seriously the next time around.’ 
 
To make sure all the bases are covered in the drawing up of instructions, most 
departments now haven begun working with broad-based ‘dossier teams’ on issues 
deemed important by their leaderships. These teams are generally considered to be 
effective vehicle for exchanging information, coordinating a single and balanced 
departmental position, and being effective in the interdepartmental arena, where 
ultimately ‘the’ Dutch position ought to be negotiated (various participants noted that 
the producing the latter can be an arduous task in the ‘organized anarchy’ of Dutch 
horizontal policy coordination). However, as any solution to anything, it is not 
without potential problems of its own. Two stand out, and need to be addressed at the 
strategic level of the organizations involved:  
• at any point in time, one can have only so many of them, raising the question  
who decides on which grounds if an issue qualifies to be given this kind of 
systematic and sustained  attention; 
• not each and every bundle of relevant expertise may be represented on the 
dossier teams, the often understaffed and overworked legal divisions of 
departments being a case in point.   
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6.3.5 Feedback and accountability  
How do civil servants who operate in European arenas report about their activities to 
their ‘back offices’, and do these ascertain and evaluate their performance? We can be 
brief here, since the answer to this question runs parallel to the answer given to the 
question about instruction and guidance. Instruction and feedback run in tandem: 
without clear instructions there is no clear feedback mechanism. The main reason for 
this is that both are the result of priorities and interest from the departmental 
leadership in. We will turn to this point next. 
 
6.3.6 Top management commitment  
To what extent do the top echelons of the organization accord priority to European 
issues, and to what extent do they get personally involved in European arenas if and 
when needed? The survey study showed that most civil servants feel that European 
issues enjoy low to moderate priority in their organizations, although there were 
clearly distinctions between various clusters of organizations. In the case studies, it 
became clearer that top management commitment to EU affairs does differ greatly 
between departments: 
• In the Ministry of Agriculture, the EU is part of daily work and is therefore an 
integral part of the department’s commitment and priorities. 
• In the Ministry of Justice, EU affairs have gained greater importance because 
of the current minister’s commitment to them. Still, EU activities are less 
integrated in the Ministry’s day-to-day operations than in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. As a consequence, commitment from top management is much 
more contingent on the personal or political choices of the top management 
than of organizational routines. 
• In the Ministries of Health and the Interior, EU affairs have a relatively low 
priority. As a result, interest in and commitment to EU issues by top 
management is limited. 
Discussions in the expert groups confirmed the idea that differences in top 
management’s commitment to EU issues and activities can have significant 
consequences for Eurocratic work: 
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• Lack of commitment makes their work more difficult. Interviewees indicate 
that (active) political support from one’s minister is crucial to get something 
done. This is true both at the EU-level proper (e.g. when a minister is willing 
to make a phone call to a colleague from another member state in order to 
speed up decision-making or generate support for the Dutch position) and in 
relations with other departments in the Netherlands. 
• Lack of commitment leads to a peripheral position of officials working on EU-
affairs within the department. This, again, has two consequences: 
o It means that EU activities are separated from other, ‘domestic’ 
activities in the department. The EU becomes an add-on to the 
department’s activities, rather than an integral part of it; 
o It means that European experiences hardly play a role in the 
department’s policies toward career development of individual civil 
servants (see also above). 
 
It was also noted that management commitment is not just about management rhetoric 
– these days, no sensible department leader will deny the importance of the EU in the 
affairs of his organization – but about management also ‘walking the talk’ in terms of 
its role in setting strategic priorities, allocating their personal attention to EU dossiers 
when needed, demonstrating by example personal ambition and competence in the 
European domain, and creating proper incentives for staff to do the same.  
 
6.3.7 Resource availability  
Do civil servants involved in European policy work find there is enough funding and 
staff support from their organizations for them to be able to operate effectively? As 
noted earlier, the answer to this question depends crucially on the way EU activities 
are integrated in a department’s organizational routines. Where the EU is an integral 
part of a department’s day-to-day work, there is hardly a distinction between domestic 
and EU-related activities, and issues of funding and staff support become part of more 
general debates about funding for specific government activities. Where the EU is a 
more isolated element in a department’s activities, funding and staff support become 
more of an issue in themselves. The number of staff dedicated to EU-related activities 
then becomes a direct result of the relative importance accorded to EU issues by the 
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departmental leadership. As stated above, the main problem then is not the low 
amount of funding and personnel available for EU-related tasks as such, but the lack 
of support for these organizations’ Eurocrats from other parts and higher levels in the 
organization. 
 
 
6.4 Summing up: types of civil servants and degrees of Europeanization 
 
Drawing together the various specific conclusions discussed above, two clear overall 
conclusions arise, one relating to individual EU-related activities and one relating to 
the organizational context of EU-related work. With regard to individual EU-related 
activities, the key observations in this study relate to differences in types of civil 
servants. EU-related work in the Netherlands is carried out by three types of civil 
servants: those working in highly formalized EU decision-making forums 
(‘bureaucrat-diplomats’), those working in informal, task-related networks (‘street-
level entrepreneurs’), and those working in the ‘back office’ of The Hague 
departments, coordinating EU-related work within and across organizations 
(‘departmental coordination bureaucrats’). 
 The distinction between these types of civil servants runs through almost all 
aspects of individual EU-related activities: it is relevant for their role orientations, for 
their daily activities and contact patterns, for the arenas in and channels through 
which they are active, for the formal and informal rules of the game they have to cope 
with, and for the measures of quality and effectiveness they apply. Distinguishing 
between these types of civil servants is therefore crucial for understanding what kind 
of activities take place and why these activities are done the way they are. In addition, 
this typology of civil servants highlights some key challenges in organizing EU-
related work within Dutch government. ‘The’ Dutch input in EU policymaking is 
formed by the combined efforts of all three types of civil servants. More often than 
not, their respective activities focus on related concerns and have an impact on each 
other. At the same time, these three types of civil servants have distinct outlooks on 
the EU and on the way EU-related work should be handled, making for a high 
potential of clashes and lack of coordination. Hence, effectively organizing EU-
related activities largely consists of coordinating and accommodating these various 
activities so as to minimize overlap and tensions, and increase possible synergies. 
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 With regard to the organizational context of EU-related work, the overriding 
differences found in our study relate to the degree of Europeanization of an 
organization. The more highly Europeanized an organization is, the higher the priority 
accorded to EU-related work, the better EU-related work is for one’s career, and the 
better this work is organizationally facilitated. In a sense, there seems to be a ‘virtuous 
circle’ of Europeanization, whereby greater degrees of Europeanization lead to better 
organizational facilitation which may in turn be expected to strengthen EU-related 
work in the organization again. This conclusion has a theoretical relevance, since it 
pinpoints the key determinant of the way EU-related work is organized. Moreover, it 
has practical implications for efforts to improve the way EU-related work is organized 
and facilitated. Efforts should preferably focus on organizations that are not very 
highly Europeanized, and they should seek ways to overcome the relative lack of 
importance of EU-related work in those organizations. 
 
 
6.5 Improving Dutch Eurocracy: Ideas from the field 
 
In this final section, we articulate a number of concluding observations. Each 
harbours lessons for the design and management of Eurocratic activities in the Dutch 
central government. One important caveat applies. This study was not designed as an 
evaluation of the Dutch performance in the EU. We have consistently avoided making 
normative judgments. As our main research questions reveal, our main aim was to 
observe, describe and understand the nature of Eurocratic work. Nevertheless, the 
insights gained from this study can be used to formulate some tentative policy 
recommendations. What follows then is not the product of a scholarly evaluation but 
of us observing and listening carefully to Eurocratic insiders in numerous corners of 
the Dutch government. It is their voices that have been doing much of the talking 
throughout this study, and it is ideas for improvement picked up from them that we 
now offer for future consideration. 
The basic point of departure in discussing these issues at all must be clear: the 
Dutch government cannot afford to be a mere follower in a Union of 25. Therefore the 
first hurdle to overcome on the road to strengthening the Dutch administration’s 
Eurocratic capacity is the temptation of fatalism. We live in an era of integration 
impasse and widespread Euro scepticism. Hence the nagging question: if the people 
 161
do not care about or actively mistrust the EU, why should departments and agencies 
bother to invest in strengthening their capacity to act on the European stage? The 
answer is self-evident: because whether we like it or not, the EU will continue to exert 
great and probably increasing influence over large segments of public policy. Yet this 
answer may be a lot less obvious to those operating outside the relatively confined 
inner circle of EU cognoscenti than these insiders think. Credible communication and 
professional incentives aimed at underlining importance of effectively engaging with 
and in the EU will continue to be needed, targeted in particular at the great majority of 
national civil servants who spend precious little time at doing just that. 
In an EU of 25, the Netherlands, once a ‘mid-sized’, fairly influential founding 
nation, now has become one of an army of small member states. When it comes to 
votes in council, it has little weight. Hence it must exercise its influence by other 
means. Throughout the research process we encountered Dutch officials who were 
clearly able to punch far above their country’s weight in the European arena. They 
managed to do so by living up to a few simple maxims. 
 
1. Know your business  
Nurture a reputation for professional competence, particularly when operating in 
expert committees. Hence: send only highly qualified, well-briefed people to 
European meetings, and – equally important - keep them in their roles longer than 
other states tend to do. In EU settings where participation in policymaking arenas is 
highly fluid, a ‘government of strangers’ emerges; in such an environment, 
embodying knowledge, experience and memory is a pivotal asset.  
 
2. Be ahead of the game 
Political scientists have agreed for decades that the most important source of power in 
any process derives from the opportunity to determine the subject and terms of the 
debate on the issues. This lesson needs to be transplanted more systematically towards 
departmental EU strategies. Hence: start ‘signalling’ (see chapter 4) Dutch 
perspectives into European arenas (Commission, Parliament) by producing well-
considered policy frames and policy alternatives which these institutions – 
understaffed and overextended as they are – are more often than not likely to take 
seriously if not embrace wholeheartedly.   
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3. Place people where the action is 
Although some departments are quite active in it already, there is considerable scope 
for stepping up the ‘frontloading’ strategy described in chapter 4. Hence: move more 
Dutch civil servants into pivotal positions in those policy domains where Dutch 
strategic interests are judged to be at stake. This does not mean: get a few Dutchmen 
appointed to top positions within the Commission or the Council Secretariat, although 
that helps. It means: get many more Dutchmen seconded to ‘help out’ the 
Commission in the nitty-gritty work of drafting policy proposals since it is there that 
the crucial issue framing and agenda-setting take place. 
 
4. Build coalitions proactively 
The final strategy identified in chapter 4, ‘coalition formation’ was presented there as 
the main avenue for action when Commission proposals are on the table already and 
are moving toward decision. However, in chapter 5 we saw that coalition-building can 
also be done much more proactively. It can, in fact, go hand in hand with a signalling 
approach, for example when operational level ‘coalitions of the willing’ seek to get 
Commission funding for pilot projects. This is the way to go for a small state. It is not 
a panacea, since there will be many instances where it will find itself in a minority 
coalition, or simply outflanked by the ‘big 6’ member states. But that is not the point. 
The point is that not engaging in timely coalition formation is a path with only one 
outcome: lack of influence.   
 
5. Bridge the gap between bureaucrat diplomats and street-level entrepreneurs  
In chapter 5 we noted the difference between these two outlooks and styles of doing 
business in Europe. We also noted that representatives of both approaches inhabit 
different worlds and do not necessarily regard one another as helpful. In a sense, this 
is merely an extension of the long-standing schism and latent tensions between policy 
bureaucrats and implementation agents. The former’s disdain for the allegedly 
pedestrian approach to Eurocratic work, is matched by the latter’s disdain of the 
former’s ‘pussyfooting’ and proceduralism. This is a missed opportunity. No member 
state can afford being caught speaking with different voices in European arenas. In the 
Dutch context, much has been made of this issue as far as the interdepartmental 
coordination of Dutch EU policies is concerned, but what has received far less 
attention is the policy-operational divide, which also needs to be bridged. Policy 
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bureaucrats and EU coordination units within departments should be more proactive 
about bringing and keeping the agents of implementation (executive agencies, non-
profit and even for profit organizations) into the loop of EU strategy-building and 
policy preparation. Reversely, agents of implementation should suppress their 
inclination to ‘go solo’ in Brussels. Some civil servants have taken up this challenge 
by organizing conferences and other types of meetings that bring together different 
types of civil servants working in a given policy area. These initiatives could be used 
in a wider range of areas and on a more regular basis in order to bridge the gap 
between bureaucrat-diplomats and street-level entrepreneurs. The Permanent 
Representation in Brussels – whose expertise and assistance is generally trusted and 
appreciated by actors on both parts of the divide – could be another locus for 
consultation and integration of the two strands.       
 
6. Know what you want to achieve or avoid  
All maxims above more or less presuppose one thing: clear and cogent policy 
preferences. At the level of individual Eurocrats this boils down to securing that they 
have a clear sense of the overall direction of policy in the domain at hand, as well as 
cogent instructions on how to deal with particular issues under a variety of conditions 
(see above). This can only be achieved consistently when there is a forward-looking, 
purposeful system for managing EU policy within the organizations these Eurocrats 
are part of. At present, this is the case in a relatively small number of ‘EU bulwarks.’ 
This number needs to grow, with EU ‘newcomers’ being able to draw upon the 
lessons learnt by these bulwarks. This presupposes an active learning strategy at the 
level of the Dutch government as a whole that is presently lacking. We do not at 
present have a system in place that provides clarity to all departments and agencies as 
to which EU policies are considered of strategic priority to the Dutch state (e.g. which 
policies they should strive to achieve and which they should try to stop, slow down or 
modify). The reality of Dutch EU policymaking which we observed is one of 
improvisation-based policymaking: no strategic frameworks are in place, preferences 
are formed on an ad-hoc basis, often by portfolio experts rather than strategic 
policymakers, or emerge belatedly from tenuous interdepartmental coordination 
processes. 
Time and again, Dutch officials mention the French and English systems as 
being superior to their own in this regard. Invariably, the French and the British are 
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described as having ‘a much more strategic approach than we do’, ‘having their act in 
Brussels together,’ ‘knowing what they want and working systematically to get it,’ 
and so on. These are highly centralized systems, which are often deemed 
inconceivable and undesirable in the Dutch context. Yet many Dutch officials 
compare the French and British performance favourably to what is generally 
perceived as a Dutch ‘muddling through’ approach where every department and 
agency charts its own course in terms of EU strategy and capacity building (which an 
increasing number among them is beginning to take up more purposefully). Yet EU 
policy coordination between them remains relatively reactive, organized as it is 
mainly on an issue by issue basis. 
Although currently the debate on the Dutch interdepartmental coordination 
system for EU affairs seems to have been laid to rest, the tension remains: those 
working in EU settings simply see that other nations do it better, and get better results 
because of it. Hence: even if embracing their models wholeheartedly is out of the 
question, consider which elements of the French and/or British approach to managing 
EU policy can be borrowed and adapted to the Dutch context. To begin with, it should 
become standard practice in all departments for the political and organizational 
leadership to periodically identify a number of EU dossiers in which the department 
seeks to achieve particular results and for which it is willing to give active support to 
those tasked with achieving these results. By making a discussion of EU-related 
issues part of regular and recurring rounds of strategic priority setting, EU-related 
activities may acquire a clearer place on the organizational agenda and the vacuum in 
which some lower-ranking civil servants now feel they operate may be partially filled. 
 
7. Get middle management involved and committed 
Support from the political and administrative leadership of one’s own organization 
was often identified as key to effective participation in European arenas. Lack of such 
was mentioned often as a major handicap. Interestingly, the impression is that in 
many even as yet not very highly Europeanized departments and agencies the top 
management layer has begun taking more interest in and organizing itself for the 
European arena. For example in ‘non-bulwark’ departments such as Education, 
Science & Culture, and Housing, Environment & Physical Planning, the top echelon 
now meets regularly to discuss current and future EU portfolios. 
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 The problems, many Eurocrats observe, are really one level down, at the level 
of directors and other middle management. These people are often bogged down in 
national arenas and outlooks, which provide the more direct and intrusive demands on 
their time and incentives for career development. As a result, many of them take a 
reactive approach to European issues, leaving the Eurocrats in their staff largely to 
their own devices. Whilst some Eurocrats may welcome such a long leash, many of 
them are acutely aware that this also means they are fighting an uphill struggle for 
attention, priority and support from management as and when these are really needed. 
Hence: current top management interest in EU affairs should be made to spill 
over more poignantly towards middle management. This can be done in a number of 
ways. The first method is to have strategic papers and conferences about European 
issues, in order to raise the profile of European issues within the organization. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, EU-related internal accountability practices 
should be beefed up by making achievements in EU-related dossiers an integral part 
of the assessment of middle managers’ performance. If departmental leaders are so 
serious about upgrading Dutch EU policy capacity, they should make clear to the 
middle management layers that (in)competence and (lack of) results in European 
arenas will be rewarded accordingly. Third, and finally, middle managers should be 
encouraged to form networks with counterparts in other EU member states and the 
European Commission. These need not be highly intensive networks, but by meeting 
once in a while middle managers may both become more aware of the European 
dimension of their work and feel more at home in the workings of European 
cooperation processes.   
  
8. Select and motivate people with the right skills for EU-positions 
This study shows that formal training for EU-related work is not seen as an important 
factor by most Dutch Eurocrats. The importance of individual skills is not denied, on 
the contrary: Eurocrats are all too aware that in many EU settings one’s personal 
authority may be more important than the positional authority derived from 
nationality or otherwise. But what they experience is that the skills to acquire such 
authority cannot be acquired in formal training. They depend to a large extent on 
personal characteristics and motivation. Solutions are therefore sought in selecting 
and ‘incentivizing’ people with the right motivation and skill sets rather than 
providing elementary training to everyone in the organization. This is not to say, of 
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course, that training serves no purpose: it remains important for people to acquire 
language and negotiation skills, as well as legal/institutional knowledge about the EU. 
However, from our observations so far it appears that training need not be the main 
priority in HRM-policy. Instead, the focus should be on: identifying and selecting the 
right people from within the organization; building more proactive and reliable 
systems of job rotation for staff seconded to EU and international posts; and 
integrating of EU and international experience more firmly in the departmental and 
national HRM incentive systems. In brief, then, our main recommendation is to invest 
primarily in organizational and managerial support for EU-related work, as well as 
improved career prospects for civil servants working on European matters. This, and 
the greater attention for European issues that goes with it, are considered the most 
important asset in working on EU-related dossiers by Dutch Eurocrats themselves. 
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Appendix I: Questions on Europeanization included in the POMO survey 
 
PART H  IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In your work you may be affected by the European Union (EU). For instance, you may be involved in preparing 
the Dutch input into EU decision-making, you may participate in meetings at the EU-level or bilateral meetings 
with colleagues from other member states, or you may play a role in implementing European legislation and 
policies. In the following, some of these activities are listed. 
 
1. Is your work affected by the European Union? 
 
 Yes 
 No, go to question XXX. 
 
2. Can you indicate the importance of the following activities in your work? 
 
 Totally 
unimportant 
Not very 
important 
Neutral Fairly 
important 
 
Very 
important 
1. Preparation of the Dutch input into EU-level 
meetings 
     
2. Participation in working groups of the Council of 
Ministers  
     
3. Participation in meetings organized by the 
European Commission (e.g. expert meetings, 
     
4. Consultation with colleagues from one or more 
other member states outside the formal EU 
     
5. Transposition of European policies into national 
legal measures 
     
6. Practical application or enforcement of rules and 
policies that originated in the EU 
     
7. Taking into account EU policies during national 
policy making 
     
8. Involving local government in EU-level decision 
making or policy making 
     
 
 
3. On average, how many hours per week do you spend on the EU-related activities listed above? 
 
  hours per week (→ to question XXX if you spend 0 hours per week on EU-related activities). 
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4. The following statements concern the way in which your employer facilitates EU-related activities 
organizationally. This may involve training opportunities, career development, and managerial support. To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
  I do not 
agree at all 
I do not 
agree 
neutral I agree 
 
I totally 
agree 
don’t know / 
not 
applicable 
 
1. My organization offers sufficient training opportunities for 
EU-related activities 
      
 
2. When selecting candidates for EU-related activities, my 
employer takes sufficient account of European experience 
      
 
3. Experience with EU-related activities offers an advantage 
for my career development 
      
 
4. When I participate in EU-level meetings, I receive a clear 
negotiation mandate 
      
 
5. In my organization, EU-related activities have a lower 
priority than purely national activities 
      
 
6. In my policy area, there is sufficient coordination between 
those who negotiate at the EU-level about European 
policies, and those who are responsible for transposing and 
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Appendix II 
 
Interviews on police co-operation 
 
Bruinsma, E. Permanent Representation EU    24 October 2005 
Bus, M.   Ministry of the Interior, co-ordinator international policy 3 October 2005 
Bours, R. Bureau Epic (euregional police co-operation), director 14 March 2006 
Dane, M. Ministry of Justice, International Criminal Law and 
Drugs Policy Department, International Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, Senior advisor    28 November 2005 
Goet, J-K. Ministry of the Interior, director department of Police  15 November 2005 
Grootaarts, E. Police Haaglanden, co-ordinator international policy  10 October 2005 
Fransen, N. Ministry of Justice, Administration of Justice and Law 
Enforcement Policy Instruments Department, 
senior policy advisor     9 October 2006 
Haaren, W. van Police Limburg-Zuid, assistant chief of police  8 November 2005 
Heeres, F.  Police Brabant, chief of police    10 November 2005 
Hellemons, A. National Police Agency, director of EU Affairs Program for  
Transport Police, Director of TISPOL organisation ltd. 4 October 2005 
Olthof, A. Ministry of the Interior, DG Security,  
Department of Strategy, head    10 November 2005 
Oudenhoven, P. Police Academy of the Netherlands, co-ordinator  
international police education     25 October 2005 
Kampen, L. van Europol, former assistant director     17 October 2005 
Kuijl, A. v.d.  Ministry of Justice, Criminal Investigations Policy   24 November 2005 
Department, senior policy advisor    and 9 October 2006 
Reijnders, P. Permanent Representation EU, Embassy Counsellor Brussels 24 October 2005 
Rienen, G. van Ministery of the Interior, DG Security, Department of  
Strategy, senior co-ordinator international co-operation 10 July 2006  
Rutting, T. Police Academy of the Netherlands,  
director International police education   25 October 2005 
Schermers, N. National Intelligence and Security Agency –  
Department of Strategic Planning Co-ordination  27 October 2005  
Schreuder, H. National Police Agency, National Criminal Investigation 20 October 2005 
Spaan, P. Ministry of Justice, International Criminal Law and  
Drugs Policy Department, Head of the Office of International  
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters/deputy director  28 November 2005 
Trip, H.  National Police Agency, head International Police Services 18 October 2005 
Velde, M. v.d. National Intelligence and Security Agency –  
Department of Strategic Planning Co-ordination  27 October 2005  
Ven, M. v.d. Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands,  
Bureau for Euregional Cooperation, senior public prosecutor 8 November 2005 
Winkel, B.  Ministry of Justice, International Criminal Law and  
Drugs Policy Department, Policy advisor   7 November 2005 
Ijzerman, A. Ministry of Justice, director International Criminal Law  7 November 2005  
and Drugs Policy Department    and 6 March 2006 
Zunderd, P. van National Police Agency, chief of police   14 November 2005 
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Interviews on veterinary policy 
 
Akkerman, T. Permanent Representation EU,  
Animal health and human health affairs, animal welfare 6 February 2006 
Arnts, L. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,  
international policy co-ordinator    14 November 2006 
Bergkamp, R. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,   2 June 2006 
director general       
Boonstra, C. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,   20 July 2006 
Department of International Affairs, policy advisor     
Brouw, A. European Commission, DG SANCO,  
Seconded National Expert     29 May 2006 
Dommers, H. Ministry of the Interior, Local & Regional Governance  
and Europe Division, deputy head     19 September 2005 
Esveld, M. National Institute for Public Health and the Environment,  
Centre for Infectious Disease Control, co-ordinator  
International Affairs     3 March 2006 
Gemmeke, E. European Commission DG AGRI,  
Seconded National Expert,     29 May 2006 
Goebbels, J. Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority,  
Director Inspection     23 November 2005 
Jong, H. de Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Head Foreign Agriculture Service, Deputy Director  
International Affairs     26 April 2006 
Kalden, Chr. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Secretary General      23 November 2005 
Leeuw, P. de Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of Food Quality and Veterinary Affairs,  
Chief Veterinary Officer     9 May 2006 
Ottevanger, A. Ministry Health, Welfare and Sports, Nutrition, Health  
Protection and Prevention Department,  
policy co-ordinator health protection   26 September 2005 
Paardekooper, J. Permanent Representation EU,  
animal health and human health affairs, animal welfare 6 February 2006 
Paul, H.  Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of Food Quality and Animal Health, Director 16 March 2006 
Siemelink, L.  Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,  
policy advisor      10 October 2005 
Sprang, A. van Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority,  
directorate of Inspection, senior policy advisor  14 November 2005 
Thissen, F. Royal Netherlands Embassy London, Counsellor for  
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality   3 October 2005  
Valk, F. v.d. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of International Affairs, manager  21 November 2005 
Visscher, L.  Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,  
policy advisor       1 November 2005 
Vrolijk, B. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of International Affairs, senior policy advisor 28 November 2005 
Warmerhoven, K.Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority,    
  directorate of Inspection, senior policy advisor  31 October 2005 
Weijtens, M. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,  
Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,  
senior policy advisor     30 November 2005 
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Observations on police co-operation 
 
Preparatory meeting Council Working Party on Police Co-operation   25 January 2006 
Ministry of the Interior, The Hague      and 1 March 
Meeting Council Working Party on Police Co-operation,  
Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels      26 January 2006 
 
Preparatory Meeting Comité Article 36  
Ministry of Justice, The Hague      1 February 2006 
Meeting Comité Article 36, Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels   2 and 3 February 2006
  
 
Preparatory Meeting Task Force Chiefs of Police,     1 March 2006 
Ministry of the Interior, The Hague 
 
Epic, bureau for euregional police co-operation  Heerlen   14 March 2006 
Police bureau in Kerkrade (cooperation with Germany) and in 
Maastricht (cooperation with Belgium)      10 May 2006 
 
Preparatory meeting Europol Management Board 
Ministry of the Interior, The Hague      10 July 2006 
Meeting Management Board Europol, European Patent Office Rijswijk  12 July 2006 
 
 
 
Observations on veterinary policy 
 
Agricultural Import Forum (information meeting organised by the   24 November 2005 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority; Rotterdam Airport)  
 
Meeting SCoFCAH, Brochette Building Brussels    15 June 2006 
         and 26 June 2006 
Council meeting, Chief Veterinary Officers,  
Justus Lipsius Building Brussels      11 July 2006 
 
Preparatory meeting Comité 133, Ministry of Economic Affairs  20 July 2006 
Meeting Comité 133, Justus Lipsius Building Brussels   24 July 2006 
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Expert meetings, held at the Netherlands School of Public Administration, The Hague 
 
 
1. Monday 25 September 2006 10.00 – 12.00 h. 
Blok, H.  Government Buildings Agency, department Projects, policy co-ordinator 
Koning, E. de Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, DG of environmental 
protection, policy advisor 
Monfils, V. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, department of European funding 
regulation on labour market 
Reiff, J. Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 
Rienen, G. van  Ministry of the Interior, DG Safety, department of strategy, senior co-ordinator 
international co-operation 
 
 
2. Monday 25 September 2006 13.30 -15.30 h. 
Eyk, H. van Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, policy development 
Groot, D. de Ministry of the Interior, Strategy and Innovation department  
Janssens, M. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, DG of environmental 
protection, department of climate change and industry, policy advisor 
Holl, C. Ministry of Finance, department of international financial affairs, senior policy 
advisor 
Remmen, Y. van Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, DG of International 
Affairs, policy advisor 
Vijlbrief, A. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, department of labour affairs 
 
 
3. Tuesday 26 September 2006 10.00 – 12.00 h.  
Arnts, L. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Department of Food Quality and 
Animal Health, international policy co-ordinator 
Billiet, S. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Agentschap SZW 
Kootstra, J. Ministry of the Interior, department on innovation and datapolicy in public affairs, 
senior policy advisor 
Mink, W.   Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, department of 
passenger transport, senior policy advisor 
Ossendorp, R. Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, department of 
Transport and aviation security, senior policy advisor 
Stoop, J. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, department of 
international affairs, legal advisor 
 
 
4. Monday 2 October 2006 13.30 – 15.30 h.  
Dekker, B. Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, DG Water Affairs, 
assistant director international affairs 
Galje, S. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment  
Kohll, N. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, department of legal 
affairs, head international legal affairs 
Mallekoote, M. Ministry of Defence, Dutch army affairs 
 
 
5. Thursday 5 October 2006 10.00 – 12.00 h. 
Akkerman, E. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, head European co-operation 
Brussaard, A. Ministry of Justice, co-ordinator international policy affairs 
Draaisma, A. Ministry of Finance, co-ordinator international policy affairs 
Seriese, A.   Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, co-ordinator international policy affairs 
Versteeg, J. Ministry of General Affairs, co-ordinator international policy affairs 
Weyenberg, S. v. Ministry of Economic Affairs, co-ordinator international policy affairs 
 
 
 
